Talmud - Yevamot 31b יבמות ל״א ב׳

let the land remain in the possession of Bar Shatya. Since no substantiated proof was brought forth, the land remains in the hands of its current possessor. As such, the same should be true with regard to cases of betrothal and divorce whose status is uncertain; the woman should remain in her former presumptive status.

Rather, Rabba’s understanding of the mishna must be rejected, and Abaye said: The mishna should be understood according to that which is written: “His fellow speaks of him” (Job 36:33). This principle teaches that a related case can be inferred from the single case cited. The mishna teaches the case where it is uncertain whether the item is closer to him or closer to her with regard to betrothal, and the same is true with regard to divorce if it is uncertain whether the bill of divorce fell closer to him or closer to her. Similarly, the mishna teaches the case of bills that were written in a questionable manner with regard to divorce, and the same is true with regard to betrothal.

Rava said to him: If you understand that the legal ruling in all of these cases is the same, and the mishna was written in the style of: His fellow speaks of him, then what is the meaning of the term: This is, that the mishna teaches? The mishna in fact emphasizes that this is a betrothal whose status is uncertain and this is a divorce whose status is uncertain, which indicates this case alone and no other.

Rather, Rava said: All of the cases that exist with regard to betrothal whose status is uncertain exist in cases of divorce as well. However, there are some cases of uncertainty with regard to divorce that do not exist with regard to betrothal, as betrothal performed with a questionable bill is not disqualified. Accordingly, the term: This is, utilized in the mishna with regard to divorce, is not specific and does not imply exclusion of the case where it is possibly closer to him and possibly closer to her. Rather, because the mishna teaches the ruling of: This is, with regard to betrothal, where it is specific it teaches the phrase: This is, with regard to divorce as well. The Gemara asks: And what does the phrase: This is, mentioned with regard to betrothal, come to exclude? The Gemara answers: It comes to exclude the matter of the date, which is not essential with regard to betrothal, as when one betroths a woman by means of a document the date need not be written.

The Gemara asks about this matter itself: And for what reason did they not institute that the date must be included in the betrothal document? This policy works out well according to the one who says that the reason the Sages instituted that the date must be written on a bill of divorce is due to the profits. As the husband receives the profits from the wife’s properties during the period of their marriage, it was necessary to write a date on the bill of divorce in order to know at what point his right to receive or sell these items was terminated. However, it was not necessary to include a date on a deed of betrothal, as this document serves only to create a bond of betrothal, and there are no profits from a betrothed woman. A husband does not have the right to receive profits from his betrothed’s property until she is his full-fledged wife.

However, according to the one who says that the Sages instituted the requirement of including the date in the bill of divorce due to a case where a man is married to the daughter of his sister, then they should institute that he must include the date in a deed of betrothal as well. Occasionally a man might marry the daughter of his sister, whom he loves all the more because she is his close relative in addition to being his wife. If he knows that she acted licentiously while she was married to him, he might grant her a bill of divorce without a date so as to save her from the death penalty. Were witnesses to come forth and testify to her behavior, she could claim that at the time of her licentious act she was already a divorced woman. If this was indeed the reason for the Sages’ instituting the requirement of including the date in a bill of divorce, then the date should be included in a deed of betrothal as well, for an undated document of betrothal could be utilized equally well to prove the innocence of the daughter of his sister. If she acted licentiously in the period prior to her betrothal, she would not be penalized. Therefore, the date should be written on this document as well.

The Gemara answers: Because there are those who betroth by means of money and those who betroth by means of a deed, the Sages did not institute that the date must be written in the document. As the date of the betrothal has no place in the act of betrothal by means of money, the Sages did not distinguish between the various modes of betrothal.

Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Yosef, said to Rav Ashi: But with regard to a slave, where there are those who acquire them with money and there are those who acquire them with a deed, the Sages nevertheless instituted that the date must be written in a slave’s deed of purchase. He responded: There, with regard to slaves, the majority of people purchase them by means of a deed. Here, with regard to betrothal, the majority of people perform betrothal by means of money.

If you wish, say a different reason why the Sages did not institute that the date must be included in a deed of betrothal. This is due to the fact that it is not possible to institute this in a manner that will ensure that no problems will result. How would we do this? If we leave the deed of betrothal with her, she will erase the date, and so it would remain impossible to prove the juncture at which her licentious behavior took place. If we leave the deed with him, then there are times when she is his sister’s daughter and he might cover for her by erasing the date himself.

If we leave it with the witnesses who signed the document, if they remember themselves the date when the deed was given to the woman, the date need not be written in the document itself, for let them come forth and testify from their memory. And if they do not remember by themselves, then there are times when they see the date that is written and come forth to testify on that basis. And the Merciful One states: “By the mouth of two witnesses, or at the mouth of three witnesses, shall a matter be established” (Deuteronomy 19:15). From this verse it is derived: From their mouths, and not from their writings, indicating that testimony is proper only if the individual stated it of himself, and not on the basis of what is written.

The Gemara asks: If that is so, let us say that with regard to divorce as well. In cases of divorce there should also be a concern lest the woman erase the date on the bill of divorce in her possession. The Gemara responds: There, in the case of a bill of divorce, the date comes to save her, since the bill of divorce removes her status as a man’s wife. She therefore would fear erasing anything lest she disqualify the bill altogether, thereby possibly rendering herself a married woman again (Ramban). Here, however, when dealing with a deed of betrothal, the date comes to her disadvantage, since until now she was presumed to be a single woman, and if there is no date on the document then she clearly cannot be punished.

MISHNA: In the case of three brothers who were married to three unrelated women, and one of the brothers died, the following occurred: The second brother performed levirate betrothal with the wife of the deceased brother and before he was able to consummate the levirate marriage he died as well, leaving behind two women who happen before the third brother for levirate marriage. Then those two women must perform ḥalitza and may not enter into levirate marriage.

As it is stated: “If brothers dwell together and one of them dies and he has no child, the wife of the dead man shall not be married outside of the family to one not of his kin; her brother-in-law will have intercourse with her” (Deuteronomy 25:5). This teaches that a woman eligible for levirate marriage is one who has one levirate relationship and not one who has a double levirate relationship. In this case, the wife of the first deceased brother requires levirate marriage due to both the marriage with her first husband as well as the levirate betrothal with the second brother. Rabbi Shimon says: He may consummate the levirate marriage with whichever woman he wishes and then perform ḥalitza with the second.

GEMARA: The Gemara asks: If the halakha that a woman who has a double levirate relationship is exempt from levirate marriage is by Torah law, as indicated by the proof offered in the mishna, she should not require ḥalitza as well, but be completely exempt. Rather, it is by rabbinic law. The restriction on levirate marriage in this case is not by Torah law, as by Torah law the brother is allowed to consummate the levirate marriage with both of these women since each was the wife of a different brother. The requirement for ḥalitza in this case was instituted as a rabbinic decree lest people say that two yevamot who come from a single household can enter into levirate marriage. Since the second brother had performed levirate betrothal, people might come to think that both were actually married to him. If the third brother consummates the levirate marriage with both women, it would lead people to think that it is permitted to take two of a brother’s wives in levirate marriage, when in fact the Torah allows the yavam to marry only a single wife of the deceased.

The Gemara asks: So let him consummate the levirate marriage with one woman and perform ḥalitza with the other one, and this would eliminate our concern. The Gemara responds: We do not do this due to a rabbinic decree lest they say: When there are two women from a single household, part of it must be built

Traduction : The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren Noé Talmud, with commentary by Rabbi Adin Even-Israel Steinsaltz.

Yevamot 31b examines uncertain betrothal and divorce cases, comparing legal presumption over disputed land with rabbinic debate on ambiguous documents.