Talmud - Yevamot 103b יבמות ק״ג ב׳

is a disadvantage for the righteous, as a righteous individual gains no pleasure from this so-called beneficial act. As it is stated by God to Laban: “Take heed to yourself that you speak not to Jacob either good or bad” (Genesis 31:24). Granted, speak no bad; this is rightly so, i.e., understandable. But speak no good? Why not? Rather, learn from here that even something that would be a good benefit to the wicked like Laban, is a disadvantage for the righteous.

The Gemara asks: Granted, there, in Laban’s words to Jacob, it is understandable that there could be a certain repulsive aspect to a wicked man speaking nicely to a righteous individual, as perhaps he will mention to him the name of the idol he worships and even though he means well, it still would repulse Jacob. But here, what disadvantage is there if she derives benefit from licentious relations with a wicked man?

The Gemara answers: He implants filth in her and contaminates her, as her body accepts his semen. As Rabbi Yoḥanan also said, based on his understanding that the serpent seduced Eve into having sexual relations with him: When the serpent came upon Eve, he infected her with moral contamination, and this contamination remained in all human beings. When the Jewish people stood at Mount Sinai their contamination ceased, whereas with regard to gentiles, who did not stand at Mount Sinai, their contamination never ceased. Therefore, Yael was repulsed by the contamination that she allowed into her body, and she did not benefit from relations with Sisera.

§ It was taught in the mishna that if she performed ḥalitza using a shoe that was not his, the ḥalitza is valid. The Sages taught: From the verse “And remove his shoe from on his foot” (Deuteronomy 25:9), I have derived only that the yavam may wear “his shoe,” i.e., a shoe that belongs to him; from where do I derive that he may wear any person’s shoe? The verse states the words “shoe” and “shoe” twice: “And remove his shoe” (Deuteronomy 25:9), and “The house of he who had his shoe removed” (Deuteronomy 25:10), to teach us that in any case it is acceptable, i.e., the shoes of another person may also be worn for ḥalitza.

But if so, what is the meaning when the verse states: “His shoe,” which seems to indicate that he must own the shoe that he is wearing? It teaches that one must wear “his shoe,” i.e., a shoe that is fitting for him, excluding a shoe so large that he is unable to walk in it, and excluding a shoe so small it does not cover most of his foot, and also excluding a heelless sandal [sandal hamesulyam], a sandal that has only a sole but does not have a heel and is not fit for walking.

The Gemara relates: Abaye was standing before Rav Yosef and a yevama came to perform ḥalitza. Rav Yosef said to Abaye: Give the yavam your sandal so that the ḥalitza may begin. He gave him his left sandal. Rav Yosef said to him: Granted, one can say that the Sages said that it is permitted to perform ḥalitza with the left shoe after the fact, but did they say that it is also permitted ab initio?

He said to him: If so, then also with regard to a sandal that does not belong to him, say that the Sages said that it is permitted after the fact; however, did they say it is permitted as well to perform ḥalitza using another’s shoe ab initio? Rav Yosef said to Abaye: This is what I was saying to you: Give him your sandal and transfer ownership to him by giving it to him as a temporary gift so that it will be his, and therefore the ḥalitza will be performed in an ideal manner, without any question as to its validity.

The mishna taught that if the yevama performed ḥalitza while the yavam was wearing a wooden sandal the ḥalitza is valid. The Gemara asks: Who is the tanna who taught that it is permitted to use a wooden sandal? Shmuel said: It is the opinion of Rabbi Meir, as we learned in a mishna (Shabbat 65b): One with an amputated leg may go out on Shabbat with his wooden leg, as it has the legal status of a shoe; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And Rabbi Yosei prohibits it, since he does not consider it to have the legal status of a shoe. Alternatively, the father of Shmuel says: Here the mishna is referring to a wooden sandal that is covered in leather, and all agree. This halakha was taught in accordance with all opinions, as even Rabbi Yosei agrees that the leather covering makes it a shoe.

Rav Pappi said in the name of Rava: One should not perform ḥalitza on a yavam wearing a quarantined sandal, i.e., a sandal examined by a priest who found its signs of leprosy to be inconclusive, and places the sandal in isolation for a waiting period of up to two weeks to see if clear indications of leprosy develop. But if she did perform ḥalitza while the yavam was wearing it, her ḥalitza is nevertheless valid after the fact. On the other hand, if the sandal with leprosy is a confirmed sandal, i.e., a sandal that was definitively ruled to have leprosy, one may not perform ḥalitza with it, and if she did perform ḥalitza while the man was wearing it, her ḥalitza is disqualified. As an object with confirmed leprosy must be burned, it is considered halakhically as if it were already burnt, and is consequently considered to lack the qualities of a shoe necessary for ḥalitza.

In contrast, Rav Pappa said in the name of Rava: With regard to both a quarantined sandal and a confirmed sandal the same halakha applies: She may not perform ḥalitza with it ab initio, but if she did perform ḥalitza with it, her ḥalitza is valid.

The Gemara raises an objection to Rav Pappi’s version, from a mishna (Nega’im 13:4): A quarantined house, i.e., one in which a discoloration appeared and was then quarantined by a priest until it could be determined whether it would be deemed a confirmed house of leprosy or not, renders one who touches it ritually impure from within, i.e., if one touches the inside of the house he becomes ritually impure; a house with confirmed leprosy renders one impure not only from touching it inside from within, but additionally from touching it behind, by touching it on the outside; and both this and that, i.e., both a quarantined house and a confirmed house, impart ritual impurity through entering it, as one who enters into either house becomes ritually impure, even if he does not touch the walls.

The Gemara elaborates: And if it enters your mind to say that an item with confirmed leprosy is considered as if it were crushed and not intact due to the requirement to burn it, then in order to contract ritual impurity through entering a house with leprosy, we require that there be a house, as the verse states: “Moreover, one who enters the house…shall be ritually impure” (Leviticus 14:46)? And this requirement is not satisfied here, as the house confirmed with leprosy must be burned and consequently should be considered as if it is crushed and not intact.

The Gemara answers: There it is different, as the verse states: “And he shall break down the house” (Leviticus 14:45), which teaches that even while it is being broken down it is still called a house, until it is totally destroyed. Therefore, although for other purposes, objects that are required to be burned are considered crushed, the verse explicitly teaches that a house confirmed with leprosy is considered intact with regard to its ability to transmit ritual impurity to those who enter it.

Come and hear a proof from the Tosefta (Nega’im 7:3): If a rag that is three fingerbreadths by three fingerbreadths has a spot of leprosy, then even if it does not contain the minimum volume of an olive-bulk, once most of the rag enters a pure house it renders the house ritually impure. What, is it not referring to a rag with confirmed leprosy, implying that one should calculate its measurements even when its leprosy is confirmed and it is destined to be burned? The Gemara rejects this assumption: No, this is referring to a quarantined rag, which does not have to be burned and is consequently considered intact. It can be measured to determine if it has the minimum measurements required for imparting ritual impurity.

The Gemara challenges: If you interpret it so, say the latter clause: If the rag was the volume of several olives, i.e., it was very thick and even a small section of the cloth was equal to an olive-bulk, when one olive-bulk of the rag enters a ritually pure house, even if it is a small portion of the rag, it renders the house ritually impure.

Granted, if you say that the entire baraita is referring to a rag with confirmed leprosy, this is so because a confirmed leper is juxtaposed with and thereby compared to a dead person (Numbers 12:12), and therefore an olive-bulk of the rag causes ritual impurity just as an olive-bulk of a corpse does. But if you say it is speaking about a quarantined rag, why should it be juxtaposed to a dead person? There is no biblical source comparing a quarantined leper to a corpse, and therefore, there is no reason to think that an olive-bulk of a rag transmits ritual impurity. Only if the rag is of the minimum dimensions and the entire rag enters the airspace does it transmit ritual impurity.

The Gemara answers: That is correct; the baraita is referring to a rag with confirmed leprosy, but nevertheless it is not difficult for Rav Pappi. Although generally objects that are required to be burnt are considered crushed even before they are burnt, this is not true with regard to a garment with leprosy. There the halakha for a garment that has confirmed leprosy is different, as the verse states: “And he shall burn the garment” (Leviticus 13:52), which indicates that even when it is being burned, it is still called a garment.

The Gemara asks: If your interpretation above is correct, that a garment with confirmed leprosy can still transmit ritual impurity even though the object is to be burned and should be considered crushed, let us learn from this concerning a sandal that even after it has been definitively determined to have leprosy, it is still considered a shoe and should be eligible for ḥalitza, at least after the fact, in accordance with Rav Pappa’s opinion. The Gemara answers: We cannot derive a halakha of a prohibition from a halakha of ritual impurity, as these different areas of halakha cannot be compared. Therefore, although a garment with leprosy is considered intact with regard to the transmission of ritual impurity, that status cannot act as a source to teach that it is intact for the purpose of ruling that ḥalitza performed with a shoe with confirmed leprosy is valid.

The Gemara cites Rava’s final ruling: Rava said that the halakha is the same for a quarantined sandal, a confirmed sandal, and a sandal of idolatrous worship, i.e., a sandal that was placed on a statue of idolatrous worship; one should not perform ḥalitza with it, and if she did perform ḥalitza with it, her ḥalitza is valid. If, however, he was wearing a sandal that functioned as an offering of idolatrous worship, in that it was brought as a gift to an idol;

Traduction : The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren Noé Talmud, with commentary by Rabbi Adin Even-Israel Steinsaltz.

Yevamot 103b explores why righteousness rejects favors from the wicked and discusses spiritual contamination, plus the validity of using another person's shoe for chalitza.