Talmud - Gittin 39a גיטין ל״ט א׳

The Gemara answers: In accordance with whose opinion is this baraita? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who says: A person does not make a statement of consecration for naught. If one declared an item consecrated, even if he did not use the correct formulation, his statement is interpreted in a manner to render it meaningful. Therefore, although the master did not say that the slave is consecrated with regard to his monetary value, his statement is interpreted in this way. However, Rav holds in accordance with the dissenting opinion of the Rabbis. In their opinion the slave is not consecrated.

The Gemara comments: This too stands to reason, as it teaches in the latter clause of the baraita: And so too, a freeman who consecrated himself works and is sustained from his labor, as he consecrated only his monetary value and he did not consecrate his body. Granted, if you say that this baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, then the entire baraita works out well. According to the opinion of Rabbi Meir, even when he consecrated himself, his statement is interpreted so that it is referring to a type of consecration that is meaningful.

Rather, if you say that it is the opinion of the Rabbis, granted, the first clause of the baraita that deals with one who consecrates his slave is understood, as his slave exists primarily for monetary value. It is logical that when the owner consecrates him he intends to consecrate his monetary value. However, in the case of the latter clause of the baraita, which is referring to one who consecrates himself, does he exist for monetary value? Therefore, the baraita must be in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir.

The Gemara suggests: Let us say that this dispute with regard to one who consecrates his slave is parallel to a dispute between tanna’im. A baraita taught: With regard to one who consecrates his slave, if one then makes use of the slave, there is no misuse of property consecrated to the Temple. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: One misuses property consecrated to the Temple if one makes use of his hair. What, is it not that they disagree about this issue, as one Sage, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, holds that the slave is consecrated, and therefore the halakhot of misuse of consecrated property apply, and one Sage, the first tanna, holds that the slave is not consecrated?

The Gemara asks: And how can you understand that to be their dispute? If that were the case, then these expressions of: One misuses property consecrated to the Temple, and: There is no misuse of property consecrated to the Temple, are not the correct expressions. They should have used these expressions, of: Consecrated, and: Not consecrated, if that were actually the subject of their dispute.

Rather, everyone agrees that the slave is consecrated, in opposition to the opinion of Rav. And here they disagree about this, as one Sage, the first tanna, holds that a slave is considered equivalent to land, as slaves are compared to land in several areas of halakha. Just as the misuse of consecrated property does not apply in the case of land, so too, it does not apply to slaves. And one Sage, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, holds that they are considered equivalent to movable property, and therefore the halakhot of misuse of consecrated property do apply to slaves.

The Gemara challenges this explanation: If that is so, and they disagree with regard to whether a slave is equivalent to land or movable property, instead of disagreeing with regard to whether making use of the slave’s hair constitutes a misuse of consecrated property, let them disagree with regard to whether making use of the slave himself constitutes a misuse of consecrated property.

Rather, it must be that everyone agrees that a slave is considered equivalent to land, and making use of the slave himself does not constitute a misuse of consecrated property. And here they disagree with regard to his hair that is ready to be cut, whether it is still considered a part of the slave. One Sage, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, holds that it is considered as if it were already cut and is no longer part of the slave. Since it is viewed as detached, it is subject to the halakhot of misuse of consecrated property, like all movable property. And one Sage, the first tanna, holds that it is not considered as if it were already cut. Until it is cut, the hair is part of the slave, and, like all land, is not subject to the halakhot of misuse of consecrated property.

The Gemara suggests: Let us say that the opinions of these tanna’im are parallel to the opinions of those tanna’im, as we learned in a mishna (Shevuot 42b) that Rabbi Meir says: There are certain things that are like land with regard to their form but are not treated like land from a halakhic perspective, but the Rabbis do not admit to him that this is so. How so? If one makes the claim: I gave you ten grapevines laden with fruit to guard, and the other one says: They are only five vines, then Rabbi Meir obligates the defendant to take an oath, for one who makes a partial admission to a claim concerning movable property is obligated to take an oath that he is stating the truth. And the Rabbis say: The halakhic status of anything that is attached to the ground is like the ground itself, and therefore one does not take an oath in this case, as one does not take an oath if one makes a partial admission to a claim concerning land.

The Gemara continues the comparison: And with regard to this, Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, says that the practical difference between them is not concerning all vines. It exists only in a case of grapes that are ready to be harvested, as Rabbi Meir holds that since they are ready to be harvested, they are considered like they are already harvested, and the defendant must take an oath, as he is denying a claim concerning movable property. And the Rabbis hold that they are not considered like they are already harvested, and they still have the status of land. This dispute seems to be identical to the dispute between Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel and the Rabbis.

The Gemara rejects this suggestion: The dispute in the baraita with regard to a slave’s hair is not necessarily parallel to the dispute with regard to grapes. Even if you say the opinion of Rabbi Meir, that grapes that are about to be harvested are considered like they are already harvested, this does not dictate one’s opinion with regard to a slave’s hair that is ready to be cut. Rabbi Meir states his opinion only there, with regard to grapes, since the longer they remain on the vine after ripening the more they become withered and are ruined. Since they no longer benefit from their attachment to the ground, they are considered to be like movable property. However, here, with regard to hair, the longer it remains on the slave the more it improves, i.e., grows, and therefore it should not be considered as if it were already cut.

In connection with Rav’s statement that one who renounces ownership of his slave emancipates the slave, the Gemara recounts: When Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Yosef ascended from Babylonia to Eretz Yisrael, he stated this halakha of Rav, that one who renounces ownership of his slave emancipates the slave, before Rabbi Yoḥanan. Rabbi Yoḥanan said to him in astonishment: Did Rav actually say so? This indicates that Rabbi Yoḥanan disagreed with the statement of Rav, which leads the Gemara to ask: But didn’t Rabbi Yoḥanan himself say so? But didn’t Ulla say that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: With regard to one who renounces ownership of his slave, the slave is emancipated but nevertheless requires a bill of manumission. Why then was Rabbi Yoḥanan so surprised by Rav’s statement?

The Gemara answers: The Gemara answers that Rabbi Yoḥanan was not objecting to Rav’s opinion, but this is what he said to him: Did Rav actually say in accordance with my opinion? And alternatively, there are those who say that Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Yosef did not conclude Rav’s statement before Rabbi Yoḥanan by saying that nevertheless the slave requires a bill of manumission. Therefore, Rabbi Yoḥanan said to him: And didn’t Rav say that the slave requires a bill of manumission? And Rabbi Yoḥanan conforms to his standard line of reasoning, as Ulla says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: With regard to one who renounces ownership of his slave, the slave is emancipated but nevertheless requires a bill of manumission.

§ The Gemara discusses the matter itself: Ulla says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: With regard to one who renounces ownership of his slave, the slave is emancipated but nevertheless requires a bill of manumission to be fully considered a freeman and to be able to marry a Jewish woman.

Rabbi Abba raised an objection to Ulla from a baraita: If a convert died and Jews plundered his property, as his possessions became ownerless property with his death because he had no heirs, and among his possessions were slaves, then, whether the slaves were adults or minors, they acquire ownership of themselves and become freemen, as they can acquire themselves from the ownerless property. Abba Shaul says: Adult slaves acquire ownership of themselves and become freemen. However, with regard to minor slaves, anyone who takes possession of them acquires them.

This appears difficult for Rabbi Yoḥanan, as one could ask: But who wrote a bill of manumission for those slaves who became free men? Their owner died without freeing them, and nevertheless they are emancipated. Therefore, the baraita demonstrates that when a slave becomes ownerless, he is emancipated entirely and does not require a bill of manumission to be considered a freeman.

Ulla said in reply: This one of the Rabbis, Rabbi Abba, is like a person who has not studied halakha. He refused to address Rabbi Abba’s objection, as he did not think it was worthy of a response. The Gemara asks: And what is the reason that these slaves do not require a bill of manumission? Rav Naḥman said that Ulla holds as follows: A slave of a convert is comparable to his wife in this case. Just as his wife is freed by his death without a bill of divorce, and she is no longer considered married with regard to any halakhot, so too, his slaves are freed without a bill of manumission.

The Gemara challenges this answer: If so, if a slave is comparable to a wife, then even the slave of a Jew that dies should be freed entirely as well, just as his wife is. Why should this halakha apply only to the slave of a convert? The Gemara answers: The verse states with regard to slaves: “And you may make them an inheritance for your children after you, to hold for a possession” (Leviticus 25:46). Therefore, slaves are not emancipated with the death of their owner, as the heirs have a right to the slaves. However, in the case of a convert who does not have heirs, the slaves are emancipated.

The Gemara challenges: If so, then in a case of one who renounces ownership of his slave and dies, the slaves should not require a bill of manumission as well, as they are not part of the inheritance of the children. Why then did Ameimar say that with regard to one who renounces ownership of his slave and dies, there is no remedy for that slave and he cannot marry a Jewish woman, as there is no one to emancipate him? The Gemara states: This statement of Ameimar poses a difficulty to Rav Naḥman’s explanation of Ulla’s statement.

Rabbi Ya’akov bar Idi says that Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Abba Shaul with regard to a convert who died and left behind slaves. Rabbi Zeira said to Rabbi Ya’akov bar Idi:

Traduction : The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren Noé Talmud, with commentary by Rabbi Adin Even-Israel Steinsaltz.

Gittin 39a examines Rabbi Meir's view on consecration statements and debates whether dedicating a slave or oneself implies monetary value rather than the body itself.