Talmud - Hullin 74b חולין ע״ד ב׳

Rabbi Shimon Shezuri says: Even if the fetus emerged alive and is now five years old and plowing in the field, the earlier slaughter of its mother rendered it permitted and it does not require slaughter before it is eaten. But if one tore an animal, i.e., he killed it without slaughtering it, and inside he found a live nine-month-old fetus, everyone agrees that the fetus requires its own slaughter because its mother was not slaughtered.

GEMARA: Rabbi Elazar says that Rabbi Oshaya says: The Sages discussed the permissibility of a live nine-month-old fetus found inside a slaughtered animal only with regard to the matter of whether it requires its own slaughter. The Gemara asks: What does Rav Oshaya’s statement serve to exclude? Rav Oshaya’s statement indicates that with regard to other matters all agree that it is considered an independent animal, with the associated prohibitions. The Gemara suggests: It serves to exclude its fat, i.e., the fats that are prohibited in a regular animal, such as the fat of the kidneys and innards, and its sciatic nerve.

The Gemara asks: The fat of which part? If we say that this is referring to the fat of the fetus, that is difficult because the Sages disagree as to whether or not it is permitted, as it is taught in a baraita: The prohibition of the sciatic nerve applies to a fetus and its fat is prohibited; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says: The prohibition of the sciatic nerve does not apply to a fetus, and its fat is permitted. And Rabbi Elazar says that Rabbi Oshaya says: This dispute concerns a live nine-month-old fetus, and Rabbi Meir follows his standard line of reasoning, which he expressed in the mishna, that such a fetus is considered an independent full-fledged animal; and Rabbi Yehuda follows his standard line of reasoning, as expressed by the Rabbis in the mishna, that such a fetus is considered a part of the mother.

Rather, say that Rabbi Elazar is referring to the fat of the sciatic nerve of the fetus, which all agree is permitted. The Gemara rejects this as well: But the Sages also disagree with regard to that, as it is taught in a baraita: With regard to the sciatic nerve, one scrapes around it to remove it entirely in any place that it is found in the thigh, and one cuts out its fat completely, even those fats that are sunk into the flesh; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says: One cuts out the nerve and the fat that is level with the flesh of the thigh, but there is no obligation to remove all traces of the fat.

Rather, if Rabbi Oshaya’s statement was stated, it was stated like this: Rabbi Elazar says that Rabbi Oshaya says: The Sages discussed the permissibility of the fetus only with regard to matters of consumption, i.e., whether or not it must be slaughtered in order to permit its flesh and whether or not the fat and the sciatic nerve are permitted. This statement serves to exclude only one who copulates with the animal, or one who plows with it together with an animal of a different species, as everyone agrees that these prohibitions apply to such a fetus just as they do to any other animal.

§ A related amoraic dispute is cited concerning a live nine-month-old fetus found inside a slaughtered animal: Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said: According to the statement of Rabbi Yehuda, who permits the fat, he also permits its blood; according to the statement of Rabbi Meir, who prohibits its fat, he also prohibits its blood. And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Even according to Rabbi Yehuda, who permits its fat, he prohibits its blood.

Rabbi Yoḥanan raised an objection to Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish from the mishna, which states with regard to an eight-month-old fetus, whether alive or dead, or a dead nine-month-old fetus, found inside a slaughtered animal, that since it is considered part of the mother its blood is prohibited. Therefore, one must tear the fetus and remove its blood before it may be consumed. The mishna prohibits the blood but apparently permits the rest of the fetus, including its fat, which contradicts the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish. In resolution of this difficulty, Rabbi Zeira said: Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish meant to say only that the consumption of blood lost as the fetus died is not punishable by excision from the World-to-Come [karet], whereas Rabbi Yoḥanan holds that it is.

The Gemara clarifies: According to whom did Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish state that one who permits the fat of the fetus also holds that the consumption of its blood is not punishable by karet? Ostensibly, it is according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who permits its fat. But that is difficult, because this blood should be regarded only as blood of exudate, i.e., blood that exudes from the neck of the animal after the initial spurt of its slaughter concludes. This blood did not spurt out during the slaughter of the mother. Rabbi Yehuda holds that consumption of even this blood is punishable by karet, as it is taught in a baraita: The consumption of blood of exudate is prohibited by a regular prohibition and is punishable with lashes, unlike the initial spurt of blood, known as blood of the soul, whose consumption is punishable by karet. Rabbi Yehuda says: Blood of exudate is also punishable by karet.

Rav Yosef, son of Rav Salla the Pious, interpreted this matter before Rav Pappa: One of the verses prohibiting the consumption of blood states: “And whoever…eats any blood, and I will set My face against that soul that eats the blood, and will cut him off from among his people” (Leviticus 17:10). Rabbi Yehuda holds that since it would have been sufficient for the verse to state: Blood, but instead it states: “Any blood,” it is interpreted as teaching that wherever one is liable for karet for the consumption of blood of the soul, i.e., the initial spurt from the slaughter, as is the halakha with regard to a regular animal, one is also liable for karet for the consumption of blood of exudate, i.e., the rest of the blood. But wherever one is not liable for karet for the consumption of blood of the soul, as is the halakha with regard to the blood of a fetus according to Rabbi Yehuda, who holds that the fetus is not considered an independent life, one is also not liable for karet for the consumption of blood of exudate; rather, its blood is subject to a regular prohibition.

§ A dilemma was raised before the Sages: What is the halakha with regard to redeeming a firstborn donkey with a ben pekua? Can one perform the mitzva, as stated in the Torah: “And every firstborn of a donkey you shall redeem with a lamb” (Exodus 13:13), with this animal? The Gemara elaborates: According to the opinion of Rabbi Meir do not raise the dilemma, as, since he says a ben pekua requires slaughter, evidently it is a full-fledged lamb, and therefore it can certainly be used to redeem a donkey.

When should you raise the dilemma? Raise it according to the opinion of the Rabbis, as they say that the slaughter of its mother renders it permitted. What is the halakha in this case? Does one say that since the Rabbis say that the slaughter of its mother renders it permitted, it is apparent that despite being physically alive, a ben pekua is halakhically regarded like meat placed in a pot, which cannot be used to redeem a donkey (see Bekhorot 12a)? Or perhaps, since the animal is running back and forth, i.e., it is alive, we call it a lamb and it can be used?

Mar Zutra said: One cannot redeem a donkey with this lamb, and Rav Ashi said: One can redeem it.

Rav Ashi said to Mar Zutra: What is the reason for your opinion? Is it because you derive the halakhot of redeeming a firstborn donkey from Paschal offerings by means of a verbal analogy between the term “lamb” (Exodus 13:13) written concerning a firstborn donkey and “lamb” (Exodus 12:5) written concerning a Paschal offering, and a ben pekua is unfit for sacrifice as a Paschal offering?

If so, just as there, with regard to the Paschal offering, it must be male, unblemished, and in its first year, so too here, the lamb must be male, unblemished, and in its first year. Yet the mishna in Bekhorot (9a) states explicitly that one may redeem with a female lamb, and even if it is blemished, and also with one that is past its first year. Mar Zutra responded: The repetition of the words “You shall redeem,” “You shall not redeem” written in the verse: “And every firstborn of a donkey you shall redeem with a lamb, and if you shall not redeem it then you shall break its neck” (Exodus 13:13), included a lamb that does not fulfill these criteria.

Rav Ashi responds: If the repetition of “You shall redeem,” “You shall not redeem” serves to amplify, then it should even amplify all other types of lambs, including a ben pekua, i.e., they should also be included in the category of those that are fit for redemption. Mar Zutra answers: If that was so, what purpose would the verbal analogy of “lamb,” “lamb” serve? Rather, the repetition of “You shall redeem” serves to include all types of lambs, but the verbal analogy still serves to exclude a ben pekua.

§ A dilemma was raised before the Sages: According to the Rabbis, a ben pekua is permitted for consumption and is therefore susceptible to ritual impurity. If the ben pekua was still inside the slaughtered mother and the body of the mother came in contact with a primary source of ritual impurity, what is the halakha with regard to counting the mother as having first-degree ritual impurity and the ben pekua as having second-degree ritual impurity? If the fetus is considered independent of the mother, it is rendered impure only through its contact with the mother and so would have second-degree impurity. But if it is considered part of the mother it would have the same first-degree impurity as the mother.

Rabbi Yoḥanan says: One counts the mother as having first-degree impurity and the ben pekua as having second-degree impurity. Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish says: One does not count the mother as having first-degree impurity and the ben pekua as having second-degree impurity. Rather, the fetus has first-degree impurity like its mother, as it is considered like a nut rattling in its shell; this is considered a single entity such that if impurity touches the shell, both the nut and the shell are rendered impure with the same degree of impurity.

Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish raised an objection to Rabbi Yoḥanan from the mishna (72a): If a fetus extended its foreleg outside its mother’s womb and then the mother was slaughtered, and afterward the foreleg was severed, the flesh of both the mother and the fetus are ritually impure due to having been in contact with a carcass. Since the foreleg was not permitted through an act of slaughter it is regarded as a carcass with the associated ritual impurity. The rest of the flesh, which was permitted, was in contact with it and was thereby rendered ritually impure; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir.

And the Rabbis say: The flesh has the ritual impurity of having been in contact with a tereifa that was slaughtered. The limb is regarded as a tereifa that was slaughtered, which by Torah law is prohibited for consumption but does not carry ritual impurity. Nevertheless, the Sages decreed that if a tereifa was slaughtered and then came in contact with another item, the other item should be regarded as ritually impure to the extent that it will disqualify sacrificial foods that come in contact with it.

Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish explains his objection: Granted, according to my opinion, as I say that the mother and fetus together are one entity; that is why the flesh of the fetus is rendered susceptible to ritual impurity through the blood of its mother that spilled onto the body of the mother. When the blood from the mother’s slaughter renders the mother susceptible to impurity, the fetus is also rendered susceptible to impurity, as it is considered part of the mother. But according to your opinion, that the fetus is an independent entity, through what means is it rendered susceptible to contracting impurity from its foreleg?

Rabbi Yoḥanan said to Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish: It is rendered susceptible through the slaughter of its mother, which also permits the consumption of the fetus, and this is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who maintains that the flesh of a slaughtered animal is rendered susceptible to ritual impurity by virtue of the fact that it is permitted for consumption, even if it did not come in contact with blood or one of the other six liquids. Accordingly, the fetus will be susceptible to impurity even if it is not considered part of its mother.

Rabbi Yoḥanan raised an objection to Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish from a baraita: If a ben pekua grew up and passed through a river, it was thereby rendered susceptible to impurity. Therefore, if it went from there to a cemetery, it is rendered impure.

Rabbi Yoḥanan explains his objection: Granted, according to my opinion, as I say that the mother and fetus are two entities; it is due to that reason that only if the ben pekua itself has been rendered susceptible to impurity by coming in contact with the water of the river, yes, it can be rendered impure upon entering a cemetery, whereas if it has not been rendered susceptible to impurity through these waters, no, it does not become impure when it enters a cemetery. But according to your opinion, in which you said that the mother and fetus together are one entity, why is it necessary for it to have passed through a river? It was already rendered susceptible to impurity through the blood of its mother that spilled onto the mother’s body when it was slaughtered.

Traduction : The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren Noé Talmud, with commentary by Rabbi Adin Even-Israel Steinsaltz.

Chullin 74b examines whether a live fetus removed from a slaughtered mother requires its own slaughter, debating rules on forbidden fat and the sciatic nerve.