Talmud - Yevamot 106a יבמות ק״ו א׳

§ The Sages taught: A mistaken ḥalitza is valid. The Gemara asks: What constitutes a mistaken ḥalitza? Reish Lakish said: Any case in which they say to a yavam who is not well versed in halakha: Let her remove your shoe, and in doing so you will take her in marriage, i.e., the yavam understands that by allowing ḥalitza he will actually be marrying her. Although he actually intended to marry her, having allowed her to remove his shoe validates the ḥalitza. Subsequently it is prohibited for the woman to marry him, and she is permitted to others.

Rabbi Yoḥanan said to him: I teach that whether in a case where he had intended to perform valid ḥalitza and she did not intend, or whether she had intended and he did not intend, the ḥalitza is invalid, unless they both intend together as one to perform a proper ḥalitza that would permit her to marry others. And yet you say that in that case when he doesn’t have any intention of permitting her to others, and actually intends to marry her through the act of ḥalitza, her ḥalitza is valid?

Rather, a mistaken ḥalitza that is valid refers to any case in which they say to him: Let her perform ḥalitza on you, with the intention of releasing her bond, on the condition that she will give you two hundred dinars afterward, and even if she does not give him the money the ḥalitza is valid, as the stipulated condition is not binding. This idea of Rabbi Yoḥanan is also taught in a baraita, which states: A mistaken ḥalitza is valid. What constitutes a mistaken ḥalitza? Any case in which they say: Let her perform ḥalitza on you on condition that she will give you two hundred dinars.

And an incident occurred involving a certain woman, who happened before her yavam for levirate marriage, yet he was not suitable for her, and they, the judges, said to him: Let her perform ḥalitza on the condition that she will give you two hundred dinars. Afterward, when she did not pay, the incident came before Rabbi Ḥiyya and he validated that ḥalitza.

One man came before Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba with his yevama in order to have the court convince her to perform a levirate marriage. Rabbi Ḥiyya said to her: My daughter, stand up, for we are beginning to discuss your case now, and the participants must stand. She said to him: Say that her sitting, referring to her desire to remain seated as an act of refusal of even contemplating the possibility of performing levirate marriage, is therefore tantamount to her standing, as levirate marriage is not an option for her. In other words, the option that will enable her to remain standing proud in the future is not to enter into levirate marriage with this man. Rabbi Ḥiyya said to her: Are you acquainted with this yavam and do you know him well enough to know why he wants to perform levirate marriage with you although you are not interested? She said to him: Yes, it is money that he saw in her, a euphemism for herself, and he wants to consume it by taking it from her, and therefore he wishes to enter levirate marriage.

Rabbi Ḥiyya said to her: Is he not amenable to you? She said to him: No, I am certain he is not good for me. Rabbi Ḥiyya accepted her wish, but knowing that the yavam was adamant in his desire to marry her, he said to the yavam: Let her remove your shoe, and in doing so you will take her in marriage, for he wanted to mislead him into allowing ḥalitza, which would disqualify a subsequent levirate marriage between them. After he allowed her to perform ḥalitza, Rabbi Ḥiyya said to the yavam: Now, she is disqualified for you forever, since you allowed her to perform ḥalitza. Although you thought it was an act of marriage, she is no longer permitted to marry you, so you have nothing to lose if you permit her to marry others. Therefore, allow her to perform valid proper ḥalitza, so she will be permitted to others. By performing a second ḥalitza, even Rabbi Yoḥanan, who disqualified this form of a mistaken ḥalitza, would have no problem permitting her to remarry based on the second ḥalitza.

It is told: The daughter of Rav Pappa’s father-in-law, i.e., his sister-in-law, happened before her yavam for levirate marriage, yet he was not suitable for her, although he wished to perform levirate marriage. The case came before Abaye. Abaye said to the yavam: Let her remove your shoe, and in doing so you will take her in marriage. Rav Pappa said to him: Does the Master, i.e., do you, not accept what Rabbi Yoḥanan said, that this type of ḥalitza does not work at all? Abaye said to him: But what shall I say to him?

He said to Abaye that he should say to him as Rabbi Yoḥanan himself suggested: Let her perform ḥalitza on the condition that she will give you two hundred dinars. Convince him to allow ḥalitza on the basis that he will profit financially from it. Abaye told the yavam to do so and he did. After he let her perform ḥalitza, Abaye said to Rav Pappa’s sister-in-law: Go give him the money, for you have agreed to give him two hundred dinars. Rav Pappa said to Abaye on her behalf that a case of: I was fooling you, was what she did to him. She never seriously intended to give him the money when accepting his stipulated condition, and even though the ḥalitza is valid one cannot force her to pay.

Isn’t it taught in a baraita: One who was running away from prison and came upon a ferry. He said to the ferry man: Take a dinar, i.e., he offered to pay an amount much larger than the standard fee, and take me across the river. Despite the escapee’s commitment, it is ruled in the baraita that the ferryman receives nothing other than his usual rate, as the escapee is legally exempt from paying the higher amount he had agreed to pay.

Apparently, one could have said in such a case: I was deceiving you and never really intended to live up to my side of the agreement, and therefore it is not an actual debt. Here too, she may say to him: I was fooling you, and she is therefore exempt from paying the two hundred dinars. Abaye heard this and agreed.

Abaye was amazed at Rav Pappa’s sharpness, as he was a young man at the time of this incident. Therefore, he said to Rav Pappa: Where is your father? He said to him: He is in the city. Where is your mother? He said: In the city. Abaye, who was orphaned in his youth, felt that a large part of Rav Pappa’s success came because his parents lived in close proximity to him and provided for all his needs, freeing him from any need to get involved in business affairs and enabling him to immerse himself in Torah without distractions. Abaye felt a twinge of jealousy and set his gaze upon them, Rav Pappa’s parents, in the pain that he did not have similarly supportive parents, and both Rav Pappa’s father and mother died.

§ The Sages taught: A mistaken ḥalitza is valid, while a mistaken bill of divorce is invalid. A coerced ḥalitza is invalid, while a coerced bill of divorce is valid. The Gemara clarifies: What are the circumstances of a coerced bill of divorce? If they force him until he says: I want to give the bill of divorce, then even this type of ḥalitza also should be valid, as although he was initially coerced, he acquiesced. And if he did not say by the end of the giving of the bill of divorce: I want to divorce her, then even this type of coerced bill of divorce should also not be acceptable.

The Gemara answers that this is what the Sage said: A mistaken ḥalitza is always valid, while a mistaken bill of divorce is always invalid. A coerced ḥalitza and a coerced bill of divorce are sometimes valid and sometimes invalid. How so? With regard to the one who says after being coerced: I want to give the bill of divorce, it is effective, although he says this as a result of being under compulsion. With regard to the one who does not say: I want to give the bill of divorce, the divorce is invalid.

As it is taught in a baraita: It is said with regard to some offerings: “He shall offer it” (Leviticus 1:3). This teaches that they may coerce him to bring the offering he owes. I might have thought this means that he brings the offering totally against his will. Therefore, the continuation of that verse states: “In accordance with his will” (Leviticus 1:3). How can these two contradictory expositions be reconciled? They coerce him by imposing fines or penalties until he says: I want to. And similarly, you find the same principle with respect to bills of divorce for women, as it is prohibited for anyone other than the husband to write the bill of divorce, but they coerce him until he says: I want to divorce her, and then write the bill of divorce on his behalf.

§ Rava said that Rav Seḥora said that Rav Huna said: Judges can allow a man and woman to conduct ḥalitza even if the judges do not recognize the participants. In other words, even if they do not have complete testimony before them that proves that these two people are a yavam and a yevama, if two people wish to perform ḥalitza, the judges are not required to check their identities. Likewise, with regard to women making declarations of refusal: If a young woman after reaching majority comes to make a declaration of refusal against her husband, she may do so, even if witnesses do not recognize her and they do not know for sure that she is the wife of the supposed husband.

Therefore, in cases where the woman is not identified, although the court may perform ḥalitza and refusals, it may not write a document of ḥalitza, i.e., a document attesting that ḥalitza took place, unless they, the judges, recognize her. And witnesses to the act may not write a document of a declaration of refusal, i.e., a document attesting that a refusal took place, unless they, the judges, recognize the woman, as we are concerned about the possibility of a mistaken court. Perhaps a court will not know that such a document is not complete proof that the action was conducted properly, and will consider it as proof that it was the yevama in this document who removed the shoe, or the wife in this document who made a declaration of refusal. Since the first court can conduct ḥalitza and refusals without accepting witnesses attesting to the identities of the involved parties, a second court cannot rely on these attesting documents alone, but must verify the identities before declaring the women eligible for marriage.

And Rava himself said the opposite of what he quoted in the name of others: A court may not conduct ḥalitza unless they, the judges, recognize the participants, and a court may not convene a declaration of refusal unless they, the judges, recognize the young woman. Therefore, witnesses may write a document of ḥalitza even if they do not recognize the woman themselves, as one who witnessed a court conduct ḥalitza can be sure that the court already checked the party’s identities thoroughly. And witnesses may write a document of refusal even if they do not recognize the young woman who has refused, relying on the fact that witnesses must have already attested to their identities. And we need not be concerned about the possibility of a mistaken court, as there is no reason to fear that the first court conducted the case without properly identifying the participants.

Traduction : The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren Noé Talmud, with commentary by Rabbi Adin Even-Israel Steinsaltz.

Yevamot 106a explores what makes a mistaken ḥalitza valid, debating whether shared intent between yavam and widow is required for it to permit remarriage.