Talmud - Bava Kamma 18b בבא קמא י״ח ב׳

did you hear him distinguish between the different parts of the payment? There is no aspect of innocuousness in the case of pebbles.

Rather, when Rabbi Elazar says that the owner of the dog pays the full cost of the damage in a case that is similar to one of propelled pebbles, he was referring to a case where the owner of the animal was forewarned with regard to this matter. And they disagree about this point: One Sage, Rabbi Elazar, holds that there is forewarning with regard to propelling pebbles; therefore, if there was testimony given in court that a particular animal regularly propels pebbles in the course of its walking, the animal is deemed forewarned and its owner pays the full cost of the damage. And one Sage, the first tanna, holds that there is no forewarning with regard to pebbles. Apparently, payment for damage caused by pebbles is paid from the body of the animal.

The Gemara asks: But if this is the case, then the dilemma raised by Rava concerning whether there is forewarning for propelling pebbles or there is no forewarning for propelling pebbles, can be resolved from this dispute. If the dilemma is raised according to the Rabbis, i.e., the first tanna, there is no forewarning for propelling pebbles. If the dilemma is raised according to Rabbi Elazar, there is forewarning for propelling pebbles.

The Gemara answers that Rava could have said to you: When I raise the dilemma, I do so specifically according to the opinion of the Rabbis who disagree with Sumakhos and hold that one pays half the cost of the damage in the case of pebbles; but here in this baraita, both the Rabbis, i.e., the first tanna, and Rabbi Elazar hold in accordance with the opinion of Sumakhos, who says that in the case of pebbles, one pays the full cost of the damage.

And what is the reason that the Rabbis say that one pays half the cost of the damage in the case of pebbles? It is that in the case of pebbles the animal acted atypically and was not forewarned. And in this baraita, concerning the dog that lit the stack of grain, the dispute between the first tanna and Rabbi Elazar is with regard to the issue that is the subject of the dispute between Rabbi Tarfon and the Rabbis, i.e., the halakha in the case of damage caused by an innocuous ox on the property of the injured party.

The Gemara rejects the parallel between the opinion of Rabbi Elazar and the opinion of Rabbi Tarfon. Say that you heard that according to Rabbi Tarfon the owner pays the full cost of the damage; but did you hear that according to Rabbi Tarfon restitution is paid only from the body of the animal that caused the damage?

The Gemara answers: Yes, Rabbi Tarfon holds that restitution is paid only from the body of the animal that caused the damage. From where does Rabbi Tarfon derive the halakha that when damage is caused by an innocuous ox on the property of the injured party its owner is liable to pay the full cost of the damage and not merely half? He derives it via an a fortiori inference from damage categorized as Goring that is caused in the public domain, as explained in the mishna (24b).

His ruling is based on the principle: It is sufficient for the conclusion that emerges from an a fortiori inference to be like its source, i.e., a halakha derived from an a fortiori inference cannot be more stringent than the source of that derivation. Since restitution for damage categorized as Goring that is caused in the public domain is paid only from the body of the damaging animal, the same is true with regard to restitution for damage categorized as Goring that is caused on the property of the injured party.

The Gemara asks: But isn’t it clear from that mishna that Rabbi Tarfon does not accept the principle: It is sufficient for the conclusion that emerges from an a fortiori inference to be like its source, as, if he accepted that principle, not only would he hold that payment is only from the body of the animal, he would also require payment of half the cost of the damage.

The Gemara answers: He does not reject the principle. When he does not accept the principle: It is sufficient for the conclusion that emerges from an a fortiori inference to be like its source, it is in a case where the result of rejecting the principle is that the a fortiori inference is refuted. But in a case where the result of rejecting the principle is that the a fortiori inference is not refuted, but will be applied in a more limited fashion, he accepts the principle: It is sufficient for the conclusion that emerges from an a fortiori inference to be like its source. Therefore, in this case the payment of the full cost of the damage, which is derived by means of the a fortiori inference, is paid only from the body of the animal based on the principle: It is sufficient for the conclusion that emerges from an a fortiori inference to be like its source.

§ The Gemara discusses the matter itself, cited earlier. Rava raises a dilemma: Is there forewarning for propelling pebbles, so that the owner would pay the full cost of the damage if he had been forewarned three times, or is there no forewarning for propelling pebbles, and he will always pay half the cost of the damage? The Gemara elaborates: Do we liken the case of propelled pebbles to damage categorized as Goring? Accordingly, when an innocuous ox causes damage by propelling pebbles its owner pays half the cost of the damage, and when a forewarned ox does so the owner pays the full cost of the damage. Or perhaps, is it a subcategory of the primary category of Trampling, which is deemed forewarned from the outset? Accordingly, the owner would always pay half the cost of the damage, as there is no change in status after the third warning.

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear the resolution of this dilemma from a baraita: With regard to hopping, a chicken is not deemed forewarned. And some say that it is forewarned. The Gemara questions the formulation of the baraita: Does it enter your mind to raise the possibility that a chicken is not forewarned with regard to hopping? Hopping is the typical manner of movement for chickens. Rather, is it not that the reference in the baraita is to a case where the chicken was hopping and propelled pebbles that caused damage?

What, is it not referring to a case where the chicken has done so three times? And it is with regard to this that they disagree: One Sage holds: There is forewarning for pebbles, and one Sage holds: There is no forewarning for pebbles. According to this analysis, Rava’s dilemma is the subject of a tannaitic dispute. The Gemara rejects this resolution: No, perhaps the reference in the baraita is to a case where the chicken hopped only one time. And the tanna’im disagree with regard to the issue that is the subject of the dispute between Sumakhos and the Rabbis, concerning the compensation for damage caused by pebbles.

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear the resolution to the dilemma from an amoraic dispute: If an animal dropped excrement onto dough and damaged it, Rav Yehuda says: The owner of the animal pays the full cost of the damage, and Rabbi Elazar says: He pays half the cost of the damage. What, is it not referring to a case where the animal has done so three times? And it is with regard to this that they disagree, as one Sage holds: There is forewarning for pebbles, and one Sage holds: There is no forewarning for pebbles.

The Gemara rejects this resolution: No, perhaps the reference in the baraita is to a case where the animal dropped excrement only one time. And the tanna’im disagree with regard to the issue that is the subject of the dispute between Sumakhos and the Rabbis, concerning compensation for damage caused by pebbles. The Gemara asks: But isn’t this atypical behavior of the animal, and since all behavior that deviates from the norm is classified within the category of Goring, the owner should be liable to pay only half the cost of the damage? The Gemara answers: The case is one where the animal was forced into a narrow place and had no alternative to relieving itself onto the dough; therefore, it does not constitute atypical behavior.

The Gemara asks: But if the amoraic dispute parallels the tannaitic dispute, let Rav Yehuda say: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Sumakhos, and let Rabbi Elazar say: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, instead of stating their dispute in the context of the particular case of the animal and the dough. The Gemara answers: It was necessary for them to state their dispute in this case, as there is a novel element concerning excrement. It would enter your mind to say: Since the excrement is drawn after the body of the animal, its legal status is like that of damage caused by its body, not like pebbles propelled by the animal. Therefore, their stating the dispute with regard to excrement teaches us that its status is like that of propelling pebbles. Therefore, the dispute between Rav Yehuda and Rabbi Elazar can be explained as parallel to the dispute between Sumakhos and the Rabbis with regard to pebbles.

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear the resolution to the dilemma from a baraita: Rami bar Yeḥezkel taught: In the case of a rooster that extended its head into the airspace of a glass vessel and crowed in the vessel and broke it with the sound waves, its owner pays the full cost of the damage. And Rav Yosef said that the Sages from the school of Rav say: If a horse neighed or a donkey brayed and the sound waves broke vessels, the owner pays half the cost of the damage. These are cases similar to the case of pebbles, and there is a dispute between the Sages with regard to these cases.

What, is it not referring to a case where the rooster or animal has done so three times?

Traduction : The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren Noé Talmud, with commentary by Rabbi Adin Even-Israel Steinsaltz.

BavaKamma 18b examines whether an animal can be forewarned for kicking up stones, weighing full versus half damage payments among Rabbi Elazar, Sumakhos, and the first tanna.