Talmud - Eruvin 82b עירובין פ״ב ב׳

Rav Yehoshua, son of Rav Idi, said in answer: When Rav Asi said that this child may go out by means of his mother’s eiruv, he was referring to a case where his father established an eiruv on his behalf to the north, and his mother prepared an eiruv on his behalf to the south, as even a six-year-old prefers the company of his mother to that of his father. However, Rav Asi agrees that if they did not both establish an eiruv for him he is not subordinate to his mother.

The Gemara raises an objection from a baraita: A child who needs his mother may go out by means of his mother’s eiruv that she established for herself. Until what age may he do so? He can be up to the age of six. This baraita is a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Rav Yehoshua bar Rav Idi, who maintains that a six-year-old may go out by means of his mother’s eiruv only if she established an eiruv on his behalf as well? The Gemara concludes: This is indeed a conclusive refutation.

The Gemara comments: Let us say that this is also a refutation of the opinion of Rav Asi, as here it states: Until the age of six, which indicates that he can be up to, but not including, six years old, whereas Rav Asi maintains that even a six-year-old is included in this halakha. The Gemara states: Rav Asi can say to you that when the baraita states: Up to the age of six, it means up to and including six years old.

The Gemara comments: Let us say that this is also a refutation of the opinion of Rabbi Yannai and Reish Lakish, who maintain that a child in need of his mother is one who is up to age four or five. The Gemara explains: This is not difficult. Here Rabbi Yannai and Reish Lakish are referring to a situation when the child’s father is in town. As the child can go out with his father, he is no longer in need of his mother, even though he is younger than six. In contrast, there the baraita is referring to a case when his father is not in town. The child therefore needs his mother until he reaches the age of six.

Our Sages taught in a baraita: A person may establish an eiruv on behalf of his minor son or daughter, and on behalf of his Canaanite servant or maidservant, either with their knowledge or without their knowledge. However, he may not establish an eiruv, neither on behalf of his Hebrew servant or maidservant, nor on behalf of his adult son or daughter, nor on behalf of his wife, except with their knowledge.

It was taught in another baraita: A person may establish an eiruv on behalf of his adult son or daughter, and on behalf of his Hebrew servant or maidservant, and on behalf of his wife, only with their knowledge. However, he may establish an eiruv on behalf of his Canaanite servant or maidservant, and on behalf of his minor son or daughter, either with their knowledge or without their knowledge, as their hand is like his hand, i.e., their status and the domain in which they are located are determined by his status and domain.

And all of these who established an eiruv for themselves, and at the same time their master established an eiruv for them in a different direction, they may go out by means of their master’s eiruv, except for a wife, because she can object by saying that she does not want her husband’s eiruv.

The Gemara begins its analysis of the baraitot by posing a question: A wife, in what way is she different from an adult son or daughter? Why can’t they object? They are also of age and under their own authority. Rabba said: The reference is not only to a wife; the tanna is speaking of a wife and all who are similar to her in this regard, such as a Hebrew servant or an adult son.

The Master said in the baraita: These people may go out by means of their master’s eiruv, except for a wife, because she can object. The Gemara infers: The reason is due to the fact that she objected, but if he established an eiruv and she did not specify her feelings about it one way or another, she may go out by means of her husband’s eiruv. The Gemara raises an objection: Doesn’t the first clause of the baraita state that he may establish an eiruv only with their knowledge? What, is this not referring to a case where he asked them whether or not they want this eiruv, and they said yes? It can be inferred from here that if his wife did not say anything, she may not use the eiruv.

The Gemara rejects this argument: No; what is the meaning of the phrase: Only with their knowledge? It means that they were silent and said nothing in protest. This comes to exclude a case where they said no. If, however, they did not object, they may go out by means of the eiruv of the head of the family.

The Gemara raises an objection: Wasn’t it taught in that same baraita: And with regard to all of these who established an eiruv for themselves, and their master established an eiruv for them in a different direction, they may go out by means of their master’s eiruv. And that is referring to a situation when they did not specify their feelings, as it does not state that they objected, and yet the baraita states: Except for a wife, who may not go out by means of her husband’s eiruv. The baraita clearly indicates that even if she did not object, the husband’s eiruv is ineffective for his wife.

Rava said: Since they established an eiruv in a different direction, you have no protest greater than this. They need not register any other objection, as their actions prove that they do not wish to be part of their master’s eiruv.

MISHNA: What is the measure for a joining of Shabbat boundaries? It consists of a quantity of food sufficient for two meals for each and every one of those included in the eiruv. The tanna’im disagree with regard to the size of these two meals. It is referring to one’s food that he eats on a weekday and not on Shabbat; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says: It is referring to the amount he eats on Shabbat and not on a weekday. And both this Sage, Rabbi Meir, and that Sage, Rabbi Yehuda, intended to be lenient, as Rabbi Meir maintains that people eat more food on Shabbat, whereas Rabbi Yehuda believes that they consume more on a weekday.

Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka says: Food for two meals is the size of a loaf bought with a pundeyon, which is one-forty-eighth of a sela, when four se’a of wheat are sold for a sela. Rabbi Shimon says: Food for two meals is two of three parts of a loaf, when three loaves are prepared from a kav of wheat. In other words, the measure is two-thirds of a loaf the size of one-third of a kav.

Having discussed measures with regard to a loaf of bread, the mishna states that half of this loaf is the amount called a half [peras], a measure relevant for the halakhot of a leprous house. If one enters a house afflicted with leprosy and remains there long enough to eat this amount of food, the clothes he is wearing become ritually impure. And half of its half, a quarter of this loaf, is the amount of ritually impure food that disqualifies the body. In other words, impure food of this amount imparts ritual impurity to the body of the eater, and disqualifies him by rabbinic law from eating teruma.

GEMARA: The Gemara asks: And how much is food for two meals according to the measures of Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Meir? Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: Two farmers’ [ikaryata] loaves of bread. Rav Adda bar Ahava said: Two standard loaves of bread baked in the region of the Pappa River.

Rav Yosef said to Rav Yosef, son of Rava: Your father, in accordance with whose opinion does he hold, that of Rabbi Yehuda or Rabbi Meir? He replied: He holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir. Rav Yosef added: I too agree with the ruling of Rabbi Meir, because if the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda, a difficulty would arise from the popular saying: There is always room for sweets. It is generally accepted that one dining on delicacies eats more, and therefore, the amount of food in Shabbat meals is greater than that of weekdays, as they include more sweet foods.

We learned in the mishna that Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka says that one measure is the amount of food for two meals, while Rabbi Shimon established a different amount. A Sage taught in the Tosefta: And their statements are close to being identical. The Gemara expresses surprise at this: Are they really identical? According to the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan there are four meals to a kav. He maintains that food for two meals is equivalent to a loaf that can be purchased with a pundeyon, which is one-forty-eighth of a sela, when four se’a are bought for a sela. As there are twenty-four kav in four se’a, a loaf purchased with a pundeyon is half of a kav. This means that each meal is a quarter of a kav, or that there are four meals in a kav. In contrast, according to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, there are nine meals to a kav. Rabbi Shimon maintains that food for two meals is two-thirds of a loaf equal in size to one-third of a kav. By this calculation, one meal is one-third of a loaf that itself is one-third of a kav in size, which amounts to nine meals in a kav.

Rav Ḥisda said in explanation of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka’s opinion: Deduct one-third for the grocer’s markup, as he takes one-third as profit. This adds one half to the total cost.

The Gemara asks: Even after allowing for this adjustment, it remains the case that according to this Sage, Rabbi Shimon, there are nine meals to a kav, whereas according to the other Sage, Rabbi Yoḥanan, although it suffices for more than four meals, there are only six meals to a kav. According to the measure of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka, each meal is two-thirds of a quarter kav, i.e., one sixth of a kav, which still leaves a considerable discrepancy between their measures.

Rather, we must explain in accordance with that other statement of Rav Ḥisda, as he said: Deduct one half for the grocer’s markup. If the calculation is based on the assumption that the grocer takes half the sum as profit, the two measures are indeed close.

The Gemara asks: But it remains the case that according to this Sage, there are nine meals to a kav, whereas according to the other Sage, there are only eight meals to a kav, as each meal is one half of a quarter kav, or one-eighth of a kav. The Gemara answers: This is the meaning of that which was stated in the Tosefta: And their rulings are close to being identical. Although their measures are not exactly the same, there is no great difference between them.

The Gemara comments: Nonetheless, there is a contradiction between one statement of Rav Ḥisda and the other statement of Rav Ḥisda concerning the size of the grocer’s profit. The Gemara answers: This is not difficult, as in this case, the homeowner provides the wood for baking bread, and the grocer therefore marks up the price by one-third as compensation for his efforts. Whereas in that case, the homeowner does not provide the wood; the grocer is entitled to reimbursement for the cost of the wood in addition to the work of baking, and consequently he marks up the price by one half.

We learned in the mishna that the time it takes to eat half the loaf is the time it takes for the clothes of one who entered a leprous house to become ritually impure, and half of its half, of the loaf, is the amount of ritually impure food that disqualifies the body from eating teruma.

Traduction : The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren Noé Talmud, with commentary by Rabbi Adin Even-Israel Steinsaltz.

Eruvin 82b examines up to what age a young child may rely on his mother’s eiruv rather than his father’s when navigating Shabbat boundaries.