Talmud - Yevamot 103a יבמות ק״ג א׳

whether the yavam is standing or sitting or leaning; and a woman who performs ḥalitza on a blind yavam; in all of these cases her ḥalitza is valid. But if she performs ḥalitza when he is wearing a shoe that is so torn that it does not cover most of the foot; or using a broken sandal that does not hold most of the foot; or using a hand blanket that the amputee wears on his hands, similar to a leather shoe, in order to drag himself using them; or using a soft shoe [anpileya] made of cloth; or a woman who performs halitza with a yavam who is a minor; in all these cases her ḥalitza is disqualified.

The Gemara comments: Who is the tanna who holds that an amputee’s prosthetic is considered a shoe? It is Rabbi Meir, as we learned in a mishna (Shabbat 65b): One with an amputated leg may go out on Shabbat with his wooden leg, as it has the legal status of a shoe; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. He reasons that the prosthesis functions like the shoe of any other person, indicating that Rabbi Meir is not especially concerned about the material from which the shoe is made. And Rabbi Yosei, on the other hand, prohibits the amputee from going out on Shabbat with his wooden leg, as he does not consider it a shoe that is being worn, but rather a wooden object that is being carried.

The Gemara asks how Rabbi Meir can be the tanna of the baraita, as the continuation of the baraita states ḥalitza is disqualified if performed with an anpileya made of cloth, as this cloth shoe is not to be considered a shoe. If so, have we come to the opinion of the Rabbis, who rule in accordance with Rabbi Yosei, and render it prohibited to use any shoes for ḥalitza that are not made of leather?

In an attempt to resolve the contradiction Abaye said: Since the latter clause of the baraita is in accordance with the Rabbis, who rule like Rabbi Yosei, the first clause is also in accordance with the Rabbis. And therefore the first clause, which permits the amputee’s prosthesis, is referring to a prosthetic foot covered in leather, as it constitutes a shoe due to its leather exterior.

Rava said to him: But according to your explanation, if the prosthesis is not covered in leather, what would its status be? It would be unfit. If so, rather than teaching in the latter clause: Anpileya made of cloth is invalid for ḥalitza, let it distinguish within the matter itself and say: In what case is this statement that a wooden prosthesis is fit said? It is in the case of a prosthetic leg covered in leather, but if it is not covered in leather, it is unfit.

Rather, the fact that the baraita was not taught in that manner indicates that Abaye’s explanation is incorrect. Therefore, Rava said that the contradiction should be reconciled in another way: Since the first clause of the baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, that the shoes need not be made of leather, the latter clause is also taught in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, and the distinction between a wooden prosthetic and an anpileya of cloth is: This prosthesis protects the foot, and that soft shoe does not protect the foot, as it does not have a hard sole. Rabbi Meir does not require that the shoe be of leather, but he does require that it be protective footwear.

With regard to the statement in the baraita that indicates that ḥalitza may be performed even if the yavam is not standing, Ameimar said: The one who performs ḥalitza by having his yevama remove his shoe must press his foot to the ground, and while in this position the yevama will remove his shoe.

Rav Ashi said to Ameimar: But isn’t it taught in the baraita above: She may perform ḥalitza whether he was standing or sitting or leaning? One who is leaning cannot easily press his foot into the ground. He answered him: Say that the man may perform ḥalitza while in any of these positions, but that actually this is true only if he presses his foot to the ground, which is admittedly more difficult to do while leaning.

And Ameimar also said about this issue: Someone who walks on the backs of his feet, meaning he is clubfooted and his foot is twisted upside down, cannot perform ḥalitza. Rav Ashi said to Ameimar: But isn’t it taught in a baraita: Leg supports can be used for ḥalitza. Does this not mean that this lame individual performs ḥalitza using these supports on his knees? This would indicate that even one with twisted feet can perform ḥalitza. The Gemara answers: No, the intention is that if he gave these supports to another whose foot is shaped normally and he wore them while performing ḥalitza, it is valid. That other one is allowed to perform ḥalitza while wearing these supports because they are also considered shoes, but one whose foot is misshapen may not perform ḥalitza with them, as it functions for him as a foot, not a shoe.

Rav Ashi said: According to what Ameimar said, bar Uva cannot perform ḥalitza and bar Kipof cannot perform ḥalitza, as these two, who were famous eulogizers in Rav Ashi’s generation, had feet that became so crooked that they were unable to walk normally.

It was taught in the mishna that if one’s leg was amputated from the knee down and his yevama performed ḥalitza with him, the ḥalitza is valid. The Gemara raises a contradiction from a baraita that comments on the pilgrimage one makes to Jerusalem during a Festival. The Torah states: “Three Festivals [regalim] you shall celebrate for Me in the year” (Exodus 23:14). The baraita comments on the verse: Festivals are referred to in the verse as regalim, which literally means feet, indicating that one must actually make the pilgrimage to Jerusalem by foot [regel] during the Festival, which comes to exclude people who have prostheses. This indicates that a prosthetic foot is not called a regel, which seems to contradict the mishna that allows ḥalitza on a prosthetic from the knee down.

The Gemara answers: It is different here, with respect to ḥalitza, as it is written: “She removes the shoe from on his foot [me’al raglo]” (Deuteronomy 25:9), which indicates that not only can his actual foot be used for performing ḥalitza, but also the part above it, i.e., the calf. The Gemara objects: If that is so, that one may use a part of his leg above his foot to perform ḥalitza, then if one’s leg was amputated from above the knee, he should also be eligible for ḥalitza; and yet, the same mishna taught that only one with a leg amputated from below the knee is eligible for ḥalitza. The Gemara answers that the verse states: “From on his foot,” meaning above his foot, but not: From on that which is on his foot; the wording indicates that it can be above his foot until the knee, but not any further above that.

Rav Pappa said: Learn from here that the heel bone [istavira] reaches to the ground where it connects to the foot, for if it enters your mind to say that it is separate and divided, and there is another bone in between, then that ankle bone is “from on the foot” and the calf would be prohibited for ḥalitza, as it would be considered: From on that which is on his foot. Rav Ashi said: Even if you say that it is separate and divided from the calf, because anything that is connected with the sole of the foot is considered like the foot, then the ankle is certainly part of the foot, making the calf the area that is “from on the foot.”

It was taught in the mishna that if one’s legs were amputated from the knee and above, the ḥalitza is invalid. This implies that the regel includes the calf but not the thigh. Rav Kahana raised an objection from the verse: “And against her afterbirth that emerges from between her legs [ragleha]” (Deuteronomy 28:57), implying that regel includes even the thighs. Abaye said: The verse actually means between her feet, as when a woman crouches to give birth, she pushes her heels into her thighs and she gives birth, so it appears as if the fetus emerges from between her feet.

The Gemara continues its challenge. Come and hear another verse: “He had neither dressed his feet [raglav], nor trimmed his beard” (II Samuel 19:25). The phrase “dressed his feet [raglav]” is referring to treating his pubic hair, implying that even the area around the thigh is referred to as regel. The Gemara answers: This is a euphemism. The Gemara attempts another challenge: Come and hear from another verse: “And Saul went in to cover his feet [raglav]” (I Samuel 24:3), meaning: To urinate, implying that regel refers even to the thighs. The Gemara answers: This is also a euphemism.

Come and hear the meaning of: His feet, from the following verse regarding the Moabite king, Eglon, which states: “Surely he is covering his feet [raglav] in the cabinet of the cool chamber” (Judges 3:24). The Gemara answers: This is a euphemism. The Gemara attempts another proof from a verse regarding Sisera’s encounter with Yael: “At her feet [ragleha] he sunk, he fell” (Judges 5:27), which indicates that they had sexual intercourse, and implies that regel includes the thigh. The Gemara answers: This is also a euphemism.

The Gemara elaborates on what happened when Sisera was in Yael’s tent. Rabbi Yoḥanan said: That wicked man, Sisera, had sexual intercourse with Yael seven times that day, as it is stated: “At her feet he sunk, he fell, he lay; at her feet he sunk, he fell; where he sunk, there he fell down dead” (Judges 5:27). Each instance of the terms “sunk,” “fell,” or “lay” in the verse indicates an act of intercourse, as Yael sought to tire and weaken Sisera to enable her to kill him. The Gemara asks: But how could Yael do this even for the noble purpose of killing the wicked Sisera, as she derived pleasure from the transgression of licentious sexual relations with a gentile? Rabbi Yoḥanan said in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai: Every act that is a benefit for the wicked

Traduction : The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren Noé Talmud, with commentary by Rabbi Adin Even-Israel Steinsaltz.

Yevamot 103a explores valid and invalid halitza procedures, debating whether a prosthetic leg or cloth shoe qualifies as proper footwear.