Talmud - Shabbat 11b שבת י״א ב׳

and the same is true in the wine press.

In light of the halakha that was taught in this mishna a dilemma was raised before the Sages: What is the legal status of a karmelit in this matter? Is it permissible to stand in one domain and drink from a karmelit or not? Abaye said: That case is equal to that case, i.e., the same way that the Sages prohibited drinking from the private domain to the public domain and vice versa, so too, they prohibited drinking from the karmelit to another domain. Rava said: It is not prohibited. It, the prohibition to carry between a karmelit and another domain, itself is merely a rabbinic decree. And will we arise and issue one decree to prevent violation of another decree? Although the Sages prohibited doing so in one of the domains by Torah law, i.e., the public and the private domains, a similar decree was not issued in a karmelit, which is a domain by rabbinic law.

Abaye said: From where do I say that halakha, i.e., that the decree applies to a karmelit? From that which we learned at the end of the mishna in tractate Eiruvin: And the same is true in the wine press. The question arises: What is the status of the wine press in terms of the domains of Shabbat? If you say that it is the private domain, we already learned that in the mishna. If it is the public domain, we already learned that as well. Rather, isn’t this press a karmelit? Apparently, a karmelit was also prohibited in the mishna.

Rava said: That which we learned in the mishna: And the same is true in the wine press, is not relevant to the halakhot of Shabbat. It refers to the matter of the halakhot of tithes. And Rav Sheshet also said: That which we learned in the mishna: And the same is true in the wine press, refers to the matter of tithes, as we learned in a mishna: One may ab initio drink grape juice directly on the press without tithing, whether the juice was diluted with hot water, even though he will then be unable to return the leftover wine to the press, as it would ruin all the wine in the press, or whether the juice was diluted with cold water, in which case he could return the leftover wine without ruining the rest, and he is exempt. Drinking that way is considered incidental drinking, and anything that is not a fixed meal is exempt from tithing. That is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Tzadok, obligates one to separate the tithe in both cases. And the Rabbis say: There is a distinction between these two cases; when the wine was diluted with hot water, since he cannot return what is left of the wine to the press, he is obligated to tithe, as it is like fixed drinking for which one is obligated to tithe. However, when the wine was diluted with cold water, he is exempt, because he returns the leftover wine to the press, and it is incidental drinking, which is exempt from tithing. Our mishna, which says: And the same is true in the press, means that only if his head and most of his body was in the press is he permitted to drink without separating the tithe, and that halakha is not at all related to matters of Shabbat (Rabbeinu Ḥananel).

As proof for Abaye’s opinion, the Gemara states that which we learned in our mishna: The tailor may not go out with his needle adjacent to nightfall on Shabbat eve, lest he forget that he is carrying the needle and go out with it to the public domain even after Shabbat begins. Is it not speaking here in a case where the needle was stuck in his clothing? In that case, even if he was to go out into the public domain with the needle, he would not be liable by Torah law, since that is not the typical manner of carrying out; carrying out an object in that manner is prohibited only by rabbinic decree [shevut]. Nevertheless, not only did the Rabbis issue a decree to prohibit going out with the needle on Shabbat, they issued a decree to prevent violation of another decree and prohibited the tailor from going out with his needle adjacent to nightfall. Apparently, the Sages institute a decree to prevent violation of another decree with regard to the halakhot of carrying out on Shabbat (Tosafot). Consequently, with regard to the halakhot of karmelit, the Sages issued a decree as well, and this is proof for Abaye’s opinion. The Gemara rejects this: No, the mishna is referring to a case where he is holding the needle in his hand, which constitutes performance of the full-fledged prohibited labor of carrying out.

Come and hear another proof from that which was taught explicitly in the baraita: The tailor may not go out with his needle stuck in his clothing. Is it not speaking of a case where he goes out on Shabbat eve, and the Sages issued a decree to prevent violation of another decree, just as Abaye said? The Gemara rejects this: No, when that was taught in the baraita, it was only with regard to carrying out on Shabbat itself. The Gemara asks further: Wasn’t it taught explicitly in a baraita: The tailor may not go out with his needle stuck in his clothing on Shabbat eve at nightfall, and the Sages issued a decree to prevent violation of another decree, just as Abaye said? The Gemara rejects this: Whose opinion is cited in this baraita? It is the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who said: A craftsman who carries out an object in the manner common to his craft, even if others do not generally carry it out in that manner, the craftsman is liable, because he carried the object out in a manner standard for him.

As it was taught in a baraita: The tailor may not go out with his needle that is stuck in his clothing, and a carpenter may not go out with the wood chip that is behind his ear for use as a measuring stick, and a comber of wool may not go out with a cord with which he ties bundles of wool and which is usually placed that is on his ear, and a weaver [gardi] may not go out with a bit of wool [ira] that is on his ear which he uses for the purpose of his work, and the painter may not go out with the sample of dyed wool that is on his neck, and a money changer may not go out with the dinar that is in his ear. In all of these cases the halakha is that if he went out, he is exempt by Torah law, but it is prohibited for him to do so by rabbinic decree. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says: A craftsman who carries out an object in the manner common to his craft on Shabbat is liable by Torah law; any other person who carries it out in that manner is exempt, but it is prohibited for him to do so.

Since the dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda with regard to the legal status of one who carries out an object in an atypical manner was mentioned, the Gemara discusses a contradiction between two related baraitot. It was taught in one baraita: The zav may not go out on Shabbat with his pouch that he ties to his organ in order to absorb his emission. And if he went out, he is exempt by Torah law but it is prohibited for him to do so by rabbinic law. And it was taught in another baraita: The zav may not go out on Shabbat with his pouch. And if he went out unwittingly, he is liable to bring a sin-offering.

Rav Yosef said: This is not difficult. There is no contradiction between the baraitot, as this baraita, which deems him exempt, is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir; that, the other baraita, which deems him liable, is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda.

Abaye said to Rav Yosef: Say that you heard that Rabbi Meir deems him exempt with regard to an object that is not carried out in its typical manner. However, with regard to a matter that is carried out in its typical manner, did you hear that he deems him exempt? In general, one carries out a needle in his hand. Rabbi Meir exempts one who carries it out in his clothing, even if he is a craftsman. However, this pouch of a zav, even though it is not held in his hand, is always carried out in that manner, and, even according to Rabbi Meir, that constitutes a bona fide act of carrying out. As, if you do not say so, that the specifics of various prohibited labors can be performed in different manners, in the case of a layman [hedyot], who carved out a vessel the size of a kav in a piece of wood on Shabbat, would you say that Rabbi Meir also does not deem him liable for performing a prohibited labor on Shabbat because he is not a craftsman and he did not craft the vessel according to the standards of a craftsman? Certainly, the layman performed a full-fledged labor to the best of his ability and he is liable.

Rather, Rav Hamnuna said: This is not difficult, as the two baraitot are referring to two different cases. Here, in the baraita that deemed him liable by Torah law, it is referring to a zav who experienced two sightings of an emission. Liability to bring an offering as part of the purification process is only after he sees three emissions. Therefore, the zav requires the pouch in order to ascertain whether or not he experienced a third emission. However, there, in the baraita that deems him exempt, it is referring to a zav who already experienced three sightings. For him there is no significance whether or not he experiences an additional emission. Therefore, the pouch is insignificant and he has no interest in carrying it out.

The Gemara asks: What is different about a zav who had two sightings, who is liable, as he requires the pouch for the purpose of examination to ascertain whether or not he experienced a third sighting, and a zav who already experienced three sightings and requires the pouch for the purpose of counting clean days? In order to become ritually pure, he must count seven clean days without experiencing an emission. If so, even a zav who had three sightings requires the pouch, in order to ascertain whether or not he experienced another emission. The Gemara answers: That baraita was only needed for that day when he already saw his third emission. In any case, that day will not be a clean day.

The Gemara asks: Doesn’t even that zav need the pouch so that his clothes will not get soiled by the emission? Although he does not need the pouch for a halakhic determination, he needs it for practical considerations. Rabbi Zeira said: This tanna is the one who said that any usage intended to prevent filth is not considered a special purpose that will render a certain object an actual vessel. As we learned in a mishna: One who places a bowl on the wall while it is raining, if he did that so that the bowl would be rinsed with the rainwater, that is under the rubric of the verse: “If water be placed.” The water has the legal status of a liquid that he poured of his own volition on fruit and seeds. It renders them liable to become ritually impure, as it is written: “If water be placed upon seed and any of their carcass fell on it, it is impure to you” (Leviticus 11:38). However, if he placed the bowl so

Traduction : The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren Noé Talmud, with commentary by Rabbi Adin Even-Israel Steinsaltz.

Shabbat 11b explores whether rabbinic decrees against carrying between domains apply to a karmelit, debated by Abaye and Rava using the winepress example.