Talmud - Hullin 135b חולין קל״ה ב׳

The Gemara asks further: And how do the Rabbis respond to Rabbi Ilai’s claim? The Gemara answers: The Rabbis do not accept that the conjunction “and” goes back and combines the two matters together, as, if that were so, let the Merciful One write neither “and” nor “the first.”

The Gemara asks: And how does Rabbi Ilai respond to this contention? The Gemara answers that Rabbi Ilai would say that the first sheared wool and teruma are essentially different obligations, as the first sheared wool is merely a monetary obligation with no inherent sanctity. By contrast, it is prohibited for non-priests to partake of teruma. Since this case of the first sheared wool involves only sanctity that inheres in its value, and that case of teruma referred to in the beginning of the verse involves inherent sanctity, the verse separated them through the repetition of the term “the first,” and then the verse went back and combined them through the term “and,” so that their halakhot could be derived from one another.

The Gemara provides an alternative explanation as to why the Rabbis do not derive the exemption of sheep owned in partnership with a gentile from the case of teruma. If you wish, say instead that with regard to teruma, the Rabbis hold that one who owns produce in partnership with a gentile is in fact obligated, as it is taught in a baraita: If there were a Jew and a gentile who purchased a field in partnership, the produce grown in that field is considered to be untithed produce, which is subject to the halakhot of terumot and tithes, and non-sacred produce, which is exempt from the requirements of terumot and tithes, mixed together; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: The portion of the Jew is obligated in teruma and tithes, but the portion of the gentile is exempt.

The Gemara explains the inference. They disagree only with regard to the following issue: That one Sage, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, holds that there is retroactive clarification, which means that when they divide the produce it will be clarified who owned which produce from the outset; and one Sage, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, holds that there is no retroactive clarification, and because it grew in a mixed state, it retains that status even after they divide the produce. But with regard to produce that a Jew owns in partnership with a gentile, everyone agrees that it is obligated in teruma.

The Gemara presents an alternative explanation of Rabbi Ilai’s opinion: If you wish, say instead that Rabbi Ilai does not derive only the exemption of sheep owned in partnership with a Jew from the term “your flock” while he derives the exemption of sheep owned in partnership with a gentile from the term “your grain.” Rather, according to Rabbi Ilai both exemptions are derived from the term “your flock.”

The Gemara explains why both exemptions can be derived from a single phrase: With regard to partnership with a gentile, what is the reason that one is exempted from the obligation of the first sheared wool? It is due to the fact that the sheep is not exclusively his. In the case of a partnership with a Jew too, the sheep is not exclusively his. The Gemara asks: And what do the Rabbis reply to this claim of Rabbi Ilai? The Gemara answers: The Rabbis hold that partnership with a Jew cannot be compared to partnership with a gentile, as a gentile is not obligated in the mitzva of the first sheared wool, whereas a Jew is obligated.

§ Rava said with regard to the dispute between the Rabbis and Rabbi Ilai: Although Rabbi Ilai holds that two partners who own a sheep are exempt from the first sheared wool, he concedes that jointly owned produce is obligated in teruma. This is the halakha even though it is written with regard to teruma: “Your grain” (Deuteronomy 18:4), using the singular pronoun, from which one may infer that with regard to yours, yes, one is obligated, whereas with regard to that which is owned in partnership, the partners are not obligated.

The Gemara explains that the joint owners of produce are nevertheless obligated in teruma, as the Merciful One writes: “There will I require your terumot” (Ezekiel 20:40). The use of the plural pronoun in this verse indicates that even partners who own produce are obligated in teruma. The Gemara asks: But if so, why do I need the term: “Your grain,” using the singular pronoun? The Gemara answers: This serves to exclude produce owned in partnership with a gentile.

Similarly, with regard to ḥalla, the portion of dough that one is required to separate and give to a priest, Rabbi Ilai concedes that joint owners are obligated in this mitzva, even though one could claim otherwise, as it is written: “Of the first of your dough you shall set apart a cake for a gift” (Numbers 15:20), and it is possible to say that one should derive a verbal analogy between the term “the first” in this context and the term “the first” from the first sheared wool: Just as there, with regard to the first sheared wool, if the sheep are owned in partnership the owners are not obligated, so too here, with regard to ḥalla, if the dough is owned in partnership they are not obligated. Nevertheless, the Merciful One writes: “Your dough,” using a plural pronoun, indicating that even joint owners of dough are obligated to separate ḥalla.

The Gemara challenges: But according to this claim, the reason joint owners of dough are obligated to separate ḥalla is that it is written “your dough,” using a plural pronoun. It can be inferred from here that were that not the case I would say that they are exempt, as derived by a verbal analogy between the term “the first” mentioned with regard to ḥalla and the term “the first” from the first sheared wool. On the contrary, one should derive a verbal analogy between the term “the first” with regard to ḥalla and the term “the first” from teruma: Just as the obligation to separate teruma applies to produce owned in partnership, so too, the obligation to separate ḥalla applies to dough owned in partnership. It is preferable to compare ḥalla to teruma, because their halakhic status is similar in that they are both prohibited to non-priests. If so, the inference from the term “your dough” is unnecessary.

The Gemara explains: It is indeed so; the obligation of produce owned in partnership in the case of ḥalla is derived from the case of teruma. But if so, why do I need the term “your dough”? This teaches that the quantity of dough to which the obligation of ḥalla applies is equivalent to the quantity of your dough, i.e., the quantity of dough kneaded daily by the Jewish people when they were in the Sinai Desert, when the mitzva was given. This is one omer for each person (see Exodus 16:16), which is a tenth of an ephah (see Exodus 16:36).

Likewise, with regard to pe’a, produce in the corner of the field that is left for the poor, Rabbi Ilai concedes that the joint owners of produce are obligated, even though it is written in the verse cited below: “Your field [sadekha],” using a singular pronoun, from which it can be inferred that with regard to your field, yes, one is obligated, whereas with regard to that which is owned in partnership, one is not obligated. The reason is that the Merciful One writes: “And when you reap [uvekutzrekhem] the harvest of your land, you shall not entirely reap the corner of your field” (Leviticus 19:9). The term “when you reap” uses the plural pronoun, which indicates that even partners of land are obligated in pe’a. The Gemara asks: But if so, why do I need the term “your field” in the singular? The Gemara answers: This serves to exclude land owned in partnership with a gentile from the obligation of pe’a.

Similarly, with regard to the firstborn status of a male firstborn kosher animal, Rabbi Ilai concedes that jointly owned animals are sanctified, even though it is written: “All the firstborn that are born of your herd [bivkarekha] and of your flock [tzonekha] that are male you shall sanctify to the Lord your God” (Deuteronomy 15:19). Once again it might have been inferred from the singular pronoun in the terms “your herd” and “your flock” that your firstborn, yes, are sanctified, but the firstborn that is owned in partnership is not sanctified.

Therefore, the Merciful One writes: “And there you shall bring there your burnt offerings, and your peace offerings, and your tithes, and the gift of your hand, and your vows, and your gift offerings, and the firstborn of your herd [bekarkhem] and of your flock [tzonekhem]” (Deuteronomy 12:6). The pronouns in the terms “your herd” and “your flock” in this verse are in the plural, which indicates that firstborn animals owned in partnership are sanctified. The Gemara asks: But if so, why do I need the terms “your herd” and “your flock” (Deuteronomy 15:19), where the pronouns are in the singular? The Gemara again answers: This serves to exclude animals owned in partnership with a gentile, which are not sanctified.

Likewise, with regard to a mezuza, Rabbi Ilai concedes that the house of two partners is obligated, even though it is written: “And you shall write them upon the doorposts of your house [beitekha]” (Deuteronomy 6:9), with a singular pronoun, from which one might have inferred that with regard to your house, yes, it is obligated, whereas a house owned by two people in partnership is not obligated. Consequently, the Merciful One writes with regard to the mitzva of mezuza: “So that your days may be multiplied, and the days of your children” (Deuteronomy 11:21). The use of the plural pronoun in the terms “your days” and “your children” in this verse indicates that partners are obligated in the mitzva of mezuza. The Gemara asks: But if so, for what purpose does the term “your house [beitekha]” come? The Gemara answers: It is necessary for that which Rabba derived, as Rabba said:

Traduction : The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren Noé Talmud, with commentary by Rabbi Adin Even-Israel Steinsaltz.

Chullin 135b explores whether first-shorn wool and teruma share halakhic obligations, and debates tithing rules for produce jointly owned by a Jew and a gentile.