Talmud - Gittin 15a גיטין ט״ו א׳

my brooch [kevinati] to my daughter, and the brooch is worth twelve hundred dinars. And this woman subsequently died, and the Sages fulfilled her statement. Rabbi Elazar said to them that the sons of Rokhel should be buried by their mother, i.e., he cursed them. Rabbi Elazar meant that it is not possible to bring a proof from this incident, as these sons were wicked people. Consequently, when dealing with them the Sages did not act in accordance with the halakha, but allowed their mother to give this valuable piece of jewelry to their sister, circumventing the halakhot of inheritance.

The Gemara states: The first tanna holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, who holds that there must be an actual act of acquisition or the money still belongs to the giver. And Rabbi Natan and Rabbi Ya’akov also hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar. However, they add that even though the giver died one does not say: It is a mitzva to fulfill the statement of the dead. And the Sages in the clause beginning: Some say, hold in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who say that the statement of a person on his deathbed effects acquisition through mere speech.

And Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, who said his opinion in the name of Rabbi Meir, holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar. However, he maintains that where the giver died we say: It is a mitzva to fulfill the statement of the dead. And the Rabbis say: They should divide it, because they are uncertain about the halakha in this situation. And according to the Sages in the clause beginning: Here they said, the discretion of the agent is preferable. And Rabbi Shimon HaNasi came to teach us a relevant incident but does not express an additional opinion.

A dilemma was raised before those studying this issue: Is the Rabbi Shimon HaNasi mentioned here himself a Nasi, or does the baraita mean that he spoke in the name of the Nasi? The Gemara suggests: Come and hear that which Rav Yosef, who was precise in his statements, says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon HaNasi. This indicates that he was an actual Nasi. But you can still raise the dilemma: Is he a Nasi, or does the baraita mean that he spoke in the name of the Nasi, as Rav Yosef may merely be quoting the above baraita? The Gemara has no answer for this question, and states that the dilemma shall stand unresolved.

The Gemara returns to the matter itself: Rav Yosef says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon HaNasi, that the money should be returned to the heirs of the sender. The Gemara raises a difficulty: But don’t we maintain that the statement of a person on his deathbed is considered written and delivered? If so, the agent should give the money to the heirs of the recipient.

The Gemara answers: Rav Yosef establishes this halakha with regard to a healthy person, not someone on his deathbed. The Gemara asks: But he said that the money should be returned to the heirs of the sender, and we maintain that it is a mitzva to fulfill the statement of the dead, even if he issued these instructions when he was healthy. The Gemara answers: Emend Rabbi Shimon HaNasi’s statement and teach: Return the money to the sender, not to his heirs, as this is referring to a case where the sender had not died.

MISHNA: With regard to one who brings a bill of divorce from a country overseas and says: The bill of divorce was written in my presence but it was not signed in my presence; or if he said: It was signed in my presence but it was not written in my presence; or: All of it was written in my presence and half of it was signed in my presence, i.e., he observed the signing of only one witness; or: Half of it was written in my presence and all of it was signed in my presence, in all these cases the document is invalid.

If one agent bringing a bill of divorce says: It was written in my presence, and one other agent says: It was signed in my presence, it is invalid. If two agents say: It was written in our presence, and one says: It was signed in my presence, it is invalid. And Rabbi Yehuda deems the document valid. If one agent says: It was written in my presence, and two agents say: It was signed in our presence, it is valid.

GEMARA: The Gemara asks with regard to the entire mishna: Why do I need all these further examples? Didn’t it teach these halakhot once, as the mishna states (2a): One who brings a bill of divorce from a country overseas is required to say: It was written in my presence and it was signed in my presence? This indicates that if one did not state this declaration, then the bill of divorce is invalid. The Gemara explains: If the halakha were derived from that mishna alone, I would say: He is required to issue this statement ab initio, but if he did not say it the bill of divorce is nevertheless valid after the fact. Therefore, this mishna teaches us that the bill of divorce is invalid.

§ The mishna taught that if the agent said: Half of it was written in my presence and all of it was signed in my presence, the document is invalid. The Gemara asks: With regard to which half of the bill of divorce did he claim he saw written? If we say that he saw its first half written, but didn’t Rabbi Elazar say: Even if the husband or scribe wrote only one line of it for her sake, the agent is no longer required to check if the rest of the bill of divorce was written properly? Rather, Rav Ashi said: He testifies that he saw that its latter half was written, and he does not testify with regard to the first half, which is the primary section of the bill of divorce.

§ The mishna taught that if he said: All of it was written in my presence and half of it was signed in my presence, i.e., the agent observed the signing of only one of the witnesses, it is invalid. Rav Ḥisda says: And even if two people testify to the signature of the second witness, and the court ratifies this signature, nevertheless it is invalid. What is the reason for this ruling? After all, the court has the agent’s testimony with regard to one signature and the confirmation of two witnesses for the second signature.

The Gemara answers: The document must be authenticated either entirely through the process of the ratification of a bill of divorce, i.e., the bill of divorce must be ratified like any other legal document, by two people attesting to the validity of the signatures of both witnesses, or it must be entirely ratified via the rabbinic decree that the agent is deemed credible when he states: It was written in my presence and it was signed in my presence.

Rava objects to this: Is there any situation in which if one person said it, the document is valid, i.e., if the agent would have attested to the signature of the second witness the bill of divorce would be valid, and now that there are two witnesses who attest to the signatures it is invalid? Rather, Rava says: Even if

Traduction : The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren Noé Talmud, with commentary by Rabbi Adin Even-Israel Steinsaltz.

Gittin 15a examines deathbed gift disputes over a valuable brooch, exploring rabbinic views on inheritance and honoring a deceased person's wishes.