Talmud - Eruvin 99a עירובין צ״ט א׳

The Gemara explains: Rav Ḥinnana maintains that from the fact that the latter clause of the mishna, was taught in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, it can be inferred that the first clause was likewise taught in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir. But in fact that is not so: The latter clause is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, while the first clause is in accordance with that of the Rabbis.

We learned in the mishna: One may move objects in a public domain when he is standing in a private domain, provided that he does not carry them beyond four cubits in the public domain. The Gemara infers: This teaching indicates that if he carried them beyond four cubits, he is liable to bring a sin-offering. The Gemara asks: Let us say that this ruling supports the opinion of Rava, as Rava said: With regard to one who carries an object in a public domain from the beginning of four cubits to the end of those four cubits, even if he carried it above his head, i.e., he lifted the object above his head so that it passed through an exempt place, he is nonetheless liable for carrying four cubits in a public domain. Here, too, although he is standing in an elevated private domain and carries the object at that elevated height, he is still liable.

The Gemara rejects this contention: Is the mishna teaching that if he carried the object beyond four cubits he is liable to bring a sin-offering? Perhaps the mishna means: If he carried the object beyond four cubits, he is exempt from bringing a sin-offering, but it is nevertheless prohibited by rabbinic decree to do so.

Some say a different version of the previous discussion: The Gemara’s initial inference was actually that if he carried the object beyond four cubits he is exempt from bringing a sin-offering, but it is prohibited by rabbinic decree to do so. The Gemara asks: If so, let us say that this is a conclusive refutation of Rava’s opinion, as Rava said: With regard to one who carries an object in a public domain from the beginning of four cubits to the end of those four cubits, even if he carried it above his head, he is liable. The Gemara rejects this suggestion: Is the mishna teaching that if he took it beyond four cubits he is exempt, but it is prohibited to do so? Perhaps the tanna means that if he carried it beyond four cubits, he is liable to bring a sin-offering.

The mishna states: A person may not stand in a private domain and urinate or spit into the public domain. Rav Yosef said: One who urinated or spat in this manner is liable to bring a sin-offering.

The Gemara raises a difficulty: But for an act of carrying to be considered a prohibited Shabbat labor that entails liability, we require that the lifting and placing of the object be performed from atop an area four by four handbreadths, the minimal size of significance with regard to the halakhot of carrying on Shabbat. And that is not the case here, as one’s mouth, which produces the spittle, is not four by four handbreadths in size.

The Gemara answers: One’s intent renders it an area of significance, i.e., as one certainly considers his mouth a significant area, it is regarded as four by four handbreadths in size. As, if you do not say so, that the size of an area is not the sole criterion, but that a person’s thoughts can also establish a place as significant, there is a difficulty with that which Rava said: If a person threw an object and it landed in the mouth of a dog or in the mouth of a furnace, he is liable to bring a sin-offering. But don’t we require that the object be placed on an area of four by four handbreadths? And that is not the case here.

Rather, the person’s intent to throw the object into the dog’s mouth renders it an area of significance. Here too, his intent renders his own mouth a significant area.

Rava raised a dilemma: If one is standing in a private domain, and the opening of his male member is in the public domain, and he urinates, what is the halakha? How should this case be regarded? Do we follow the domain where the urine is uprooted from the body, i.e., the bladder, which is in the private domain? Or do we follow the point of the urine’s actual emission from the body, and since the urine leaves his body through the opening of his member in the public domain, no prohibition has been violated? Since this dilemma was not resolved, the Gemara concludes: Let it stand unresolved.

The mishna states: And likewise, one may not spit from one domain to another. Rabbi Yehuda says: Once a person’s spittle is gathered in his mouth, he may not walk four cubits in the public domain until he removes it. The Gemara asks: Does this teaching mean that it is prohibited to do so even if he has not turned the spittle over in his mouth, i.e., after he has dredged up the saliva but before he has rolled it around in his mouth in preparation to spit it out?

Didn’t we learn in a mishna the halakha of one who was eating a dried fig of teruma with unwashed hands? By Torah law, only food that has come into contact with a liquid is susceptible to ritual impurity, and no liquid had ever fallen on this fig. The significance of the fact that his hands are unwashed is that by rabbinic law, unwashed hands have second degree ritual impurity status and therefore invalidate teruma. If this person inserted his hand into his mouth to remove a pebble, Rabbi Meir deems the dried fig impure, as it had been rendered liable to contract impurity by the spittle in the person’s mouth, and it subsequently became impure when it was touched by his unwashed hand. And Rabbi Yosei deems the fig ritually pure, as he maintains that spittle which is still in one’s mouth is not considered liquid that renders food liable to contract impurity; the spittle does so only after it has left the mouth.

Rabbi Yehuda says that there is a distinction between the cases: If he turned the spittle over in his mouth, it is like spittle that has been detached from its place, and therefore its legal status is that of a liquid, which means the fig is impure. However, if he had not yet turned the spittle over in his mouth, the fig is pure. This indicates that according to Rabbi Yehuda, spittle that has not yet been turned over in one’s mouth is not considered detached.

Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The attribution of the opinions is reversed, as the opinion attributed to Rabbi Yehuda is actually that of a different tanna, while Rabbi Yehuda himself maintains that the fig is ritually impure in either case.

Reish Lakish said: Actually, do not reverse the opinions, and the apparent contradiction can be reconciled in accordance with the original version of the text: With what we are dealing here in the mishna? We are dealing with his phlegm that is expelled through coughing.

The Gemara raises a difficulty against this resolution. Wasn’t it taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yehuda says: If one’s phlegm was detached, he may not walk four cubits in the public domain with it in his mouth? What, is it not the case that this halakha refers to spittle that was detached? The Gemara rejects this contention: No, this ruling applies only to one’s phlegm that was detached. The Gemara raises a difficulty: Wasn’t it taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yehuda says: If one’s phlegm was detached, and likewise, if his spittle was detached, he may not walk four cubits in the public domain before he spits it out, even if he has not yet turned it over. Rather, it is clear as we originally answered, that the opinions in the mishna with regard to spittle and ritual impurity must be reversed.

Having mentioned phlegm, the Gemara cites a related teaching: Reish Lakish said: One who expelled phlegm in front of his master has acted in a disrespectful manner and is liable for the punishment of death at the hand of Heaven, as it is stated: “All they who hate Me love death” (Proverbs 8:36). Do not read it as: “They who hate [mesanai] Me”; rather, read it as: “Those who make themselves hateful [masniai] to Me,” i.e., those who make themselves hateful by such a discharge.

The Gemara expresses surprise at this ruling: But doesn’t he do so involuntarily, as no one coughs and emits phlegm by choice; why should this be considered a transgression? The Gemara answers: We are speaking here of someone who had phlegm in his mouth and spat it out, i.e., one who had the opportunity to leave his master’s presence and spit outside.

MISHNA: A person may stand in a private domain and extend his head and drink in a public domain, and he may stand in a public domain and drink in a private domain, only if he brings his head and most of his body into the domain in which he drinks. And the same applies in a winepress, as will be explained in the Gemara.

GEMARA: The Gemara registers surprise at the mishna: It would seem that the first clause, i.e., the previous mishna, is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who maintain that a person located in one domain is permitted to move objects in another domain, whereas the latter clause, i.e., this mishna, is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who maintains that it is prohibited for a person in one domain to move objects in a different domain.

Rav Yosef said: This mishna is referring to objects that one needs, and the ruling is accepted by all. In this case, even the Rabbis concede that it is prohibited to move objects in another domain, lest one absent-mindedly draw the objects to him and thereby violate a Torah prohibition.

A dilemma was raised before the Sages: If one of the domains is a karmelit, what is the halakha? Abaye said: This case is equal to that case, i.e., in this situation a karmelit is governed by the same halakha that applies to a domain defined by Torah law. Just as the Sages prohibited one in the private domain from drinking from the public domain and vice versa, so too, they prohibited one in a karmelit from drinking in the same manner. Rava said: How can you say so? The prohibition against carrying to or from a karmelit is itself a rabbinic decree. And will we then proceed to issue a decree to prevent violation of another decree?

Abaye said in explanation of his opinion: From where do I say that halakha? From the fact that it is taught in the mishna:

Traduction : The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren Noé Talmud, with commentary by Rabbi Adin Even-Israel Steinsaltz.

Eruvin 99a examines liability for carrying objects beyond four cubits in a public domain and debates Rava's ruling on elevated carrying.