Talmud - Bava Kamma 89b בבא קמא פ״ט ב׳

so that even if she were to forgive the debt of her marriage contract with regard to her husband, the one she injured would not lose anything, as now as well she is not giving him any payment, one could respond that ultimately, in any matter that will engender a benefit to her husband, she will certainly forgive the debt with regard to him. And we do not trouble the courts to supervise the sale of the financial advantage without cause.

The Gemara asks: But if the reason she does not sell the financial advantage of her marriage contract to obtain money with which to pay the injured party is that she would then forgive the debt of the marriage contract, then with regard to that which is taught in a baraita (Tosefta 9:22): And similarly, in a case where she was the one who injured her husband she has not lost her marriage contract as a result, as he does not collect compensation from the properties she brought into the marriage that are enumerated in the marriage contract, why does she not lose it? Let her sell the financial advantage of her marriage contract to her husband in order to obtain the money to compensate him for that injury that she caused him, as, if she will forgive the debt of her marriage contract with regard to her husband there will be no loss for the purchaser, i.e., her husband.

The Gemara answers: This baraita is certainly in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who says that it is prohibited for a man to remain living together with his wife for even one hour without her having a marriage contract. Therefore, the woman cannot sell the financial advantage of her marriage contract to her husband.

The Gemara asks: And what is the reason for the ruling of Rabbi Meir? It is so that she will not be demeaned in his eyes such that he will easily divorce her, and here, if she were to sell the marriage contract to him, he would then divorce her and collect the properties listed in the marriage contract as payment for his injuries from her. If that is so, even now, where she does not sell her marriage contract to him, he will divorce her, and once she is divorced, he will collect the properties listed in the marriage contract as payment for his injuries from her. Preventing her from selling the marriage contract to him will not serve as an impediment to his divorcing her.

The Gemara answers: The baraita is discussing a case where there is a large sum recorded in her marriage contract, so that because of that slight sum due him as compensation for his injuries, he would not be willing to lose the large sum that he would have to pay were he to divorce her. Therefore, the marriage contract does serve as an impediment to his divorcing her.

The Gemara suggests: But if in fact the baraita is discussing a case where the sum recorded in her marriage contract is larger than the sum recorded in a marriage contract required by Torah law, let them establish her marriage contract at the sum of a marriage contract required by Torah law, and with regard to the other, additional, sum, let her sell it to her husband as payment for his injuries. Since she will be left with a marriage contract of standard value, they would be allowed to remain living together.

The Gemara answers: The baraita is discussing a case where the sum recorded in her marriage contract is not larger than the sum recorded in a marriage contract required by Torah law, that payment for his injury was assessed to be four dinars, and because of a gain of four dinars, the husband would not be willing to lose twenty-five dinars, which is the value of a marriage contract required by Torah law.

The Gemara asks: But with regard to that which is taught in the latter case of the baraita: Just as she does not sell her marriage contract to obtain money to pay damages while she is under him, i.e., married to her husband, so too, she does not lose the value of her marriage contract to pay damages while she is under him. But there are times when she will be found to have lost the value of her marriage contract, and what are the circumstances? It would be a case where the sum recorded in her marriage contract is larger than the sum recorded in a marriage contract required by Torah law. In that case she would be obligated to sell the portion of the marriage contract representing the additional amount in order to obtain money with which to compensate the one she injured.

Rava said in response: In the latter clause of that baraita, we arrive at the stipulation in the marriage contract that the male offspring inherit payment of their mother’s marriage contract, and it is not discussing the sale of a marriage contract in general.

And this is what the baraita is teaching: Just as the halakha stipulates that a woman who sells her marriage contract to others does not lose the future implementation of the stipulation in the marriage contract that the male offspring inherit payment of their mother’s marriage contract, and Rava clarifies: What is the reason for this? The need for money is what caused her to sell it under duress, and she did not intend to abrogate her sons’ rights to inherit the property in the future. Rava continues his explanation of the baraita: So too, a woman who sells her marriage contract to her husband does not lose the future implementation of the stipulation in the marriage contract that the male offspring inherit payment of their mother’s marriage contract, and Rava clarifies: What is the reason for this? The need for money is what caused her to sell it under duress.

§ The Gemara returns to the earlier discussion and suggests: Shall we say that the issue whether or not there was an ordinance of Usha instituting that the wife cannot sell her usufruct property is a dispute between tanna’im? As it is taught in one baraita: Canaanite slaves that the woman brought into the marriage as usufruct property are emancipated by having a tooth knocked out or an eye blinded by the woman, i.e., the wife, as is the halakha when the owner of a slave knocks out the slave’s tooth or blinds his eye, but they are not emancipated by having a tooth knocked out or an eye blinded by the man, i.e., the husband, as he is not their owner. And it is taught in another baraita: The slave is not emancipated if his tooth was knocked out or his eye was blinded, nor by the man nor by the woman.

The Gemara continues its analysis: They assumed that everyone holds that ownership of the rights to use an item and to its produce, which the husband has with regard to usufruct property, is not like ownership of the item itself, which is why the husband is not considered the owner of the slaves. What, is it not so that the two baraitot disagree with regard to this: That the one who says that the slave is emancipated if he was struck by the woman holds that there is no ordinance of Usha? Since she retains the right to sell her usufruct property, she is considered the full owner of the slaves with regard to the halakha of their being emancipated. And the one who says that the slave is not emancipated if he was struck by the man and not if he was struck by the woman holds that there is an ordinance of Usha. Since she cannot sell her usufruct property, she is not considered to be the full owner of the slaves with regard to the halakha of their being emancipated.

The Gemara offers an alternative explanation: No; perhaps it is the case that everyone holds that there is an ordinance of Usha. But here, in the first baraita, it is referring to the time before the ordinance was instituted, and since the wife had the right to sell her usufruct property, she is considered the full owner of the slaves with regard to the halakha of their being emancipated, while there, in the second baraita, it is referring to the time after the ordinance was instituted, and since she could no longer sell her usufruct property, she is not considered to be the full owner of the slaves with regard to the halakha of their being emancipated.

The Gemara offers an alternative explanation: And if you wish, say instead that both this baraita and that baraita are referring to the time after the ordinance was instituted, and the tanna in each baraita holds that there is an ordinance of Usha. Rather, according to the one who says that the slave is emancipated if he is struck by the woman but not if he is struck by the man, what is the reason? It is in accordance with the statement of Rava, as Rava said:

Traduction : The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren Noé Talmud, with commentary by Rabbi Adin Even-Israel Steinsaltz.

BavaKamma 89b explores whether a wife can sell her marriage contract rights to fund injury compensation, weighing Rabbi Meir’s protective ruling.