Talmud - Yevamot 97a יבמות צ״ז א׳

that they will say a matter of halakha in my name in this world when I have passed on to another world. As Rabbi Yoḥanan said in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai: With regard to any Torah scholar in whose name a matter of halakha is said in this world, his lips mouth the words in the grave, as though he is talking. Rabbi Yitzḥak ben Ze’eira said, and some say this was stated by Shimon the Nazirite: What is the verse from which it is derived? “And the roof of your mouth is like the best wine that glides down smoothly for my beloved, moving gently the lips of those who are asleep” (Song of Songs 7:10).

He explains: This is like a pile [komer] of grapes left to warm before they are pressed: Just as in the case of a pile of grapes, when a person places his finger on it, immediately it moves, as the wine bursts through and the whole pile shakes, so too with Torah scholars: When a teaching is said in their name in this world their lips mouth the words in the grave. For this reason Rabbi Yoḥanan wanted his Torah statements to be attributed to him, so that he would earn eternal life.

§ The Gemara addresses the statement of the mishna that this is the halakha both for a boy who is nine years and one day old as well as a twenty-year old who has not developed two pubic hairs. In both cases, their sexual relations are not considered proper intercourse with regard to levirate marriage. And the Gemara raises a contradiction against this from the following source: With regard to a man twenty years old who has not developed two pubic hairs, they must bring proof that he is twenty years old, and he is established as a eunuch, who may neither perform ḥalitza nor perform levirate marriage.

Likewise, in the case of a woman who is twenty years old and has not developed two pubic hairs, they must bring proof that she is twenty years old, and that she is a sexually underdeveloped woman, who may neither perform ḥalitza nor enter into levirate marriage. This shows that the status of a nine-year-old male and a twenty-year old man without pubic hairs are not the same, as the intercourse of a nine-year-old is considered of some significance, whereas that of a eunuch is entirely disregarded, as he may not even perform ḥalitza.

The Gemara answers: Wasn’t it stated with regard to this baraita that Rav Shmuel bar Yitzḥak said that Rav said: And this halakha applies only if he developed other signs of a eunuch by the age of twenty. The mishna, by contrast, is referring to one who merely showed the signs of maturity at a late age. Rava said: The language of the baraita is also precise, as it teaches: And he is the eunuch. One can learn from here that this is referring to one who is definitely a eunuch.

The Gemara asks a question with regard to the halakha itself: And in a case where he does not develop the signs of a eunuch, until what age is he considered a minor? The school of Rabbi Ḥiyya taught: Until most of his years have passed, i.e., until he reaches the age of thirty-five, i.e., halfway to seventy, the standard length of a man’s life.

On the same issue, the Gemara relates: When they would come before Rava to inquire about someone who had reached the age of maturity but had not yet developed the physical signs, if the person in question was thin, he would say to them: Go and fatten him up before we decide on his status. And if he was fat, he would say to them: Go and make him thin. As these signs, the pubic hairs of maturity, sometimes they fall off due to thinness and sometimes they fall off due to fatness. It is therefore possible that after his bodily shape is adjusted he will develop the signs of maturity and will not have the status of a eunuch.

MISHNA: One may marry a relative, e.g., the sister or the mother, of the woman he raped and of the woman he seduced. However, one who rapes and one who seduces a relative of the woman who is married to him is liable to receive capital punishment or karet for engaging in prohibited sexual intercourse, depending on the particular family relationship. A man may marry a woman raped by his father, or a woman seduced by his father, or a woman raped by his son, or a woman seduced by his son. Rabbi Yehuda prohibits marriage in the case of a woman raped by his father or a woman seduced by his father.

GEMARA: We learned in the mishna that which the Sages teach in a baraita: If a man raped a woman, he is permitted to marry her daughter. If he married a woman, it is prohibited for him to marry her daughter. However, the Gemara raises a contradiction from another baraita: One who is alleged to have engaged in intercourse with a particular woman is prohibited from marriage with her mother, and with her daughter, and with her sister. Apparently, as a consequence of non-marital intercourse, there is a prohibition against the man marrying the woman’s relatives. The Gemara answers: This is merely prohibited by rabbinic decree, lest the man continue to engage in intercourse with this particular woman after marrying one of her relatives, thereby transgressing a Torah prohibition.

The Gemara asks: And anywhere that there is a rabbinic prohibition, does the mishna teach that one may marry the woman ab initio? Since the marriage is prohibited by rabbinic decree, the mishna should have taught that if he marries her, he is exempt from punishment. The Gemara answers: When we learned in the mishna that he may marry her ab initio, it was dealing with their marriage after the death of the woman that he raped or seduced. The rabbinic prohibition does not relate to this case, as concern with regard to forbidden relatives is not relevant there.

The Gemara asks: With regard to the mishna’s ruling, from where are these matters derived? It is as the Sages taught: With regard to all other prohibited sexual relations, lying is stated, whereas here, with regard to a man’s intercourse with his wife’s relatives, taking is stated. This is to tell you that the Torah prohibited intercourse with these relatives only through taking, i.e., the man’s acquisition of his wife through marriage. It did not prohibit intercourse with the relative of a woman with whom he engaged in nonmarital relations.

Rav Pappa said to Abaye: However, if that interpretation is so, then with regard to intercourse with one’s sister, concerning whom it is written: “And if a man takes his sister, his father’s daughter, or his mother’s daughter” (Leviticus 20:17), you must also say that is it is only intercourse through taking, i.e., marriage, that is prohibited. But intercourse through lying, i.e., without marriage, is permitted. How can this be?

Abaye said to Rav Pappa: When the term taking is stated in the Torah without specification, it is interpreted in accordance with the context. With regard to the context of a relationship that has potential for taking through marriage, this verb is interpreted as taking through marriage. In the context of a relationship that has potential only for lying, as their marriage would be invalid, taking the woman is understood to mean lying with her.

Rava said: The halakha that if a man raped a woman it is permitted for him to marry her daughter is derived from here. It is stated: “The nakedness of your son’s daughter, or of your daughter’s daughter, even their nakedness…you may not uncover” (Leviticus 18:10). It may be inferred from here that the daughter of the woman’s own son from a different relationship, and the daughter of her own daughter, may be uncovered, i.e., intercourse with them is not prohibited.

And it is also written: “You may not uncover the nakedness of a woman and her daughter; you may not take her son’s daughter, or her daughter’s daughter, to uncover her nakedness; they are near kinswomen, it is lewdness” (Leviticus 18:17). How so? How can the two verses be reconciled? Evidently, the former verse is stated with regard to rape. A man may marry the daughter or granddaughter of the woman he raped, provided they are not his own offspring. The latter verse is stated with regard to marriage. Marrying the relatives of one’s wife is prohibited.

The Gemara asks: Perhaps I should reverse the resolution of the contradiction between the verses and state that the daughter or granddaughter of his rape victim is forbidden, whereas the relatives of his wife are permitted. The Gemara answers: With regard to those with whom intercourse is forbidden, the concept of kinship is stated (see Leviticus 18:13, 17). In marriage there is kinship, whereas in the case of rape there is no kinship. Therefore, the prohibition against intercourse with a woman and her daughter or granddaughter is clearly referring to the daughter and granddaughter of one’s wife and not of the woman he raped.

§ It is taught in the mishna that Rabbi Yehuda prohibits marrying a woman raped by his father or a woman seduced by his father. Rav Giddel said that Rav said: What is the reasoning for the ruling of Rabbi Yehuda? It is as it is written: “A man may not take his father’s wife, and may not uncover his father’s skirt” (Deuteronomy 23:1), meaning that one may not uncover the skirt that his father has seen.

And from where is it apparent that this verse is written with regard to a woman raped by his father and not with regard to his father’s wife? It is as it is written just before that verse, with regard to rape: “And the man who lay with her shall give the young woman’s father fifty shekels of silver” (Deuteronomy 22:29).

And how do the Rabbis, who disagree with Rabbi Yehuda, respond to this proof? If the prohibition stated had been juxtaposed with the verse dealing with rape, it would be as you said. However, now that it is not juxtaposed with it, as there is another prohibition in between, namely “a man may not take his father’s wife” (Deuteronomy 23:1), the prohibition of “he may not uncover his father’s skirt” is necessary to teach that which Rav Anan taught, as Rav Anan said that Shmuel said: The verse is speaking of a widow waiting for her brother-in-law, who is this man’s father, to perform levirate marriage. And what is the meaning of the phrase “his father’s skirt”? The skirt that is potentially his father’s, he may not uncover.

The Gemara questions this interpretation: Why does the Torah need to explicitly prohibit intercourse with the yevama of one’s father? Derive that intercourse is prohibited due to the fact that she is his aunt, as she is his father’s brother’s widow. The Gemara answers: The Torah purposely rendered this act a more serious offense. By specifying that it is prohibited for one to engage in sexual relations with his father’s yevama, one who engaged in intercourse with her has violated two prohibitions. The Torah specifically prohibited his father’s yevama in order to have one who engages in relations with her violate two prohibitions, the prohibition proscribing relations with his aunt and the prohibition proscribing relations with his father’s yevama, thereby rendering it a more serious offense.

The Gemara asks: But why not derive that one violates two prohibitions because there is also a prohibition against a yevama engaging in intercourse with a member of the public, i.e., someone other than her yavam. The Gemara answers: The Torah prohibited one’s father’s yevama so that one who engaged in intercourse with her will have violated three prohibitions: Intercourse with one’s aunt, with one’s yevama, and with one’s father’s yevama. And if you wish, say instead that the verse that prohibits his father’s yevama is referring to the period after the death of his father, who has no additional brothers, so there is no prohibition against the yevama engaging in intercourse with a member of the public.

Traduction : The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren Noé Talmud, with commentary by Rabbi Adin Even-Israel Steinsaltz.

Yevamot 97a explores how citing a sage’s teachings honors him after death, then examines age and physical development criteria disqualifying levirate marriage or ḥalitza.