Talmud - Gittin 28a גיטין כ״ח א׳

or in a case where he found it among his utensils in his house, then even if a long time passed, the bill of divorce is valid.

It was stated that the amora’im disagreed with regard to the halakha in this dispute: Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: The halakha is that the bill of divorce is valid as long as no person stopped there. Rabba bar bar Ḥana says that Rav Yitzḥak bar Shmuel says: The halakha is that the bill of divorce is valid as long as no other person passed there.

The Gemara asks: Why is it necessary to state the actual opinion? Let this Sage, Rav Yehuda citing Shmuel, say that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of this Sage, the opinion cited as: Some say; and let this Sage, Rabba bar bar Ḥana citing Rav Yitzḥak bar Shmuel, say that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of this Sage, Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar. The Gemara answers: Because there are those who reverse the opinions of the tanna’im, they needed to state the opinions explicitly so that there would be no mistake with regard to the halakha.

§ The mishna teaches that if one found the bill of divorce in a ḥafisa or in a deluskema, then it is valid. The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of the word ḥafisa? Rabba bar bar Ḥana says: It is a small flask. What is the meaning of deluskema? It is a purse [telika] of the elderly.

MISHNA: In the case of an agent who brings a bill of divorce to a woman, and when he had left the husband was elderly or sick, the agent gives her the bill of divorce based on the presumption that the husband is still alive, and there is no concern that in the meantime he has died, thereby canceling the bill of divorce.

Similarly, with regard to an Israelite woman who is married to a priest and may therefore partake of teruma, and her husband went to a country overseas, she may continue to partake of teruma based on the presumption that her husband is still alive. Similarly, in the case of one who sends his sin-offering from a country overseas, the priests may offer it on the altar based on the presumption that the one who sent it is still alive.

GEMARA: Rava says: They taught that this presumptive status exists only concerning an elderly man who has not reached his years of strength, i.e., the age of eighty, and an ordinary sick person, as the majority of sick people continue to live and recover from their illnesses. But if the husband was an elderly man who had reached his years of strength, or if he was moribund, then, as the majority of moribund people proceed to die, he does not have this presumptive status.

Abaye raised an objection to Rava’s statement from a baraita: With regard to an agent who brings a bill of divorce and left the husband when he was old, even one hundred years old, he gives the bill of divorce to the wife, based on the presumption that her husband is still alive. The Gemara concludes: This is a conclusive refutation, and Rava’s statement is rejected.

The Gemara comments: And if you wish, say that this is not a conclusive refutation. In the case of the baraita, since it is so that the man reached an exceptionally old age, one cannot apply the general presumptions to him and must instead apply presumptions that are for one who has reached an exceptionally old age. However, in a case where someone has not demonstrated that he is an exception to the rule, once he reaches the age of eighty there is a concern that perhaps he has died in the interim.

§ Abaye raises a contradiction before Rabba: We learned in the mishna that in the case of an agent who brings a bill of divorce to a woman and left the husband when he was elderly or sick, the agent gives her the bill of divorce based on the presumption that the husband is still alive. And one can raise a contradiction from a baraita (Tosefta 6:11) that states: If one is leaving his place of residence, and in order to preclude a situation where his wife would have the status of a deserted wife he gives her a conditional bill of divorce and stipulates: This is your bill of divorce that will take effect one hour prior to my death, it is immediately prohibited for her to partake of teruma, due to the concern that he may die immediately after an hour has passed. Apparently, there is a concern that one may die at any point.

Rabba said to him: Do you raise a contradiction from the halakhot of teruma to the halakhot of bills of divorce? Concerning teruma, it is possible for the wife to eat only non-sacred produce in order to be stringent due to the possibility that her husband may die. However, concerning a bill of divorce it is not possible to take into account the possibility that her husband may die, as there would then be no way for a husband to send a bill of divorce to her with an agent.

And the Gemara raises a contradiction from the halakhot of teruma in the mishna to the halakhot of teruma in a baraita. We learned in the mishna: With regard to an Israelite woman who is married to a priest and may therefore partake of teruma, and her husband went to a country overseas, she may continue to partake of teruma based on the presumption that her husband is still alive.

And the Gemara raises a contradiction from a baraita: If one says to his wife: This is your bill of divorce that will take effect one hour prior to my death, it is immediately prohibited for her to partake of teruma due to the concern that he may die immediately after an hour has passed. These two halakhot appear to contradict one another.

Rav Adda, son of Rav Yitzḥak, said: It is different there, as he rendered her forbidden to himself one hour prior to his death, meaning that she will definitely be prohibited from partaking of teruma at some point. Therefore, it is considered to be an uncertainty immediately. Rav Pappa objects to this answer: From where is it known that he will die first and she will be prohibited from partaking of teruma? Perhaps she will die first, and the bill of divorce will never take effect.

Rather, Abaye said that this is not difficult: This mishna, which permits the woman to partake of teruma, is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who is not concerned about potential death. That baraita, which prohibits the woman from partaking of teruma, is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who is concerned about potential death.

As we learned in a baraita in the Tosefta (Demai 8:7): In the case of one who purchases wine from among the Samaritans, about whom it is assumed that they did not separate teruma and tithes, and he is not in a position to separate teruma, he acts as follows: If there are, for example, one hundred log of wine in the barrels, he says: Two log that I will separate in the future are teruma, as the mandated average measure of teruma is one-fiftieth; ten log are first tithe; and one-tenth of the remainder, which is approximately nine log, are second tithe. And he deconsecrates the second tithe that he will separate in the future, transferring its sanctity to money, and he may drink the wine immediately, relying on the separation that he will perform later, which will clarify retroactively what he designated for the tithes and for teruma. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir.

The baraita continues: However, Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Shimon prohibit this practice. These Sages, Rabbi Yehuda among them, were concerned that perhaps the wineskin would burst before he would manage to separate the teruma, whereas Rabbi Meir is not concerned about this occurring. Similarly, it is said that Rabbi Meir is not concerned about potential death, and Rabbi Yehuda is concerned.

Rava said:

Traduction : The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren Noé Talmud, with commentary by Rabbi Adin Even-Israel Steinsaltz.

Gittin 28a examines validity conditions for a found bill of divorce and clarifies terms like ḥafisa, alongside presumptions about a husband's survival.