Talmud - Gittin 37a גיטין ל״ז א׳

Bulei, these are the wealthy, as it is written: “And I will break the pride of your power” (Leviticus 26:19), and Rav Yosef taught with regard to this verse: These are the bula’ot, the wealthy people, of Judea. Butei, these are the poor, who are in need of a loan, as it is written: “You shall not shut your hand from your needy brother; but you shall open your hand to him, and you shall lend him [ha’avet ta’avitenu] sufficient for his need” (Deuteronomy 15:7–8). Therefore, the prosbol was instituted both for the sake of the wealthy, so that the loans they would give to the poor person would not be canceled, and for the sake of the poor, so that they would continue to find those willing to lend them money. Rava said to a foreigner who spoke Greek: What is the meaning of the word prosbol? He said to him: It means the institution [pursa] of a matter.

§ Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: Orphans do not require a prosbol in order to collect payment of debts owed to them. And similarly, Rami bar Ḥama taught in a baraita: Orphans do not require a prosbol, as Rabban Gamliel and his court, i.e., any rabbinic court, are considered the fathers of orphans, meaning that all matters that relate to orphans are already managed by the court, including their promissory notes.

§ We learned in a mishna there (Shevi’it 10:6): One may write a prosbol only on the basis of the debtor owning land. If the debtor has no land, then the creditor transfers any amount of his own field to him so that he can write a prosbol. The Gemara asks: And how much is sufficient to be classified as any amount? Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi says that Rav says: Even the amount of land sufficient to grow a stalk of cabbage is sufficient. Rav Yehuda says: Even if he lent him a place sufficient for an oven and a stove, one may write a prosbol on this basis.

The Gemara challenges this statement: Is that so? But didn’t Hillel teach (Tosefta, Shevi’it 8:10): One writes a prosbol only on the basis of the debtor owning merely a perforated pot placed on the ground. This demonstrates that a perforated pot can serve as the basis for the writing of a prosbol, as it is considered to be part of the ground due to the perforation; however, a pot that is not perforated cannot serve as the basis for the writing of a prosbol.

The Gemara continues the question: Since Rav Yehuda stated that possession of the place occupied by the oven is also considered possession of the land underneath with regard to this issue, why can’t a non-perforated pot serve as the basis for a prosbol; but isn’t there the place where the pot is resting? The Gemara answers: No, one cannot compare the case of Rav Yehuda to this case, as it is necessary for Hillel to state his halakha in a case where the pot is resting on stakes and the borrower has no possession of any land at all. Hillel teaches that even so, if the pot is perforated it is considered to be land and may serve as the basis for the writing of a prosbol.

The Gemara recounts a related incident: When Rav Ashi would lend money and wish to write a prosbol he would transfer to the borrower a stump of a palm tree that was still attached to the ground, and he wrote a prosbol based on this. The Sages of the school of Rav Ashi would transfer their matters, i.e., their debts, to each other without writing a prosbol, by stating: You are hereby a court, and the debt is given over to you. Rabbi Yonatan transferred a matter by means of such a statement to Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba. Rabbi Yonatan said to him: Do I need anything else? He said to him: You do not need anything else, as this statement alone is sufficient.

The Gemara discusses the requirement for the debtor to have land. The Sages taught: If the debtor has no land but the guarantor has land then one writes a prosbol on the basis of the land of the guarantor. If both he and the guarantor have no land, but another person who is obligated to pay money to the debtor has land, then one writes a prosbol on the basis of this land. This halakha is derived from a statement of Rabbi Natan.

As it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Natan says: From where is it derived that when one lends one hundred dinars to his friend, and that friend lends an identical sum to his own friend, that the court appropriates the money from this one, the second debtor, and gives it to that one, the first creditor, without going through the middleman, who is both the first debtor and the second creditor? The verse states with regard to returning stolen property: “And gives it to him in respect of whom he has been guilty” (Numbers 5:7). The fact that the verse explains that the money is given to one: “In respect of whom he has been guilty,” indicates that the money should be given directly to the one to whom the money is ultimately owed. In this case as well, the second debtor possesses land, and as he owes money to the first debtor, it is considered as if the second debtor owes money to the first creditor, enabling the first creditor to write a prosbol.

§ We learned in a mishna there (Shevi’it 10:1): The Sabbatical Year abrogates debt both for loans that were contracted with a promissory note and for loans that were contracted without a promissory note. The amora’im disagree with regard to the interpretation of the mishna: It is Rav and Shmuel who both say: Loans that were contracted with a promissory note, is referring to loans that were contracted with a promissory note that contains a property guarantee; loans that were contracted without a promissory note, is referring even to loans that were contracted with a promissory note that does not contain a property guarantee. All the more so, a loan by oral agreement is canceled by the Sabbatical Year.

By contrast, it is Rabbi Yoḥanan and Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish who both say: Loans that were contracted with a promissory note is referring to loans that were contracted with a promissory note that does not contain a property guarantee, whereas loans that were contracted without a promissory note is referring to a loan by oral agreement. However, the Sabbatical Year does not abrogate a loan contracted with a promissory note that contains a property guarantee, as it is as though the creditor had already taken possession of the debtor’s land.

It is taught in a baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan and Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish: The Sabbatical Year abrogates a promissory note, but if the promissory note contains a property guarantee the Sabbatical Year does not abrogate it. Similarly, it is taught in another baraita: If the debtor specified one field for the repayment of his loan, then it is not canceled. And not only that, but even if he wrote: All of my property is pledged and guaranteed to you, then the Sabbatical Year does not abrogate it, even if he does not specify a field for the repayment of the loan.

The Gemara relates: The relative of Rabbi Asi had a certain promissory note that had a property guarantee written in it. He came before Rabbi Asi and said to him: Does the Sabbatical Year abrogate this loan, or does it not abrogate it? He said to him: It does not abrogate it. He left Rabbi Asi and came before Rabbi Yoḥanan and asked him the same question. Rabbi Yoḥanan said to him: It does abrogate it.

Rabbi Asi came before Rabbi Yoḥanan and said to him: Does the Sabbatical Year abrogate this loan, or does it not abrogate it? He said to him: It does abrogate it. Rabbi Asi challenged him: But wasn’t it the Master himself who said that the Sabbatical Year does not abrogate a promissory note that contains a property guarantee? Rabbi Yoḥanan said to him: Because we think that this should be the halakha should we perform an action based on this? Rabbi Asi said to him: But isn’t it taught in a baraita in accordance with the opinion of the Master? He said to him: Perhaps that baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai, who say more generally: A promissory note that stands to be collected is considered as though it has been collected, and this is why the loan is not abrogated, as it is considered as though the loan had already been repaid. And the halakha is not in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai in that issue.

§ We learned in a mishna there (Shevi’it 10:2): With regard to one who lends money to another based on collateral, and one who transfers his promissory notes to a court, the debt owed to them is not canceled. The Gemara asks: Granted, the debt is not canceled when one transfers his promissory notes to a court, as the court seizes the promissory notes, and they are able to collect this debt. But what is the reason that the debt is not canceled for one who lends money based on collateral?

Rava said: Due to the fact that the creditor has seized an item that belongs to the debtor, it is considered as though the debt has already been collected. Abaye said to him: If that is so, then if a creditor loaned money to someone and lives in his courtyard as a collateral for the loan, since he seizes the courtyard, which belongs to the debtor, would you also say that the Sabbatical Year does not abrogate the debt? That would contradict the accepted halakha that in this case the debt is canceled.

Rava said to him: Collateral is different, as the creditor acquires it for himself, as learned from the statement of Rabbi Yitzḥak, as Rabbi Yitzḥak says: From where is it derived that a creditor acquires collateral given to him and is considered its owner so long as the item is in his possession? As it is stated in the verse with regard to the obligation of a creditor to return collateral at night: “And it shall be righteousness for you” (Deuteronomy 24:13). Rabbi Yitzḥak infers: If the creditor does not acquire the collateral, then from where is the righteousness involved in returning it? He would be simply returning an item to its rightful owner. From here it is learned that a creditor acquires the collateral. Therefore, when he returns the collateral to the debtor he is performing an act of charity.

§ We learned in a mishna there (Shevi’it 10:8):

Traduction : The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren Noé Talmud, with commentary by Rabbi Adin Even-Israel Steinsaltz.

Gittin 37a explores the origins of the prosbol document protecting loans during the Sabbatical year, and outlines land ownership rules required for its validity.