Talmud - Gittin 77b גיטין ע״ז ב׳

I do not want to avail myself of the ordinance of the Sages that was instituted on my behalf, such as in this scenario, we listen to him.

The Gemara asks: What is referred to by the words: Such as in this scenario? What case did Rava refer to that he indicated that in similar situations the halakha is the same? The Gemara explains that Rava was referring to that which Rav Huna says that Rav says. As Rav Huna says that Rav says: A woman can say to her husband: I do not wish to be sustained by you, and I will not do work for you. Although the Sages instituted on her behalf that she would be sustained in exchange for her work, she has the choice of waiving that right if she prefers to retain her earnings. Rava adds that in any similar case where the Sages instituted an ordinance for one’s benefit, he can say that he does not wish to accept this rabbinic ordinance if it does not assist him.

Rava said that one can resolve the question about the wife’s ability to acquire a bill of divorce in a courtyard in a more direct way: Is that to say that her hand is not acquired by her husband? Yet despite the fact that he owns her hand, she is divorced once she receives a bill of divorce in her hand. Rather, one must say that her bill of divorce and her hand, i.e., her complete ownership over her hand, enter her possession simultaneously. Since the bill of divorce releases her from her obligations to her husband, at that moment she acquires full rights to her hand. Here too, in the case of her courtyard, one can say that her bill of divorce and her courtyard enter her possession simultaneously, as her husband’s rights to her property are terminated at the time of divorce.

Ravina said to Rav Ashi: Was it difficult for Rava to understand the halakha that one can effect divorce by placing a bill of divorce in the hand of a woman? Why is this difficult? Though the rights to her earnings belong to the husband, does her hand itself belong to him? Therefore, since a woman owns her hand, she is divorced once she receives the bill of divorce in her hand; and it is not necessary to apply the principle that the bill of divorce and her hand enter her possession simultaneously. Therefore, there is no proof that the bill of divorce and her courtyard enter her possession simultaneously.

Rav Ashi said to him: It was difficult for Rava to understand the halakha that one can effect emancipation by placing a bill of manumission in the hand of a slave, as follows: According to the one who says that a slave can be emancipated with a bill of manumission by receiving the bill himself, one can ask: How is this effective? Isn’t the hand of a slave like the hand of his master, as the master owns the slave’s body? Therefore, when the master gives the bill of manumission to his slave, it is as though he gave it to himself, and the bill is never considered as having reached the slave’s domain. How can the slave be emancipated in this manner? Rather, one must say that his bill of manumission and his hand enter his possession simultaneously. So too, with regard to a woman’s courtyard, one can explain that her bill of divorce and her courtyard enter her possession simultaneously.

§ The Gemara relates that there was a certain person on his deathbed who wrote a bill of divorce for his wife toward the evening of the coming of the Shabbat, but he did not manage to give it to her. The next day his condition intensified and he was unable to give her the bill of divorce. People came before Rava to ask what they should do. He said to them: Go tell him to transfer to her ownership of that place where the bill of divorce is resting, and she should go and close the door and open it and assert ownership over it, thereby acquiring the place together with the bill of divorce that is in it.

As we learned in a mishna (Bava Batra 42a): If one locked, fenced in, or breached any amount, this is a valid act of taking possession through which land is acquired.

Rav Ilish said to Rava: How will it help for her to acquire the place, since that which a woman acquired is acquired by her husband? Rava was embarrassed that he issued an incorrect ruling.

Ultimately, it was revealed that she was a betrothed woman. Rava said: I ruled correctly, as even if they said with regard to a married woman that everything she acquires belongs to her husband, would they say the same with regard to a betrothed woman? A betrothed woman’s hand is not considered to be like the hand of her husband. Rava then said: There is no difference if she is a betrothed woman, and there is no difference if she is a married woman, as her bill of divorce and her courtyard enter her possession simultaneously.

The Gemara asks: But didn’t Rava already say this halakha, that her bill of divorce and her courtyard enter her possession simultaneously, at the outset? The Gemara answers: When Rava said this halakha, he said it in connection with this very incident.

§ It was taught in the mishna that if a husband throws his wife a bill of divorce and she is in her house, then she is divorced. Ulla says: This is only if she is standing next to her house and next to her courtyard, as only then will her house and courtyard acquire it for her. Rabbi Oshaya says: Even if she is in Tiberius and her courtyard is in Tzippori, or if she is in Tzippori and her courtyard is in Tiberius, she is divorced.

The Gemara challenges this: But isn’t it taught in the mishna that she is in her house and in her courtyard? The Gemara answers: This is what the mishna is saying: And she is considered to be like one who is in her house; and she is considered to be like one who is in her courtyard. This means that since it is a courtyard that is secured with her knowledge, it is as though she is there, and she is divorced.

The Gemara suggests: Let us say that they disagree about this issue: One Sage, Ulla, holds that a courtyard is included in the areas where she can obtain ownership of a bill of divorce as an extension of her hand. Consequently, it has the same halakhot as her hand, so that just as her hand is close to her, so too, her courtyard must be close to her in order for her to acquire the bill of divorce through it. And one Sage, Rabbi Oshaya, holds that a courtyard is included in the areas where she can obtain ownership of a bill of divorce as an extension of agency, and therefore, like an agent, her courtyard can acquire the bill of divorce for her when she is far away.

The Gemara rejects this: No, everyone agrees that a courtyard is included in the areas where she can obtain ownership of a bill of divorce as an extension of her hand. They disagree about how it is compared to her hand. One Sage, Ulla, holds that it is entirely like her hand. Just as her actual hand is next to her, so too, her courtyard, which is an extension of her hand, acquires the bill of divorce when it is next to her.

And the other Sage, Rabbi Oshaya, holds that if you derive matters in this way, you should say that just as her actual hand is attached to her, so too, her courtyard can acquire a bill of divorce only when it is attached to her, which cannot be. Rather, the comparison is as follows: Her courtyard is like her actual hand, and just as her hand is secured with her knowledge, so too, only her courtyard that is consciously secured by her can acquire a bill of divorce for her. This serves to exclude her courtyard that is not consciously secured by her, i.e., that she has no control over, which cannot acquire a bill of divorce for her, since it is not similar to her hand.

§ The Gemara relates that there was a certain man who threw a bill of divorce to his wife while she was standing in a courtyard. The bill of divorce went and fell onto a board of wood. Rav Yosef said: We see the precise circumstance: If the board encompassed an area of four cubits by four cubits, it thereby is considered to be a separate domain of its own and is not included in the courtyard within which she was standing, and she is consequently not divorced. And if the board was not that large, it is part of the courtyard and it is all one domain, and she is therefore divorced.

The Gemara clarifies: With what are we dealing here? If we say that the incident occurred in her courtyard, if the board had an area of four cubits, what of it? Since the board belongs to her as well, it should still be an effective divorce. Rather, say that the incident occurred in his courtyard; but then, even if the board did not have an area of four cubits, what of it? Since none of it belongs to her, why would it be an effective divorce?

The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary in a case where he lent her the place, i.e., the courtyard, as a means to acquire the bill of divorce. And since people lend one place, but people do not lend two places, if the board is considered to be a separate domain then it was not included in the courtyard that was lent to her, and it would therefore not be an effective divorce.

The Gemara notes: And we said that this is the halakha only in a case where the place onto which the bill of divorce fell was not ten handbreadths higher than the courtyard. But if the place onto which the bill of divorce fell was ten handbreadths higher, even though the board did not have an area of four cubits, it is still considered to be a separate domain.

And we said that this is the halakha only in a case where the place onto which the bill of divorce fell does not have

Traduction : The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren Noé Talmud, with commentary by Rabbi Adin Even-Israel Steinsaltz.

Gittin 77b explores whether a wife can waive rabbinic entitlements like sustenance, and how a divorce document and ownership of her hand or courtyard transfer simultaneously.