Talmud - Gittin 44a גיטין מ״ד א׳

And if you wish, say instead: Even if the time for the slave or the field to be taken as collateral had arrived, there is something novel about this in a case where he borrowed on the condition that the creditors collect from it, i.e., the slave or field, but they did not yet collect from it. Since the field had not yet been collected from the gentile by the Jew as payment of the debt, it remains exempt from tithes, but the mere fact that the Jew agreed to have his slave be collected suffices for the rabbinic penalty to take effect, and the slave is emancipated.

§ The Sages taught (Tosefta, Avoda Zara 3:16): If a gentile collected a slave for payment of his debt, or the slave was taken by a Sicarius, i.e., one who would use violence and intimidation to force people to give them their property, then he is not emancipated. The Gemara asks: And is it so that if a gentile collected a slave for payment of his debt, the Sages did not institute a penalty and the slave is not emancipated?

And the Gemara raises a contradiction based on what was taught in a baraita: With regard to a case where the household of the king seized one’s threshing floor by force, if they took it for payment of his debt to the king, then he is obligated to tithe in order to render fit for consumption the grain that they seized. The reason for this is because if he were not to tithe it, it would be considered as if he paid a debt using tithe. If they engaged in unjust seizure [anparot] then he is exempt from tithing. This baraita indicates that an item taken for payment of a debt is akin to a sale, so why should the slave taken in payment of the debt not be emancipated?

The Gemara answers: It is different there, because he profits by repaying a portion of his debt with tithe. If they would have taken regular produce, it would have been more of a financial loss for him. Therefore, he must separate tithe for the seized grain. In the case of the slave, he did not profit from the seizure. Therefore, the Sages did not penalize him.

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof, as Rav says: One who sells his slave to a gentile government official [parhang], then the slave is emancipated even though the owner agreed to the sale only because he was pressured by the official. There too, he neither desired nor profited from the sale. The Gemara answers: There, the owner should have appeased the official in some other way so that he would not take the slave, and he did not appease him, therefore it is appropriate to penalize him.

The Gemara discusses the matter itself. Rav says: One who sells his slave to a gentile government official, then the slave is emancipated. The Gemara asks: What could he have done; the gentile government official forced him to agree to the sale. The Gemara answers: He should have appeased the official in some other way, and he did not appease him.

Rabbi Yirmeya raises a dilemma: If he sold the slave to a gentile for thirty days, then what is the halakha; is this considered to be a sale and he is emancipated as a result, or is it not a sale? The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof, as Rav says: With regard to one who sells his slave to a gentile government official, the slave is emancipated. The assumption is that he would be sold to the official in order to work for a limited amount of time or perform a specific task, yet he is emancipated. The Gemara answers: There, he was sold to a gentile government official, as this sale is not reversed. No proof can be brought from here with regard to the halakha of a sale that is in effect for a limited duration.

Rabbi Yirmeya asks several questions with regard to the extent of the application of this penalty: If he sold the slave to a gentile aside from his labor, i.e., the gentile will own the slave but he will still perform labor for the Jewish master, what is the halakha? If he sold him to a gentile aside from the mitzvot, i.e., he stipulated that the slave would be able to continue observing the mitzvot, what is the halakha? If he sold him aside from Shabbatot and Festivals, what is the halakha? If he sold him to a gentile who resides in Eretz Yisrael and observes the seven Noahide mitzvot [ger toshav], or to a Jewish apostate, what is the halakha? If he sold him to a Samaritan, what is the halakha? The Gemara suggests: You can resolve at least one of these questions, as it was taught: A ger toshav is like a gentile. With regard to a Samaritan and a Jewish apostate, some say they are like gentiles and some say they are like Jews.

They raised a dilemma before Rabbi Ami: If a slave fled from his master and gave himself over to a foreign army to serve as a solider, and his master cannot remove him, neither through Jewish law nor through the laws of the nations of the world, what is the halakha? Is it permitted for the master to at least take his value from the army, or would this be considered as if he is selling the slave?

Rabbi Yirmeya said to Rabbi Zerika: Go out and examine your mishnayot to find an answer. He went out, examined, and discovered an answer, as it is taught in a baraita (Tosefta, Avoda Zara 6:2): One who sells his house in Eretz Yisrael to a gentile, the monies received from the sale of the house are forbidden to him. And if there was a gentile who seized a Jew’s house by force and its owner cannot remove it, i.e., get it back, neither through Jewish law nor through the laws of the nations of the world, then he is permitted to take the house’s value from the gentile, and he may even write a document and register the sale in their courts, because he is like one who rescues the money from their possession. Although it is prohibited for a Jew to sell his house in Eretz Yisrael to a gentile, if it was taken from him by force he is permitted to take payment for it. Similarly, if the slave cannot be retrieved from a gentile, it should be permitted for him to take money in return.

The Gemara rejects this comparison: But perhaps this matter applies only to a house, that since it is not sufficient, i.e., not possible, for him to live without a house, he would not sell it willingly. Therefore, there is no reason to penalize him when it is taken by force. But with regard to a slave, as it is sufficient for him to live without a slave, there is a concern that he will also come to sell him willingly, and therefore there should be a penalty in this case as well. Or it is possible that this distinction is not made.

Rabbi Ami sent the following message to the other Sages: From me, Ami bar Natan, Torah emerges to all of Israel: If a slave fled his master and gave himself to a foreign army to serve as a solider, and his master cannot remove him, neither through Jewish law nor through the laws of the nations of the world, then he is permitted to take the slave’s value, and he writes a deed of sale and registers this transaction in gentile courts, because he is like one who rescues the money from their possession.

Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi says: With regard to one who sells his slave to a gentile, even though he can no longer enslave him, he is penalized and is forced to redeem the slave from the gentile for up to one hundred times the slave’s value.

The Gemara asks: Is this amount stated specifically or not specifically? Perhaps this number is an exaggeration? The Gemara suggests: Come and hear an answer from that which Reish Lakish says: One who sells a large domesticated animal to a gentile, he is penalized and is forced to purchase the animal back from the gentile for up to ten times its value. It can be seen here that one who violates an ordinance of the Sages by engaging in a prohibited sale must pay up to only ten times the item’s value to purchase it back, and the same would presumably apply to the case of the slave.

The Gemara rejects this: But perhaps a slave is different, as each and every day the owner releases him from the fulfillment of mitzvot by selling him to a gentile, so there may be a greater penalty as a result.

And there are those who say a different version of this discussion: Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi says that with regard to one who sells his slave to a gentile, even though he can no longer enslave him, he is penalized and is forced to redeem the slave from the gentile for up to ten times the slave’s value. The Gemara asks: Is this amount stated specifically or not specifically; is his penalty limited to up to ten times the value of the slave? The Gemara suggests: Come and hear an answer from that which Reish Lakish says: With regard to one who sells a large domesticated animal to a gentile, he is penalized and is forced to purchase the animal back from the gentile for up to one hundred times its value, and the penalty in the case of the slave should be at least as large as in the case of the animal.

The Gemara rejects this: A slave is different, as he does not return to him. Since the slave will be emancipated once the master redeems him, it may be that the Sages would not penalize him to such a great extent.

The Gemara challenges: Rather, what is the reason that he is penalized in the case of an animal more so than in the case of a slave; because of the fact that it returns to him? If so, he should be penalized only one additional amount. If the difference is that an animal returns to its owners and a slave does not, then the difference in penalties should be reflective of this, and he should have to purchase the animal for no more than eleven times its value. Rather, the Gemara offers a different distinction: The sale of a slave is an uncommon matter, and the Sages did not decree with regard to an uncommon matter. Therefore, one cannot compare the penalty in the case of selling a slave to the penalty in the case of selling an animal.

Rabbi Yirmeya raised a dilemma before Rabbi Asi: If one sold his slave to a gentile and died, what is the halakha: Is his son penalized after him? Is the son also required to redeem the slave, or does the penalty apply only to the seller? The Gemara compares this to other penalties assessed by the Sages. If you say, in accordance with the opinion that holds that if one slit the ear of a firstborn animal and by doing so intentionally blemishes it so that it may be eaten, and then that person died, then his son is penalized after him and his son may not slaughter and eat it, perhaps this is because it is a prohibition by Torah law. Here, however, with regard to the sale of a slave, it is a prohibition only by rabbinic law and perhaps the son is not penalized.

Traduction : The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren Noé Talmud, with commentary by Rabbi Adin Even-Israel Steinsaltz.

Gittin 44a explores when a debt-collected slave gains emancipation versus a seized field's tithing obligation under rabbinic penalty rules.