Talmud - Yevamot 7a יבמות ז׳ א׳

If the Temple service, which includes the sacrifice of offerings, is so severe that it overrides Shabbat, as offerings were brought on Shabbat, and yet the halakha of murder overrides it, i.e., the obligation to execute a sentenced convict overrides the Temple service, as it is stated with regard to one sentenced to death: “You shall take him from My altar, that he may die” (Exodus 21:14), then in the case of Shabbat, which is overridden by the Temple service, is it not right that the halakhot of murder should likewise override it?

§ The Gemara analyzes a puzzling statement in the above baraita. And what is the meaning of the claim: Or perhaps it is only the case that capital punishments may be administered even on Shabbat, which the tanna stated in an unexplained reversion to his previous suggestion? The Gemara explains that this is what he is saying: The a fortiori reasoning can be refuted, as the obligation to bury a corpse with no one available to bury it [met mitzva] can prove otherwise, as the obligation to bury a met mitzva overrides the Temple service, and yet it does not override Shabbat. The tanna then retracted his statement and said that one can claim that the burial of a met mitzva overrides Shabbat by means of the same a fortiori inference: If the Temple service overrides Shabbat, and the burial of a met mitzva overrides it.

The Gemara pauses in the middle of the a fortiori inference to explain this last point. This is derived from the superfluous phrase “or for his sister” in the verse “He shall not make himself ritually impure for his father, or for his mother, for his brother, or for his sister, when they die” (Numbers 6:7), which is referring to a nazirite. This verse teaches that even a nazirite on his way to sacrifice the Paschal lamb must render himself ritually impure to bury a met mitzva. The Gemara resumes the a fortiori inference: If so, as Shabbat is overridden by the Temple service, is it not right that the burial of a met mitzva should override it? Therefore, the verse states: “You shall kindle no fire throughout your habitations on Shabbat day” (Exodus 35:3).

This concludes Rav Shimi bar Ashi’s interpretation of the baraita, that the tanna suggested that a court-administered death penalty might override Shabbat not because of the principle that a positive mitzva overrides a prohibition, but due to a potential a fortiori inference. The Gemara asks: And according to that which entered his mind at the outset, that the assumption of the tanna was indeed based on the principle that a positive mitzva comes and overrides a prohibition, what is the meaning of the clause: Or perhaps it is only the case that capital punishments may be administered even on Shabbat, that the tanna said? How should the baraita be explained according to the initial interpretation?

The Gemara explains that this is what the tanna is saying: It would have been possible to say the following: How do I establish the verse “Every one who profanes it shall surely be put to death” (Exodus 31:14)? This applies to other prohibited labors, except for court-imposed capital punishment. However, court-imposed capital punishment overrides Shabbat, as a positive mitzva comes and overrides a prohibition.

The tanna then retracted his statement and said: You can say that we stated the principle that a positive mitzva comes and overrides a prohibition, yet this is true for a regular prohibition alone. However, did you hear that it overrides a prohibition that includes karet? The tanna then said, hinting at a counter-claim: Is that not to say, with regard to the principle that a positive mitzva overrides a prohibition, that the prohibition is more stringent than the positive mitzva? After all, the court punishes one who violates a prohibition with lashes, which is not the case for a failure to uphold a positive mitzva. And yet by Torah law the positive mitzva comes and overrides it.

If so, what difference is it to me if it is a case of a minor stringency and what difference is it to me if it is a major stringency? Once the Torah has stated that a positive mitzva supersedes a prohibition, there should be no difference between a relatively stringent prohibition and a lenient one. Therefore, the verse states: “You shall not kindle.” In sum, the Gemara has not found a clear proof for the opinion that a positive mitzva supersedes a prohibition that incurs karet.

Consequently, the Gemara suggests a different interpretation. The superfluous phrase “with her” indeed teaches that the obligation of levirate marriage does not override the prohibition with regard to women with whom relations are forbidden. However, this derivation is required not because one might have thought that a positive mitzva supersedes a prohibition that incurs karet. Rather, this phrase is necessary because it could enter your mind to say: Let this case of a brother’s wife, to whom the mitzva of levirate marriage applies, be treated in accordance with a well-established hermeneutical principle: A matter that was included in a generalization, but emerged to teach, emerged to teach not just about itself but to teach about the entire generalization.

The Gemara explains the application of this principle to the current case. Since the prohibition proscribing a brother’s wife is included in the general prohibition with regard to women with whom relations are forbidden, it can be claimed that the halakha of levirate marriage renders not only a brother’s childless wife permitted, but in this case it renders permitted all women with whom relations are usually forbidden. As it is taught in a baraita that clarifies this hermeneutical principle: A matter that was included in a generalization, but emerged to teach, emerged to teach not just about itself but to teach about the entire generalization. How so?

The baraita provides an example of this principle by citing a verse: “But the soul that eats of the flesh of the sacrifice of peace-offerings that belong to the Lord, with his ritual impurity upon him, that soul shall be cut off from his people” (Leviticus 7:20). But aren’t peace-offerings included in the general category of all consecrated offerings? And why were they explicitly singled out from of the rest in the above verse? To draw an analogy between them and to say to you: Just as peace-offerings are unique in that they are consecrated for the altar, so too, this halakha that one who eats of them is liable to receive karet applies to all food that is consecrated for the altar, which excludes objects that are consecrated for the Temple maintenance.

The above baraita provided an example of the principle that an item singled out from a general category teaches a halakha with regard to the entire category. Here too, one can argue: This case of a brother’s wife was included in the general category of all women with whom relations are forbidden, and why was she singled out? To compare to her and say to you: Just as a childless brother’s wife is permitted, so too, all women with whom relations are forbidden are likewise permitted.

The Gemara raises an objection: Is it comparable? There, in the case cited as an example of this hermeneutical principle, the generalization, i.e., all offerings, are included in the prohibition against eating offerings while ritually impure, and the detailed case of peace-offerings is also included in the prohibition. Consequently, it can be said that the specific case was singled out to teach about the entire category. By contrast, here, in the case of levirate marriage with forbidden relatives, the generalization is included in the prohibition against engaging in forbidden relations, and yet the detailed case is permitted. Therefore, it cannot be said that the detail has been singled out so as to clarify some aspect of the general category; rather, its halakha differs from the rest.

Instead, this case is comparable only to those that fit a different hermeneutical principle, concerning a matter that was included in a generalization but emerged to discuss a new matter. If a novel aspect or special ruling is taught with regard to a specific case within a broader general category, then you cannot return it to its generalization even for other matters, to the extent that this case has been entirely removed from the general category until the Torah explicitly returns it to its generalization. As it is taught in a baraita: With regard to a matter that was included in a generalization but emerged to discuss a new matter, you may not return it to its generalization until the Torah explicitly returns it to its generalization.

How so? The baraita provides an example of this principle. With regard to the guilt-offering of a leper, the verse states: “And he shall slaughter the sheep in the place where they slaughter the sin-offering and the burnt-offering, in the place of the Sanctuary; for as the sin-offering is the priest’s, so is the guilt-offering” (Leviticus 14:13). As there is no need for the verse to state: “As the sin-offering…so is the guilt-offering,” since apparently this comparison does not teach anything new because the halakhot of guilt-offerings are already stated elsewhere (Leviticus 7:1–10), then what is the meaning when the verse states: “As the sin-offering…so is the guilt-offering”?

Since the guilt-offering of a leper was specified from the general category of all guilt-offerings to discuss a new matter, i.e., that the blood is placed on the thumb of the right hand and the big toe of the right foot of the leper, one might have thought that this guilt-offering does not require placement of the blood and sacrificial parts on the altar, as for this guilt-offering the placement of blood on the leper is sufficient.

Traduction : The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren Noé Talmud, with commentary by Rabbi Adin Even-Israel Steinsaltz.

Yevamot 7a explores a fortiori reasoning comparing Temple service, capital punishment, and the duty to bury an abandoned corpse in relation to Shabbat.