Talmud - Eruvin 15b עירובין ט״ו ב׳

But Rabbi Meir deems it pure. Likewise, one may write women’s bills of divorce on anything, even a living creature. But Rabbi Yosei HaGelili invalidates a bill of divorce written on a living creature.

GEMARA: It was taught in a baraita that Rabbi Meir says: An animate object may neither be used as a wall for a sukka, nor as a side post for an alleyway, nor as one of the upright boards surrounding a well, nor as the covering of a grave. They said in the name of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili: Nor may one write women’s bills of divorce on it.

The Gemara asks: What is the reason for Rabbi Yosei HaGelili’s opinion? As it was taught in a baraita with regard to the verse: “When a man takes a wife, and marries her, then it comes to pass if she finds no favor in his eyes, because he has found some unseemly thing in her; that he write her a scroll of severance and give it in her hand, and send her out of his house” (Deuteronomy 24:1): From the word scroll, I have derived that only a scroll is valid. From where is it derived to include all objects as valid materials upon which a bill of divorce may be written? The Torah states: “That he write her,” in any case, i.e., any surface upon which the formula can be written. If so, why does the verse state “scroll”? To tell you that a bill of divorce must be written on a surface like a scroll: Just as a scroll is neither alive nor food, so too, a bill of divorce may be written on any object that is neither alive nor food. That is why Rabbi Yosei HaGelili invalidates a bill of divorce written on a living being.

The Gemara asks: And how do the Rabbis, who disagree and say that a bill of divorce may be written even on a living creature or on food, interpret the verse? They contend: Is the verse written: “Let him write for her in the scroll [basefer],” indicating the only type of surface on which the bill of divorce may be written? No, scroll [sefer] is written, which comes to teach that a mere account of the matters [sefirot devarim] is required. In other words, sefer is referring not to the surface on which a bill of divorce must be written, but rather to the essence of the bill of divorce. The verse teaches that the bill of divorce must contain particular content.

The Gemara continues: And what do the Rabbis derive from the phrase “that he write her”? The Gemara answers: That phrase is required to teach the principle that a woman is divorced only by means of writing, i.e., a bill of divorce, and she is not divorced by means of money. It might have entered your mind to say: Since in the verse, leaving marriage, i.e., divorce, is juxtaposed to becoming married, i.e., betrothal, then, just as becoming married is effected with money, so too, leaving marriage may be effected with money. Therefore, the Torah teaches us: “That he write for her”; divorce can be effected only with a written bill of divorce.

The Gemara asks: And Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, from where does he derive this reasoning, that a woman cannot be divorced with money? The Gemara answers: He derives it from the phrase: A scroll of severance, which teaches that a scroll, i.e., a written document, severs her from her husband and nothing else severs her from him.

The Gemara continues: And the Rabbis explain that this phrase: A scroll of severance, is required to teach that a bill of divorce must be a matter that severs all connection between him and her. As it was taught in a baraita: If a man says to his wife: This is your bill of divorce, on condition that you will never drink wine, or on condition that you will never go to your father’s house, that is not severance; the bill of divorce is not valid. If a bill of divorce imposes a condition upon the woman that permanently binds her to her husband, her relationship with her husband has not been completely severed, which is a prerequisite for divorce. If, however, he imposes a condition for the duration of thirty days, or any other limited period of time, that is severance, and the bill of divorce is valid, as the relationship will be completely terminated at the end of the thirty-day period.

And Rabbi Yosei HaGelili derives that a condition without a termination point invalidates the divorce from the fact that instead of using the term karet, the verse uses the more expanded term keritut. Inasmuch as both terms denote severance, using the longer term teaches us two things: Divorce can be effected only by means of writing and not through money, and divorce requires total severance.

And as for the Rabbis, they do not derive anything from the expansion of karet to keritut.

MISHNA: If a caravan camped in a valley, i.e., an open space not enclosed by walls, and the travelers enclosed their camp with partitions made of the animals’ equipment, e.g., saddles and the like, one may carry inside the enclosed area, provided that the resultant partition will be a fence ten handbreadths high, and that there will not be breaches in the partition greater than the built segment.

Any breach that is approximately ten cubits wide is permitted and does not invalidate the partition because it is considered like an entrance. However, if one of the breaches is greater than ten cubits, it is prohibited to carry anywhere in the enclosed area.

GEMARA: It is stated that the amora’im disagree about the case where the breached segment of the partition equals the standing portion. Rav Pappa said: It is permitted to carry within that enclosure. Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said: It is prohibited.

The Gemara explains: Rav Pappa said: It is permitted. This is what the Merciful One taught Moses: Do not breach the majority of the partition; as long as the greater part is not breached, it is considered a partition. Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said: It is prohibited. This is what the Merciful One taught Moses: Circumscribe the greater part; if the greater part is not enclosed, it is not a partition.

We learned in the mishna: And there will not be breaches in the partition greater than the built segment. Only then would carrying be permitted in the enclosed area. By inference, if the breaches equal the built segment, it is permitted. This presents a difficulty for Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua.

The Gemara responds: Do not say: By inference if they equal the built segment, it is permitted; rather, say: If the built segment is greater than the breach, it is permitted to carry in the enclosed area.

The Gemara continues: However, according to that way of understanding the mishna, if the breach equals the built segment, what is the halakha? Is carrying prohibited? If so, let the mishna teach that carrying is permitted, provided that the breaches do not equal the built segment. It can be inferred from this that if the breaches are greater than the built segment, it is certainly prohibited. The Gemara concludes: Indeed, this poses a difficulty to the opinion of Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua.

The Gemara cites a proof to support Rav Pappa’s opinion. Come and hear that which the mishna taught about the halakhot of sukka: With regard to one who roofed his sukka with metal skewers or with bed posts, both of which are unfit for sukka roofing because they are susceptible to ritual impurity, if there is space between them, equal to their width, filled with materials valid for sukka roofing, the sukka is valid. Apparently, with regard to roofing, if the valid materials equal the invalid, the sukka is valid. Similarly, if the built segment of an enclosure equals the breached segment, it is a valid enclosure for the purpose of carrying on Shabbat. This supports Rav Pappa’s opinion against that of Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua.

The Gemara contests this conclusion. With what are we dealing here? It is with a case where the skewers can be inserted and extracted easily. In other words, the case of the mishna in Sukka is not one where there are equal amounts of valid and invalid roofing. It is referring to a case where there is additional space between the skewers, which allows for their easy insertion and removal. Consequently, the space filled by the valid roofing is greater than that filled by the skewers.

The Gemara asks: Isn’t it possible to be precise? Couldn’t the mishna in Sukka be understood as describing a case where the gaps between the skewers equal the width of the skewers? That understanding supports the opinion of Rav Pappa, who maintains that when the valid segment precisely equals the invalid segment, the whole is valid.

Rabbi Ami said: This mishna is referring to a case where one adds roofing, so that the area of the valid roofing is greater than that of the skewers.

Rava said: This is referring to a case where if the skewers were placed crosswise to the sukka, he should place the valid roofing lengthwise, and similarly, if the skewers were placed lengthwise, he should place the valid roofing crosswise, ensuring that there is more valid than invalid roofing.

The Gemara seeks to adduce a proof in support of the opinion of Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua: Come and hear that which was taught in a baraita: If a caravan camped in a field, and the travelers surrounded their camp with camels that were made to crouch down, or with their saddles,

Traduction : The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren Noé Talmud, with commentary by Rabbi Adin Even-Israel Steinsaltz.

Eruvin 15b explores whether a bill of divorce may be written on a living creature, weighing Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yosei HaGelili’s differing views on valid writing surfaces.