Talmud - Zevahim 10a זבחים י׳ א׳

With regard to one who slaughters an animal in order to sprinkle its blood for idol worship, or in order to burn its forbidden fat for idol worship, Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Deriving benefit from the animal is prohibited, as it is considered an offering to idol worship, even if ultimately its blood was not sprinkled or its fat burned to that effect. This is because one can have intention from one rite to affect another rite; idolatrous intent while slaughtering the animal renders it forbidden, even if the intention pertains not to the slaughter itself but to the sprinkling of the blood or the burning of the forbidden fat. And this halakha is derived from the halakhot of piggul, as we derive halakhot of idol worship, which are applicable even outside the Temple, from halakhot concerning intent that apply inside the Temple.

Reish Lakish says: Deriving benefit from the animal is permitted. One cannot have intention from one rite to affect another rite, and we do not derive halakhot applicable outside the Temple from halakhot that apply inside the Temple.

Although both disputes are essentially the same, each is necessary. And if the Sages had taught us the dispute only with regard to that issue, namely, an animal slaughtered with idolatrous intent, one would have reasoned that Reish Lakish says his opinion only with regard to that issue, as he maintains that halakhot applicable outside the Temple are not derived from halakhot applicable only inside the Temple. But with regard to an offering that was slaughtered with the intention of sprinkling its blood not for its sake, one might say that he concedes to Rabbi Yoḥanan that it is disqualified, as halakhot applicable inside the Temple can be derived from other halakhot applicable inside the Temple.

And if the Sages had taught us the dispute only with regard to this issue, namely, an offering that was slaughtered with the intention of sprinkling its blood not for its sake, one might claim that Rabbi Yoḥanan says his opinion only with regard to this issue, which concerns halakhot applicable inside the Temple. But with regard to that issue, an animal that was slaughtered with idolatrous intent, one would say that he concedes to the opinion of Reish Lakish that halakhot applicable outside the Temple are not derived from halakhot applicable only inside the Temple. Therefore, both statements are necessary.

When Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael, he said: Rav Yirmeya responds to this dispute by eliciting evidence to support the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan; and Rabbi Ila elicits evidence to support the opinion of Reish Lakish.

Rav Dimi elaborated: Rav Yirmeya elicits evidence to support the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan by an a fortiori inference: Just as in the case of improper intent with regard to the offering’s time, where if the one slaughtering the offering said: I am hereby slaughtering it beyond its designated time, it is fit, and nevertheless, if he slaughtered it in order to sprinkle its blood beyond its designated time, it is unfit, so too, in the case of deviation from the type of offering, where even if he said: I am hereby slaughtering it not for its sake, it is unfit, isn’t it logical that if he slaughtered it in order to sprinkle its blood not for its sake, it should be unfit?

Rava bar Ahilai objects to this inference: One cannot claim that deviation from the type of offering is a more severe transgression than intent to consume it or sprinkle its blood beyond its designated time, since the latter has its own element of stringency. What is notable about intent beyond its designated time? It is notable in that one who eats the meat of such an offering is liable to be punished with karet, whereas one who eats the meat of an offering disqualified due to deviation from the type of offering is not.

Rather, Rava bar Ahilai says: Rav Yirmeya was actually referring to improper intent with regard to the offering’s designated area, since consumption of an offering thereby disqualified is not punishable by karet. And this is what he is saying: Just as in the case of improper intent with regard to the offering’s designated area, where if the one slaughtering the offering said: I am hereby slaughtering it outside its designated area, it is fit, and nevertheless, if he slaughtered it in order to sprinkle its blood outside its designated area, it is unfit, so too, in the case of deviation from the type of offering, where even if he said: I am hereby slaughtering it not for its sake, it is unfit, isn’t it logical that if he slaughtered it in order to sprinkle its blood not for its sake, it should be unfit?

Rav Ashi objects to this inference: What is notable about intent to sprinkle the blood outside its designated area? It is notable in that the disqualification applies to all slaughtered offerings. Can you say that the same halakhot govern the disqualification of an offering sacrificed not for its sake, which applies only to a Paschal offering and a sin offering?

Rather, Rav Ashi says: This is what Rav Yirmeya is saying: Just as in the case of deviation with regard to the owner, where, if the one slaughtering the offering said: I am hereby slaughtering it for the sake of so-and-so, it is fit, and nevertheless, if he slaughtered it in order to sprinkle its blood for the sake of so-and-so, it is unfit, so too, in the case of deviation from the type of offering, where even if he said: I am hereby slaughtering it not for its sake, it is unfit, isn’t it logical that if he slaughtered it in order to sprinkle its blood not for its sake, it should be unfit? The opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan is supported by this logical line of reasoning.

Rabbi Ila elicits evidence to support the opinion of Reish Lakish, that performance of one rite with improper intent with regard to another rite is of no consequence: The Torah should not have stated the requirement of sacrificing an offering for its own sake with regard to sprinkling of the blood, and rather should have let one derive it by an a fortiori inference from the common element of two other rites, from slaughter and collection of the blood. If so, for what halakha does the Merciful One write this redundant requirement? It is in order to say that one cannot have intention from one rite to affect another rite.

Rav Pappa objects to this derivation: But perhaps the requirement is written to teach the opposite, that one can have intention from one rite to affect another rite. A redundant requirement should expand, not reduce, the scope of actions that can disqualify the offering.

The Gemara answers: If that were so, let the verse remain silent with regard to sprinkling the blood for the sake of the offering, and one could derive that one can have intention from one rite to affect another rite from Rav Ashi’s aforementioned a fortiori inference. The verse must be meant to counteract that inference and teach that one cannot have intention from one rite to affect another rite.

And the other amora, Rabbi Yoḥanan, would refute Rabbi Ila’s proof like this: It is necessary for the Torah to state the requirement with regard to sprinkling. It cannot be derived from the cases of slaughter and collection of the blood, since these two share an element of stringency that sprinkling lacks. What is notable about these? They are notable in that in offerings of the most sacred order they must be performed in the north of the Temple courtyard. And furthermore, they are performed in the sacrifice of inner sin offerings as well as external sin offerings, unlike the sprinkling of the blood on the external altar.

And the other amora, Reish Lakish, would respond that now, in any event, we stand in a discussion with regard to peace offerings, since the requirement of sacrifice for the offering’s sake is derived from the verses concerning peace offerings. Peace offerings are neither offerings of the most sacred order nor inner sin offerings, and therefore the elements of stringency mentioned above are irrelevant.

A parallel dispute was stated: If one slaughtered a sin offering for its sake but with intent to sprinkle its blood not for its sake, Rav Naḥman says that the offering is unfit, and Rabba says that it is fit. And Rabba retracted his opinion, and conceded to Rav Naḥman, due to Rav Ashi’s a fortiori inference.

§ The mishna teaches: Rabbi Eliezer says: The guilt offering, too, is unfit when sacrificed not for its sake. With regard to this it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Eliezer said: A sin offering is brought for committing a transgression and a guilt offering is brought for committing a transgression. Just as a sin offering sacrificed not for its sake is unfit, so too, a guilt offering sacrificed not for its sake is unfit.

Rabbi Yehoshua said to him: The inference is not valid. If you say this with regard to a sin offering, whose blood is sprinkled above the red line that encircles the altar, should you necessarily say the same with regard to a guilt offering, whose blood is sprinkled below that line, like most animal offerings?

Rabbi Eliezer said to him: A Paschal offering can prove the point, as its blood is sprinkled below the red line, and nevertheless, if one slaughtered it not for its sake it is unfit.

Rabbi Yehoshua said to him: A Paschal offering cannot serve as the source either, since it possesses a unique element of stringency. What is notable about a Paschal offering? It is notable in that its designated time is fixed. A guilt offering does not have a fixed time.

Rabbi Eliezer said to him: A sin offering can prove the point, as it does not have a fixed time, and nevertheless, it is disqualified if sacrificed not for its sake.

Rabbi Yehoshua said to him:

Traduction : The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren Noé Talmud, with commentary by Rabbi Adin Even-Israel Steinsaltz.

Zevachim 10a explores the dispute between Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish over idolatrous intent during slaughter and whether Temple-based laws of piggul apply outside it.