Talmud - Gittin 29a גיטין כ״ט א׳

but in a Jewish court, once his verdict to be executed has emerged, they execute him.

Abaye said to him: In a Jewish court as well, it is possible that the court will see fit to acquit him afterward and he will be released. Rav Yosef said: When the court sees fit to acquit him, it is before the verdict; after the verdict the court will not further see fit to acquit him, as it is uncommon for the court to find a reason to acquit him after his verdict has been delivered.

The Gemara suggests: Let us say that a mishna (Makkot 7a) supports Rav Yosef’s opinion: Concerning one who fled from the court after his verdict was issued, the mishna states: Any place where two witnesses arise and say: We testify about so-and-so that his verdict was finalized in the court of so-and-so, and so-and-so and so-and-so were his witnesses, the halakha is that this person should be killed. It is evident from the mishna in tractate Makkot that there is no concern that the court might later have found a reason to release him. The Gemara answers: Perhaps one who flees is different, as the court will not reconsider his verdict once he has fled.

The Gemara suggests another proof: Come and hear: If one heard from a Jewish court that they were saying: The man so-and-so died, or: The man so-and-so was killed, then the court allows his wife to marry. If he heard from a gentile judicial registrar: The man so-and-so died, or: The man so-and-so was killed, then the court does not allow his wife to marry.

The Gemara clarifies: What does it mean when it says: Died, and what does it mean when it says: Was killed? If we say that it means that he actually died, and that he actually was killed, such that the case concerning the gentiles is stated in a similar manner, i.e., that he heard from the gentile registrar that the person was actually dead, why may the court not allow his wife to marry? Don’t we maintain that with regard to any gentile who speaks offhandedly, the Sages deemed him credible? Therefore, the gentile should be deemed credible when he says that someone died or was killed.

Rather, is it not necessary to explain that when it says: Died, it means that he is going out to die, and when it says: Was killed, it means that he is going out to be executed. And it teaches: If one heard in a Jewish court then the court allows his wife to marry, as it is assumed that he was already executed, in support of the statement of Rav Yosef.

The Gemara answers: Actually, it can be explained that he actually died, and was actually killed; and with regard to that which you said: Such that the case concerning the gentiles is stated in a similar manner, why may the court not allow his wife to marry? Don’t we maintain that with regard to any gentile who speaks offhandedly, the Sages deemed him credible? The answer is that this credibility applies only in a matter that is not relevant to the gentiles; but in a matter that is relevant to the gentiles, such as here, where they desire to publicize that they carried out their verdict, it is common for them to reinforce their false verdict.

MISHNA: With regard to an agent who brings a bill of divorce in Eretz Yisrael, where his only responsibility is to transmit the bill of divorce to the wife, and the agent became sick, this agent may send it in the possession of another agent. But if the husband said to the agent: When you transmit the bill of divorce to my wife, take for me such and such an item from her that I left with her as a deposit, then he may not send it in the possession of another agent. This is because it is assumed that it is not the desire of the husband that his deposit be in the possession of another person whom he did not appoint as his agent.

GEMARA: Rav Kahana said: We learned in the mishna that the agent became sick; otherwise, he may not appoint a second agent. The Gemara asks: This is obvious, as the mishna teaches explicitly that the agent became sick. The Gemara answers: Lest you say that the same is true, i.e., that he may transfer the bill of divorce to another agent, even though the agent did not become sick, and the reason that the mishna teaches specifically that he became sick is that the mishna teaches the matter in the manner in which it typically occurs, as an agent typically fulfills his agency, barring unavoidable circumstances, therefore, Rav Kahana teaches us that an agent may appoint another agent only when he becomes sick.

The Gemara clarifies: What are the circumstances of his appointment as an agent? If this is a case where the husband said to the agent: Deliver this bill of divorce to my wife, then even though the agent did not become sick, he may also appoint an agent in his place, as the husband did not state that he must be the one to deliver the bill of divorce. And if this is a case where he said to the agent: You, deliver this bill of divorce to my wife, then even if he became sick, he also may not appoint a second agent in his place, as the husband specified that he must be the one to deliver the bill of divorce. And if the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, then even if he became sick he also may not appoint a second agent, no matter what the husband said.

The Gemara explains: As it is taught in a baraita in the Tosefta (2:13): If the husband said to an agent: Deliver this bill of divorce to my wife, then this agent may send it in the possession of another agent. However, if the husband said: You, deliver this bill of divorce to my wife, then this agent may not send it in the possession of another agent. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Whether the husband said it like this or whether the husband said it like that, the agent may not designate another agent. Therefore, Rav Kahana’s statement is difficult.

The Gemara answers: If you wish, say that the mishna is referring to a case where the husband said to his agent: Deliver the bill of divorce, without specifying that he must be the one to do so, and Rav Kahana understood the baraita as follows: And this halakha, that he may send it in the possession of another agent, applies only when the agent became sick. And if you wish, say that the mishna is referring to a case where the husband said: You deliver, but one who became sick is different, and it is assumed that under those circumstances the husband would allow him to designate another agent. And if you wish, say that the mishna is even in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, that an agent is ordinarily not permitted to designate another agent. But a case where the agent became sick is different, and the agent may designate another agent.

We learned in the mishna: With regard to an agent who brings a bill of divorce in Eretz Yisrael, and the agent became sick, this agent may send it in the possession of another agent. And the Gemara raises a contradiction from a mishna (66a): If the husband said to two people: Give a bill of divorce to my wife, or if he said to three people: Write a bill of divorce and give it to my wife, then these people should write it and give it. The Gemara infers from the mishna: They themselves, yes, they should do so, but one whom they appoint as an agent may not do so.

Abaye said: There, what is the reason that an agent may not be appointed? It is due to degradation of the husband, who does not want the matter to become known, and therefore they may not designate another agent. However, here, after he has already sent the bill of divorce, the husband is not particular that word not spread, and therefore the agent may designate another agent in his place.

Rava said: There is a different reason that in the case of the mishna (66a) the agent may not appoint another to write the bill of divorce; it is because of the fact that in the case there, the husband’s instructions are mere words, and verbal directives cannot be delegated to an agent, i.e., an agent cannot be deputized to give instructions on behalf of another. Therefore, they cannot take their oral instructions and transfer them to another. In the case of the mishna here, the agent is able to give the physical bill of divorce to another agent and thereby transfer his agency.

The Gemara asks: What is the difference between the explanations offered by Abaye and Rava? The Gemara answers: There is a practical difference between them in the case of an agent appointed to write a deed of a gift, and their disagreement is parallel to the dispute of Rav and Shmuel. Rav says: A deed of gift is not like a bill of divorce, as the gift giver does not care who writes the deed. Since it is not degrading to him if another agent writes the deed of gift instead of the agent that he appointed, the agent may appoint another agent. And Shmuel says: A deed of gift is like a bill of divorce, as the mere words instructing the agent to write the deed cannot be transferred to another agent.

§ The mishna teaches: But if the husband said to the agent: When you transmit the bill of divorce to my wife, take for me such and such an item from her, then the agent may not appoint a second agent, as it is not the desire of the husband that his deposit be in the possession of another. Reish Lakish says: Here, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi taught that a borrower is not allowed to lend the item that he borrowed to someone else, and a renter is not allowed to rent out the item that he rented to someone else. In those cases, the same reasoning applies, i.e., that it is not the desire of the owner that his item be in the possession of another.

Rabbi Yoḥanan said to him: Even schoolchildren know this halakha, and this is not the novel idea expressed in the mishna. The novel idea expressed in the mishna is as follows: Not only is it not permitted for an agent to appoint another agent in this case, as it violates the desire of the husband, but sometimes it happens that the bill of divorce is also not valid if a second agent is appointed. This is because the first agent becomes as one that it was said to him: Divorce her only in the house, and he divorced her in the attic; or the husband said: Divorce her only with your right hand, and he divorced her with his left hand. Here as well, since the agent violated the instructions the divorce will not be valid.

The Gemara elaborates: Everyone agrees that when it happens that the wife went out to greet him and gave him the item that the husband requested, and then she took the bill of divorce from him, in this case everyone agrees that the bill of divorce is a proper bill of divorce. When they disagree is in a case when the husband said to the agent:

Traduction : The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren Noé Talmud, with commentary by Rabbi Adin Even-Israel Steinsaltz.

Gittin 29a examines whether a Jewish court could still overturn a death verdict after sentencing, and the reliability of testimony about a husband's death for remarriage.