Talmud - Gittin 80b גיטין פ׳ ב׳

This is the statement of Rabbi Meir, who is particular about maintaining peaceful relations with the kingdom, with regard to bills of divorce. But the Rabbis say: Even if he wrote a date on the bill of divorce only in the name of the guardsman [santar] in the city, she is divorced, since it is irrelevant which calendrical system was used for the date.

It is related that there was a certain bill of divorce in which the date was written in the name of the governor [istandera] of the city of Bascar, i.e., the date was marked according to the years of his government. Rav Naḥman bar Rav Ḥisda sent this dilemma before Rabba: What is the halakha in a case like this?

He sent him in response: With regard to this, even Rabbi Meir concedes that the bill of divorce is valid. What is the reason? The governor is an official from that kingdom, so the ruler of the kingdom does not mind.

The Gemara asks: And in what way is this case different from the guardsman in the city? The Gemara answers: There, it is demeaning for them that the date is written in the name of an unimportant official. Here, with regard to the governor, it is complimentary for them that the date is written in the name of a senior official.

Rabbi Abba says that Rav Huna says that Rav says: This mishna is in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Meir, who is stringent with regard to this bill of divorce and holds that the child is a mamzer. But the Rabbis say: The lineage of the offspring is unflawed. And the Rabbis concede to Rabbi Meir, that if he changed his name or her name, the name of his city or the name of her city, the offspring is a mamzer.

Rav Ashi says: We, too, learn in the mishna: If he changed his name or her name, the name of his city or the name of her city, and she remarried on the basis of this bill of divorce, then she must leave this husband and that husband, and all of those ways of penalizing a woman who remarried based on the bills of divorce detailed in the earlier clause of the mishna apply to her.

It is necessary to clarify who teaches this halakha? If we say that it is Rabbi Meir, let him combine the case of one who writes a different kingdom, and the case of one who changes the names, and teach them both as one halakha. Rather, conclude from it that this halakha is the opinion of the Rabbis. The Gemara concludes: Conclude from it that until this point the mishna was quoting the statement of Rabbi Meir, but subsequently it is the statement of the Rabbis that is quoted, that in a case of such a fundamental change, even in their opinion such a bill of divorce is invalid.

§ It was taught in the mishna that in all of those cases in which they said that a man who died and left behind a widow who is to the yavam one of those with whom relations are forbidden, and the rival wives were thought to be permitted to remarry, if it later became clear that the forbidden relation was an ailonit and therefore they were in fact forbidden from remarrying, then they must leave the man whom they remarried, and they cannot enter into levirate marriage with the yavam, and many other penalties apply to them as well. The Gemara comments: It is possible to deduce from the language used by the mishna that only if they married other men, then yes, these halakhot apply to them. But if the rival wives engaged in licentious sexual intercourse, then no, these halakhot do not apply to them.

The Gemara suggests: Let us say that this is a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Rav Hamnuna, as Rav Hamnuna says: A widow awaiting her brother-in-law to perform levirate marriage who engaged in licentious sexual intercourse is likened to a married woman who committed adultery, and she is prohibited from entering into levirate marriage with her yavam.

The Gemara rejects this: No, this is not a refutation, since it is possible to explain that the mishna gave the example that they married, and the same is true in a case where they engaged in licentious sexual intercourse. And this that the mishna teaches: If they married, is because it employed a euphemistic expression, to refrain from discussing a case of licentiousness.

And there are those who say that the exchange went as follows: From the mishna’s statement about the rival wives that remarried, one can understand that the halakha is so if they married, and the same is true in a case where they engaged in licentious sexual intercourse.

The Gemara suggests: Let us say that it supports the opinion of Rav Hamnuna, as Rav Hamnuna says: A widow awaiting her brother-in-law to perform levirate marriage who engaged in licentious sexual intercourse is prohibited from entering into levirate marriage with her yavam.

The Gemara rejects this: No, it is specifically when they married that they are forbidden, because she is confused with a woman whose husband traveled to a country overseas and she went and remarried. In that case she is certainly prohibited from marrying both the first and the second husband. Similarly, they instituted the same decree for a yevama who married someone else. By contrast, in the case of a yevama who engaged in licentious sexual intercourse, which is completely different, they did not institute this decree.

§ It was taught in the mishna that one who marries his yevama, and her rival wife went and married another man, and ultimately the yevama was found to be an ailonit, then the rival wife must leave her husband, and she cannot enter into levirate marriage with the yavam, and many other penalties apply to her as well. The Gemara comments: And it is necessary to teach this halakha as well, although it seemingly deals with the same issue as the previous halakha. As, if the mishna had taught us this halakha only with regard to the first case of a rival wife of a woman who is forbidden to the yavam, then one could say that the halakha is so, because the mitzva of levirate marriage was not fulfilled at all, since the rival wife married someone else, and the yavam did not perform levirate marriage.

But here, in this latter case, where the mitzva of levirate marriage was fulfilled in some way when he married the yevama, although ultimately it became clear that it was not a legitimate levirate marriage, say that the rival wives are not penalized, since she is not guilty by not having waited.

And if the mishna had taught us this halakha here, with regard to a yavam who married a yevama who was ultimately found to be an ailonit, then one could say that specifically here there is reason to penalize her, because this rival wife who remarried was also placed before the yavam, as he could have entered into levirate marriage with any of his brother’s wives. Therefore, she could have waited to see if the levirate marriage was effective before remarrying. But there, in the first case of a yevama who is forbidden to the yavam, that she is not placed before him, as all of them are entirely exempt from levirate marriage, say that the rival wives are not penalized. Therefore, it is necessary to state both halakhot.

§ It was taught in the mishna that if the scribe wrote a bill of divorce, and erred and gave the bill of divorce to the woman and the receipt to the man, and consequently the husband gave his wife a receipt and she gave him a bill of divorce, Rabbi Eliezer says: If the bill of divorce is immediately in the husband’s possession, it is not a valid bill of divorce. But if it is in his possession after some time, the assumption is that she was divorced in a correct manner and the bill of divorce was returned to him later.

The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances in which the bill of divorce is immediately in the husband’s hand and what are the circumstances in which it is in his possession after some time? Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: All the while that they are sitting and are engaged in the issue of the divorce, this is considered immediately. If they already arose and concluded the proceedings, this is considered after some time.

And Rav Adda bar Ahava says: If she was not married to someone else, this is considered immediately, since they can rectify the situation by requiring him to give the bill of divorce properly. If she was married, this is considered after some time.

The Gemara asks: We learned in the mishna with regard to Rabbi Elazar’s statement: It is not in the power of the first husband to eliminate the right of the second husband. Granted, according to the opinion of Rav Adda bar Ahava, this explanation is consistent with that which is taught: The second husband, since the mishna is discussing a case in which she remarried and has a second husband. But according to the opinion of Shmuel, what is the reference to a second husband? Shmuel’s opinion is that as soon as they arise and conclude the proceedings, it is considered to be after some time, and in this case there is no second husband. According to Shmuel’s opinion, how does Rabbi Elazar’s statement apply?

Traduction : The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren Noé Talmud, with commentary by Rabbi Adin Even-Israel Steinsaltz.

Gittin 80b examines how dating a bill of divorce by local officials' names affects its validity and the resulting child's legitimate lineage.