Talmud - Gittin 55a גיטין נ״ה א׳

The Gemara asks: And in what way is this case different from the case in which Rabbi Ami said that the scribe is not deemed credible to disqualify the Torah scroll? The Gemara answers: There it can be said that the scribe was lying and merely wished to distress the purchaser of the Torah scroll. He claimed that he had written God’s names without the proper intention because he made the mistake of Rabbi Yirmeya. He thought, as Rabbi Yirmeya did, that as a result of his purported admission he would lose only his wage for writing the holy names, but he would still receive payment for the rest of the scroll. Here, by contrast, since the scribe knows that by claiming that he did not process the parchment with the proper intention, he causes the loss of his entire wage, and he nevertheless comes and says this, you should say that he speaks the truth and should be deemed credible. Since he is deemed credible and there is no concern that he merely wished to distress the purchaser, the Torah scroll is disqualified.

MISHNA: Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Gudgeda testified before the Sages about the case of a deaf-mute woman who was married off by her father when she was a minor, so that her marriage took effect by Torah law. He said that she can be released from her marriage through a bill of divorce, whether as a minor or after she reaches adulthood. Although as a deaf-mute woman she is not legally competent to give her consent, the divorce is effective because divorce does not require the woman’s consent.

And similarly, he testified about the case of the minor daughter of a non-priest who was orphaned from her father and then married off to a priest by her mother or brother, so that her marriage took effect by rabbinic law. He said that nevertheless she may partake of teruma, although by Torah law it is prohibited for one who is not in a priestly household to partake of teruma. And furthermore if this girl dies, then her husband inherits her estate. It is not said that because the validity of the marriage is by rabbinic law and not Torah law he is not entitled to inherit from her.

And Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Gudgeda further testified about a stolen beam that was already built into a large building [bira], that the victim of the robbery receives only the value of the beam but not the beam itself, due to an ordinance instituted for the penitent. By Torah law, a robber is obligated to return any stolen item in his possession, provided that its form has not been altered. If one stole a beam and incorporated it into a building, then by Torah law he would have to destroy the building and return the beam. In order to encourage repentance, the Sages were lenient and allowed a robber to return the value of the beam.

And lastly, Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Gudgeda testified about a sin-offering that was obtained through robbery but that was not publicly known to have been obtained in that manner. He said that it effects atonement for the robber who sacrifices it, for the benefit of the altar, as will be explained in the Gemara.

GEMARA: Rava says: Learn from the testimony of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Gudgeda in the mishna that if the husband secretly says to witnesses: See this bill of divorce that I am about to give to my wife, and then he says to his wife: Take this promissory note, then she is divorced even when she herself does not know that the document in her hand is a bill of divorce. Didn’t Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Gudgeda say that we do not require the woman’s consent for a bill of divorce, as the divorce takes effect even when she is a deaf-mute, who is not legally competent to give her consent? Here too, one should say that we do not require the woman’s consent.

The Gemara asks: Isn’t this obvious? Why would the divorce not be valid? The Gemara explains: Lest you say: Since he said to his wife: Take this promissory note, after talking to the witnesses, he meant to cancel the bill of divorce with these words, Rava therefore teaches us: If it is so that he meant to cancel the bill of divorce, he would have told the witnesses that this was his intention. The fact that he did not do so indicates that he had no intention of canceling it. And the reason he said to his wife that he was handing her a promissory note is due to embarrassment, as he was ashamed to tell her that he was giving her a bill of divorce. Consequently, he gave it to her in such a way that she did not immediately know that it was a bill of divorce that she received.

§ The mishna teaches that Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Gudgeda testified about the case of a minor daughter of a non-priest who was married to a priest, and said that she may partake of teruma. The Gemara comments: This indicates that only the minor daughter can partake of teruma, while one can infer from this that a deaf-mute woman who was married to a priest may not partake of teruma. The Gemara explains: What is the reason for this? The Sages decreed that a deaf-mute woman married to a priest may not partake of teruma lest a deaf-mute priest come to feed teruma to his deaf-mute wife, as it is common for deaf-mute men to marry deaf-mute women, but their marriage is not effective by Torah law.

The Gemara asks: Why does this matter? And let him feed her teruma. Isn’t she like a minor who eats forbidden animal carcasses? Since the deaf-mute woman is not considered to be legally competent, she is not subject to the prohibition against partaking of teruma. As in the case of a minor who is eating forbidden food, there is no requirement to prevent her from doing so.

The Gemara answers: Rather, the Sages decreed that a deaf-mute woman married to a priest may not partake of teruma lest a deaf-mute priest come to feed teruma to his halakhically competent wife. Since the validity of their marriage is by rabbinic law, it is therefore prohibited for the woman to partake of teruma, as by Torah law, she is not the wife of a priest. There is a concern that a distinction will not be made between the marriage of a halakhically competent man and deaf-mute woman, in which case the woman is permitted to partake of teruma, and the marriage of a deaf-mute man and a halakhically competent woman, in which case the woman is prohibited from partaking of teruma. Owing to this error, a deaf-mute man might come to feed his wife something that is forbidden to her.

The Gemara asks: But let her partake of teruma that is defined as such by rabbinic law, as marriage that is valid by rabbinic law should suffice to permit partaking of such teruma. The Gemara answers: The Sages decreed that he may not feed her teruma even by rabbinic law, lest he come to feed her teruma by Torah law.

§ The mishna teaches that Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Gudgeda further testified about a stolen beam that was already built into a building and said that the injured party receives the value of the beam but not the beam itself. With regard to this, the Sages taught in a baraita (Tosefta, Bava Kamma 10:5): If one robbed another of a beam and built it into a building, Beit Shammai say: He must destroy the entire building and return the beam to its owners. And Beit Hillel say: The injured party receives only the value of the beam but not the beam itself, due to an ordinance instituted for the sake of the penitent. In order to encourage repentance, the Sages were lenient and required the robber to return only the value of the beam. The mishna was taught in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel.

§ The mishna teaches that Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Gudgeda testified about a sin-offering that was obtained through robbery, and said that provided that it was not publicly known to have been obtained in that manner, it effects atonement for the robber. Ulla says: By Torah law, the halakha is as follows: Whether it is known or whether it is not known that the sin-offering was obtained through robbery, it does not effect atonement for the robber who sacrifices it.

What is the reason for this? The owner’s despair of recovering an article that was stolen from him does not by itself enable the robber to acquire the stolen item. Since the stolen animal was not altered in any way, it does not belong to the robber, and he cannot sacrifice it as an offering and achieve atonement through it. And what is the reason that the Sages said that if it was not publicly known that the sin-offering was obtained through robbery it effects atonement? It is so that the priests not be distraught about having sacrificed an animal unfit for the altar.

The Rabbis said to Ulla: How can you explain the issue in this manner? But didn’t we learn in the mishna: It effects atonement for the benefit of the altar, which indicates that the halakha was enacted for the benefit of the altar, not for the benefit of the priests? Ulla said to them: When the priests are distraught, the altar is found idle. The priests will not sacrifice all of the offerings when they are distraught.

This is one explanation, but Rav Yehuda says: By Torah law, whether it is known or it is not known that the sin-offering was obtained through robbery, it effects atonement for the robber who sacrifices it. What is the reason for this? The owner’s despair of recovering an article that was stolen from him by itself enables the robber to acquire the stolen item. Once the owner despairs of regaining possession, the stolen item becomes the robber’s property and he can consecrate it. Therefore, the offering was sacrificed in a fitting manner, and it effects atonement for the robber.

Traduction : The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren Noé Talmud, with commentary by Rabbi Adin Even-Israel Steinsaltz.

Gittin 55a explores a scribe's credibility regarding improper intent in writing, then examines testimony on divorcing a deaf-mute wife and a minor's marriage status.