Talmud - Gittin 74a גיטין ע״ד א׳

and he becomes ritually impure for her if he is a priest. The principle of the matter is as follows: At that time she is like his wife in every sense, but she does not require a second bill of divorce from him when he dies. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda.

Rabbi Meir says: If she engages in sexual intercourse with another man, the legal status of her sexual intercourse depends on whether or not her husband dies from this illness. If he dies, she is considered to have been divorced from the time the bill of divorce was given, and her sexual intercourse is not deemed adulterous. Rabbi Yosei says: Her sexual intercourse has an uncertain status. And the Rabbis say: There is uncertainty whether she is divorced or whether she is not divorced, and this is an uncertainty provided that he dies from this illness. If he does not, they are certainly not divorced.

The Gemara clarifies: What difference is there between the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who says that the status of her sexual intercourse depends on whether or not her husband dies from his illness, and the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, who says that the status of her sexual intercourse is uncertain?

Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The practical difference between them is with regard to the bringing of a provisional guilt-offering, which is brought by one who is uncertain as to whether he committed a sin that requires a sin-offering. According to the opinion of Rabbi Meir, the paramour does not bring a provisional guilt-offering (see Leviticus 5:17–19), because, although there was uncertainty at the time of the act of sexual intercourse, the matter will eventually be clarified once the husband either dies or recovers from his illness. If the husband survives her paramour must bring a sin-offering, and if the husband dies the other man is exempt from bringing any offering. And according to the opinion of Rabbi Yosei her status is uncertain, and even if the husband dies from this illness Rabbi Yosei is uncertain when the bill of divorce took effect. Therefore, her paramour must bring a provisional guilt-offering.

The baraita taught: And the Rabbis say: There is uncertainty whether she is divorced or whether she is not divorced. The Gemara comments: Apparently, the opinion of the Rabbis is the same as the opinion of Rabbi Yosei. Why are they recorded as having a dispute? The Gemara answers: There is a practical difference between them with regard to the halakhic ruling transmitted by Rabbi Zeira. As Rabbi Zeira says that Rabba bar Yirmeya says that Shmuel says: Wherever the Sages said: There is uncertainty whether she is divorced or whether she is not divorced, her husband is obligated to provide her with sustenance. This formulation is stated only by the Rabbis, and Rabbi Zeira’s halakha would apply only according to them, not according to Rabbi Yosei.

MISHNA: If a husband says to his wife: This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you will give me two hundred dinars, then she is divorced and must give two hundred dinars in order to fulfill the condition of the bill of divorce.

If a husband says to his wife: This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you will give me money from now until the conclusion of thirty days, if she gives the money to him within thirty days she is divorced. And if not she is not divorced.

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said: There was an incident in the city of Tzaidan involving one who said to his wife: This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you will give me my coat [itztaliti], and she lost his coat, so that she could not give it to him. And the Rabbis said that she must give him the value of the coat, and by doing so she fulfills the condition and is divorced.

GEMARA: The mishna teaches: She is divorced and must give the money. The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of: And must give? Rav Huna says: She is divorced immediately, once the bill of divorce has been given over to her, and she must give him the money subsequently in order to fulfill the condition. The bill of divorce takes effect retroactively, from the time when it was given, after she gives the money. Rav Yehuda says: She is divorced only when she gives him this sum.

The Gemara asks: What is the difference between the opinion of Rav Huna and the opinion of Rav Yehuda? The Gemara answers: There is a difference between them if the bill of divorce was torn or lost after she received it but before she gave the money. According to the opinion of Rav Huna, who says: And she must give but the bill of divorce takes effect retroactively, if it was torn or lost then she does not require a second bill of divorce from him. By contrast, Rav Yehuda says that the divorce takes effect only when she gives him the sum. Therefore, if the document is torn or lost she requires a second bill of divorce from him, as in his opinion it is not yet a valid bill of divorce until she has given him the money.

The Gemara comments: And it was also taught in the mishna with regard to betrothal that Rav Huna and Rav Yehuda also disagreed about a case like this, as we learned in a mishna (Kiddushin 60a): If one says to a woman: You are hereby betrothed to me on the condition that I will give you two hundred dinars, then she is betrothed, and he must give the sum. And it was stated that Rav Huna and Rav Yehuda disagreed with regard to what is the meaning of: And he must give. Rav Huna says: And he must give, meaning that she is betrothed immediately, provided that the husband gives what he promised. Rav Yehuda says: She is betrothed only when he gives.

The Gemara asks: What is the difference between them? The Gemara answers: There is a difference between them in a case where she extended her hand and received betrothal from another man before the first man gave her the money that he promised. Rav Huna says: And he must give, meaning that it is merely a condition that he accepted upon himself. He fulfills his condition and moves on, and the woman is betrothed to him immediately. Therefore, her betrothal to the second man has no validity. Rav Yehuda says: When he gives, which means that when he gives her the money it will be a valid betrothal. But now it is not a valid betrothal and therefore the betrothal from the second man takes effect.

The Gemara comments: And it is necessary to mention this dispute in both the case of divorce and the case of betrothal. As if it would have taught us their opinions only with regard to betrothal, then one may think that it is specifically with regard to this case that Rav Huna says: And he should give, because he comes to draw her close in marriage. Consequently, he does this willingly, and therefore there is an assumption that his intention was for the betrothal to take effect immediately. But with regard to divorce, where he comes to distance her, there is an assumption that he does so unwillingly, so that he makes the divorce dependent on a condition in order to delay the matter. Therefore, say that Rav Huna concedes to Rav Yehuda that the divorce does not take effect until the condition has been fulfilled.

And if it would have taught us their opinions only with regard to divorce, then one may think that it is specifically with regard to this case that Rav Huna says: And she must give, because he is not embarrassed to demand the money from her afterward to fulfill the condition of the bill of divorce, and his intent was to divorce her immediately. But with regard to betrothal, where she is embarrassed to demand the money that he promised would come from him, she may not agree to be betrothed to him until she actually receives the money. Therefore, you might say that Rav Huna concedes to Rav Yehuda that the betrothal is valid only once he gives her the money.

And furthermore, if it would have taught us their opinions only with regard to betrothal, then one may think that it is specifically with regard to this case that Rav Yehuda says that the betrothal is valid only when he gives her the money, because she is embarrassed to demand it from him if he does not give it to her. Therefore, her intention is that she will be betrothed only once the condition is fulfilled. But with regard to divorce, where the husband is not embarrassed to demand the money from her, you might say that Rav Yehuda concedes to Rav Huna that the bill of divorce takes effect immediately.

And furthermore, if it would have taught us only with regard to the case of divorce, then one may think that it is specifically with regard to this case that Rav Yehuda says that the divorce is valid only when she gives him the money, because the husband comes to distance her. But with regard to betrothal, where he comes to draw her close, you might say that Rav Yehuda concedes to Rav Huna. Therefore, it is necessary to state this dispute in both cases.

The Gemara raises an objection based on what was taught in a baraita (Tosefta 7:5): If one says to a woman: This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you will give me two hundred dinars, then even though the bill of divorce was torn or lost she is divorced. And she may not marry another man until she gives her first husband the money.

And it is taught further in that same baraita: If one says to his wife: This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you will give two hundred dinars to me, and the husband died childless, if she had already given him the money, then she is not bound with a levirate bond to the yavam because she was already divorced from her husband through the bill of divorce that he gave her. But if she had not given him the money, then she is bound with a levirate bond to the yavam because the bill of divorce did not take effect and she is a widow. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: She should give the money to her late husband’s father, or to his brother, or to one of the relatives who inherit from him, and by doing so she fulfills the condition and is released from the levirate bond.

The Gemara notes: The first tanna and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel disagree only with regard to the meaning of the condition. One Sage, the first tanna, holds that when the husband said: On the condition that she will give to me, he meant: To me specifically and not to my heirs. Consequently, she cannot fulfill the condition by giving the money to his heirs. And one Sage, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, holds that when the husband said that she will give the money to me, he meant and even to my heirs. But in any event, everyone agrees that this is a valid condition, yet its fulfillment does not change the date that the bill of divorce takes effect. This is a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Rav Yehuda, who said that the bill of divorce takes effect only when she gives.

The Gemara answers: Rav Yehuda could have said to you: In accordance with whose opinion is this baraita? It is the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. As Rav Huna says that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: Anyone who states a condition employing the language: On the condition, is like one who states: The agreement will take effect retroactively from now, even though the condition is fulfilled only later on. And the Rabbis disagree with him. And I say my ruling in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis.

And Rabbi Zeira says: When we were in Babylonia we would say with regard to this following statement that Rav Huna says that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: Anyone who states a condition employing the language: On the condition, is like one who states: The agreement will take effect retroactively from now, even though the condition is fulfilled only later on; we would say that the Rabbis disagree with him. When I ascended to Eretz Yisrael I found Rabbi Asi, who was sitting and saying in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan: Everyone concedes that with regard to anyone who states a condition employing the language: On the condition, he is like one who states: The agreement will take effect retroactively from now; and the Rabbis disagreed with Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi only in a case where the bill of divorce included the condition: From today and after my death.

Traduction : The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren Noé Talmud, with commentary by Rabbi Adin Even-Israel Steinsaltz.

Gittin 74a explores rabbinic debates over a conditional divorce tied to a husband's illness, focusing on the wife's status and a paramour's guilt-offering obligations.