Talmud - Yevamot 27b יבמות כ״ז ב׳

If two women happened before a single yavam for levirate marriage, and one is a woman who received a bill of divorce and the other is a woman who received levirate betrothal, which has precedence for ḥalitza? Is the woman who received a bill of divorce preferred because he began the process of ḥalitza with her, as presenting a bill of divorce represents the first step separating the woman from him? Or perhaps the woman who received levirate betrothal is preferred, because she is closest to being able to enter into permitted sexual intercourse. The act of levirate betrothal is generally done just prior to levirate marriage and is equivalent to the act of betrothal in non-levirate contexts. As a result, levirate betrothal strengthens the connection between the woman and the yavam. For this reason, it may be preferable to perform ḥalitza with the woman who received levirate betrothal.

Rav Ashi said: Come and hear: The Sages disputed the ruling with regard to a yavam who performed levirate betrothal with one sister-in-law and then performed it with her rival wife as well, or conversely, gave both women a bill of divorce. In such cases, would the second levirate betrothal or bill of divorce be effective? It was taught: And Rabban Gamliel concedes that a bill of divorce is effective after levirate betrothal. Therefore, the bill of divorce that the yavam gave to one yevama after having performed levirate betrothal with the other yevama is effective to some degree. Similarly, Rabban Gamliel concedes that levirate betrothal performed after a bill of divorce is effective.

If the bill of divorce is preferred to levirate betrothal, then levirate betrothal performed afterward should not be effective. The opposite would hold true as well: And if levirate betrothal is preferred, then a bill of divorce given afterward should not be effective. Rather, must one not conclude from this statement that the two are equivalent to each other? The Gemara summarizes: Indeed, conclude from this statement that they are equivalent. Therefore, neither the woman who received a bill of divorce nor the woman who received levirate betrothal has precedence for ḥalitza.

§ Rav Huna said that Rav said: In a case of two sisters who became yevamot, i.e., the two sisters were married to two brothers who died, who happened before one yavam for levirate marriage, if he performed ḥalitza with the first sister, then she is permitted to marry any man. If he performed ḥalitza with the second sister, then she is permitted to do so as well.

If the first sister died before the yavam was able to perform ḥalitza with her, then he is permitted to take the second sister in levirate marriage, for even if he had actually been married to the first sister, one is permitted to marry the sister of his wife after his wife dies. And needless to say, if the second sister died, then he is permitted to take the first sister in levirate marriage because she would be considered a yevama who was permitted at the time that she happened before the yavam for levirate marriage; and then later forbidden as the sister of a woman with whom he has a levirate bond when the second sister happened before him for levirate marriage; and subsequently became permitted by the death of the second sister. Therefore, she can return completely to her original permitted status.

However, Rabbi Yoḥanan said: If the second sister dies, he is permitted to take the first. But if the first sister dies, he is prohibited from taking the second sister. What is the reason for this ruling? The reason is that any yevama to whom the verse “her brother-in-law will have intercourse with her” (Deuteronomy 25:5) cannot be applied at the time that she happens before him for levirate marriage because she was forbidden to him at that moment, is then forever considered to be like the wife of a brother who has children, and she is forbidden to him. Because the second sister was forbidden to the yavam at the time that she happened before him for levirate marriage, being the sister of a woman with whom he had a levirate bond, she can never again be permitted to him.

The Gemara asks: And does Rav not accept that reason? Didn’t Rav himself say the exact same words: Any woman to whom the verse “her brother-in-law will have intercourse with her” cannot be applied at the time that she happens before him for levirate marriage is then considered to be like the wife of a brother who has children, and she is forbidden to him? The Gemara answers: This applies only when the prohibition that stands before her and prevents the levirate marriage is the prohibition against marrying the sister of one’s wife, which is prohibited by Torah law. Therefore, if the woman who happens before the yavam for levirate marriage is his wife’s sister, he is prohibited from performing levirate marriage even if his wife dies afterward. But here the prohibition to marry the sister stems from a relationship created by a levirate bond. This prohibition is by rabbinic law, and therefore the bond does not render her forbidden to him forever.

Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina raised an objection to the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan from the mishna: In the case of four brothers, two of whom were married to two sisters, and those married to the sisters died, then those sisters must perform ḥalitza and may not enter into levirate marriage. And why does the mishna require ḥalitza? Let one of the brothers rise and perform ḥalitza with the second sister, i.e., the sister whose husband died later. As a result, the first would be like a yevama who was permitted at the time of her husband’s death but later became forbidden due to the bond that was created with her sister, and she then subsequently became permitted by means of ḥalitza performed with her sister, insofar as the other brother, i.e., he who did not perform ḥalitza, is concerned. Therefore, she should return to her original permitted status.

Rabbi Yoḥanan said to him: I do not know who taught: Sisters. Rabbi Yoḥanan was in doubt as to the correct version of this mishna, as he could not find any reasonable explanation of this mishna according to any known opinion. The Gemara asks: Why did Rabbi Yoḥanan respond in such an extreme manner. Let him say to him, to Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina, an alternate solution: What is the meaning of the ruling that the sisters perform ḥalitza, which the mishna teaches? The meaning is that one sister performs ḥalitza. The Gemara answers: Such a solution is untenable, as the mishna teaches the ruling using the words: Perform ḥalitza, in the plural.

The Gemara suggests: And let Rabbi Yoḥanan say to him: What is the meaning of the ruling to perform ḥalitza? They perform ḥalitza in general. Accordingly, the mishna teaches that in such cases the second woman performs ḥalitza. The Gemara responds: The mishna teaches: Then those women perform ḥalitza. The emphasis on the word: Those, indicates that it is specifically those two women who both perform ḥalitza. The Gemara asks further: And let him say that the mishna is referring only to the specific case where the yavam performed ḥalitza with the first sister first. As a result, there was no longer any possibility of rendering the second sister permitted, as Rabbi Yoḥanan permitted levirate marriage only in the case where ḥalitza was performed with the second sister first. The Gemara answers: This cannot be suggested either, for the phrase: Perform ḥalitza,

Traduction : The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren Noé Talmud, with commentary by Rabbi Adin Even-Israel Steinsaltz.

Yevamot 27b explores which co-wife takes precedence for ḥalitza when one received a divorce document and the other levirate betrothal.