Talmud - Yevamot 68b יבמות ס״ח ב׳

The Gemara rejects this assertion: That verse is necessary to teach its own basic halakha, that a non-priest is prohibited from partaking of teruma. The Gemara responds: Two prohibitions with regard to a “common man” are written, one in the verse previously cited and the other in Leviticus 22:13: “But there shall no common man eat of it.” One of them prohibits a non-priest from partaking of teruma, while the other is referring to the daughter of a priest married to a non-priest.

The Gemara asks: One of these verses is still necessary to teach another halakha that is taught by Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, as Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, said that the phrase “no common man” indicates that I, God, said to you that commonness, i.e., non-priesthood, renders one unfit to partake of teruma, but acute mourning, i.e., mourning on the day when one’s close relative died, does not render one unfit to eat teruma. The Gemara answers: This teaching of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, is derived from a superfluous word in the verse, as it could have stated: A common man may not eat of the holy thing, and it actually states: “No common man.”

The Gemara asks: The verse “And if a priest’s daughter be married to a common man” (Leviticus 22:12), from which Rav derived the halakha being discussed, that intercourse with an unfit man renders a woman unfit to partake of teruma and marry a priest, is still necessary for that which is taught in a baraita: When a priest’s daughter returns to her father’s house after the death of her Israelite husband, she resumes partaking of teruma, but she does not resume partaking of the breast and the right hind leg of sacrificial offerings. And Rav Ḥisda said that Ravina, son of Rav Sheila, said: What is the verse from which this is derived? As it is written: “And if a priest’s daughter be married to a common man, she may not eat of that which is set apart from the sacred” (Leviticus 22:12). This implies that even after her husband’s death, she may not partake of the portion separated from consecrated offerings. Therefore, the verse cannot be the source for the above halakha.

The Gemara answers: If so, if this is the only halakha derived from this verse, let the verse merely write: She may not eat of the sacred. What is the significance of the seemingly superfluous expression “that which is set apart from the sacred”? Conclude from this that the prohibition is referring to two deeds: The daughter of a priest who engaged in intercourse with an unfit man may not partake of teruma, and if she weds a non-priest she may not partake of the priestly portion of offerings, the breast and right hind leg.

The Gemara asks: We found a source for a priestess; from where do we derive the same halakha with regard to a Levite or an Israelite woman who engaged in intercourse with an unfit man, i.e., that they do not partake of teruma even if they marry a priest? The Gemara answers that it is as Rabbi Abba said that Rav said: The verse states: “But if a priest’s daughter be a widow, or divorced” (Leviticus 22:13). It could have begun: If a priest’s daughter. The word “but,” the prefix vav, is seemingly superfluous, and therefore it may indicate the expansion of the prohibition to include additional women. Here too, it may be derived from the distinction between the phrase: If a priest’s daughter, and the phrase: “And if a priest’s daughter,” which utilizes the prefix vav, that Levite and Israelite women are subject to the prohibition as well.

The Gemara asks: In accordance with whose opinion is this exposition possible? It is in accordance only with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, as he derives halakhot from the prefix vav, which means “and” or “but.” The Gemara responds: Even if you say it is in accordance with the Rabbis, who do not derive halakhot from the prefix vav, the entire phrase: “And if a priest’s daughter,” is superfluous in the verse, as the previous verse already mentioned the priest’s daughter. Therefore, the inclusion of Levite and Israelite women in the prohibition may be derived from the entire expression.

The Gemara asks: We found a source for the woman’s disqualification from partaking of teruma; from where do we derive that she is disqualified from marrying into the priesthood? The Gemara counters: Is that to say that we did not include a Levite and an Israelite woman in the verse “But if a priest’s daughter be a widow, or divorced, etc.” (Leviticus 22:13), with regard to their marriage to a member of the priesthood? The derivation that a Levite and an Israelite woman are included in this verse was clearly with regard to their marriage to a priest; as if the inclusion was with regard to teruma, are these women fit to partake of teruma at all, regardless of their having engaged in intercourse with an unfit man? Clearly, their inclusion pertains to their marriage to a priest and their partaking of teruma as his wife.

The Gemara rejects this assertion: Why not? Why can’t the inclusion be referring to the partaking of teruma exclusively? You find that possibility when she partakes of teruma due to her son. If an Israelite woman has a son from a priest, she may partake of teruma. Therefore, it is necessary to include a Levite or Israelite woman in the prohibition against partaking of teruma if she engaged in intercourse with an unfit man.

The Gemara responds: The halakha that this woman does not partake of teruma due to her son is deduced through an a fortiori inference: If a priestess, who partakes of teruma by virtue of her own sanctity, is disqualified from partaking of teruma by an unfit man who engaged in intercourse with her, then with regard to a Levite or Israelite woman, who partakes of teruma only due to her son, is it not all the more so that it should be prohibited for her to partake of teruma after this act?

The Gemara rejects that response: But that provides support for the contrary reasoning. It is logical that a priestess, who is herself sacred, is disqualified by intercourse with an unfit man. However, with regard to this woman, who is not sacred herself, and who eats teruma only due to her son, intercourse with an unfit man should not disqualify her. Rather, the prohibition against these women marrying into the priesthood is derived by an a fortiori inference from the case of a divorcée: If a divorcée who is the daughter of a priest, who is permitted to partake of teruma, is nevertheless prohibited from marrying into the priesthood, as is written in the Torah (Leviticus 21:7), then with regard to this woman, for whom it is prohibited to partake of teruma, is it not right that she should be disqualified from marrying into the priesthood?

The Gemara raises an objection to that inference: But do we warn, i.e., do we deduce a prohibition through logical derivation? The Gemara answers: This is not a new prohibition; rather, it is merely a revelation of the above prohibition’s scope. In other words, the prohibition against marrying a priest is subsumed under the prohibition against partaking of teruma.

Now that the source has been established, the Gemara asks: And perhaps you should say that this halakha pertaining to a woman who engaged in intercourse with a man unfit for her applies only to those liable to receive karet for their act of intercourse, but not to intercourse with a man who is unfit to marry into the assembly of Israel. The Gemara answers that the Merciful One states in the Torah: “If a priest’s daughter be married” (Leviticus 22:12), indicating that this halakha is referring to those who can have a valid marriage, while those liable to receive karet for their act of intercourse are not fit for marriage.

The Gemara asks: If so, a gentile or a slave who engaged in intercourse with a Jewish woman should not have disqualified her from marrying into the priesthood, as they cannot marry her. The Gemara answers: These disqualify her, as derived by Rabbi Yishmael, as Rabbi Yoḥanan said in the name of Rabbi Yishmael: From where is it derived with regard to a gentile or a slave who engaged in intercourse with an Israelite woman, or with a priestess, or a Levite woman, that they have disqualified her? As it is stated: “But if a priest’s daughter be a widow, or divorced, and have no child, and is returned to her father’s house, as in her youth, she may eat of her father’s bread” (Leviticus 22:13).

Traduction : The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren Noé Talmud, with commentary by Rabbi Adin Even-Israel Steinsaltz.

Yevamot 68b examines which verses restrict a priest's daughter and a common man from eating teruma, and when a widow may resume this privilege.