Talmud - Zevahim 44a זבחים מ״ד א׳

If the stringent case of impurity imparted by a corpse were not stated, but only the lenient case of the impurity of a creeping animal, would I say that the punishment in the stringent case is that of death at the hand of Heaven? Rather, the halakha in the case of impurity imparted by a corpse would be derived from the halakha in the case of the impurity of a creeping animal by means of an a fortiori inference, and it is sufficient for the conclusion that emerges from an a fortiori inference to be like its source, in this case that one is liable to be flogged for the violation of a prohibition, and no more.

Ze’eiri says: Indeed, the lenient case is referring to the impurity of a creeping animal, and the stringent case is referring to impurity imparted by a corpse. And this is what the baraita is saying: If the impurity of a creeping animal was stated, and it was stated that one who eats second tithe while impure with such impurity has violated a prohibition and one who partakes of teruma in that state is liable to be punished with death at the hand of Heaven, and the impurity imparted by a corpse was not stated in this context, I would say as follows: The lenient level of impurity, that of a creeping animal, with regard to food with lenient halakhot, second tithe, involves the violation of a prohibition, and with regard to food with stringent halakhot, teruma, it involves liability to be punished with death at the hand of Heaven.

Ze’eiri continues his explanation of the baraita: And from the fact that the lenient level of impurity, that of a creeping animal, with regard to food with stringent halakhot, teruma, involves liability to be punished with death at the hand of Heaven, it may be inferred that also in the analogous case of the stringent level of impurity, imparted by a corpse, with regard to food with lenient halakhot, there is liability to be punished with death at the hand of Heaven. Therefore, the stringent level of impurity, imparted by a corpse, was stated with regard to second tithe, which has lenient halakhot, to teach that even if one contracted impurity from a corpse, he has violated only a prohibition for eating second tithe, and is not liable to be punished with death at the hand of Heaven.

§ The mishna teaches: With regard to any item that has permitting factors, either for consumption by a person or for burning on the altar, one is liable for eating it due to violation of the prohibition of piggul. The Gemara cites a verse and a related baraita. The verse states: “And if any be at all eaten of the flesh of the sacrifice of his peace offering on the third day, it shall not be accepted, neither shall it be imputed to him who sacrifices it; it shall be piggul, and the soul that eats of it shall bear his iniquity” (Leviticus 7:18). The baraita first demonstrates that the halakha of piggul applies not only to a peace offering, with regard to which it is stated in the Torah, but to all offerings.

The Sages taught in a baraita: Or perhaps the halakha of piggul extends only to an offering that is similar to peace offerings: Just as peace offerings are notable in that they are eaten for two days and one night, so too, the halakha of piggul applies to any offering that is eaten for two days and one night.

But as for an offering that is eaten only for one day, i.e., the day the offering is sacrificed, and the following night, e.g., a sin offering, guilt offering, and firstborn offering, from where is it derived that the halakha of piggul applies to this offering as well? The verse states: “Of the flesh of the sacrifice of his peace offering,” which teaches that the status of piggul can apply to any offering whose remainder of meat is eaten after its sacrificial portions have been offered on the altar. The baraita asks: With regard to a burnt offering, whose remainder of meat is not eaten, as it is burned in its entirety on the altar, from where is this halakha derived? The verse states: “Sacrifice,” which includes any offering that is slaughtered.

The baraita asks: From where is it derived to include bird offerings, e.g., doves or pigeons, which are not slaughtered but whose napes of their necks are pinched, and meal offerings, until I include even the log of oil that accompanies the guilt offering of a recovered leper? The verse states with regard to the consumption of consecrated food in a state of ritual purity: “That they separate themselves from the sacred items of the children of Israel, which they consecrate to Me, and that they do not profane My holy name” (Leviticus 22:2).

The baraita clarifies this derivation: The halakha that the prohibition of notar applies to all these offerings is derived through a verbal analogy of profanation in the context of notar: “And if anything remains until the third day, it shall be burned in fire…and anyone who eats it shall bear his iniquity, because he has profaned the sacred item of the Lord” (Leviticus 19:6–8), and profanation stated in the verse discussing ritual impurity: “And that they do not profane My holy name.” And the halakha that piggul applies to all these offerings is subsequently derived through a verbal analogy of “iniquity” in the context of piggul and “iniquity” stated in the verse discussing notar. With regard to piggul, the verse states: “It shall be piggul, and the soul that eats of it shall bear his iniquity” (Leviticus 7:18), and with regard to notar, it is stated in the aforementioned verse: “And anyone who eats it shall bear his iniquity.”

The baraita asks: And since the verse eventually includes all items, even meal offerings and the log of oil of a leper, now one can ask: Why does the verse state piggul specifically with regard to peace offerings? The baraita answers: This serves to tell you that the offering must be similar to peace offerings in the following way: Just as peace offerings are notable in that they have permitting factors, either for consumption by a person or for burning on the altar, so too, with regard to any item that has permitting factors, either for a person or for the altar, one is liable for eating it due to violation of the prohibition of piggul.

The baraita specifies: With regard to the burnt offering, its blood renders its flesh permitted to be burned on the altar and its hide to be used by the priests. With regard to the bird burnt offering, its blood renders its flesh and its skin permitted to be burned on the altar. With regard to the bird sin offering, its blood renders its flesh permitted for consumption by the priests. With regard to bulls that are burned, e.g., the bull sacrificed for an unwitting communal transgression, and goats that are burned, e.g., the goat sacrificed for an unwitting communal sin of idol worship, their blood renders their sacrificial portions permitted to be sacrificed on the altar.

And I exclude, via the analogy to peace offerings, the handful of a meal offering, the frankincense, the incense, the meal offering of priests, the meal offering of the anointed priest, the meal offering brought with the libations that accompany animal offerings, and the blood. All these do not have an item that renders them permitted either for a person or for the altar.

The baraita concludes: Rabbi Shimon says that the fact that the verse specifies peace offerings as the standard case of piggul teaches: Just as peace offerings are notable in that they have a permitting factor that is sacrificed on the external altar, i.e., their blood, and one is liable for eating them due to violation of the prohibition of piggul, so too, with regard to any item that has a permitting factor that is sacrificed on the external altar, one is liable for eating it due to violation of the prohibition of piggul. This serves to exclude bulls that are burned and goats that are burned: Since their blood is not presented on the external altar like peace offerings, one is not liable for eating them due to violation of the prohibition of piggul.

The Gemara analyzes the baraita. The Master said: Perhaps the halakha of piggul extends only to an offering that is similar to peace offerings: What is this offering that is similar to a peace offering but not included in the category of peace offerings? The Gemara answers: The reference is to a firstborn offering, which is eaten for two days and one night, as is a peace offering. The Gemara raises a difficulty: By what hermeneutical principle is the halakha of the firstborn offering derived? If it is by the hermeneutical principle of: What do we find with regard to, a principle of inductive reasoning involving a comparison between cases that include similar details, i.e., since the peace offering and firstborn offering are similar with regard to the time designated for their eating, piggul status should apply to each, this can be refuted.

The Gemara clarifies the refutation: What is notable about peace offerings? They are notable in that they require placing hands on the head of the offering, libations, and waving of the breast and thigh. None of these apply in the case of a firstborn offering.

Rather, the halakha that piggul status applies to a firstborn offering is derived through the hermeneutical principle of a generalization and a detail and a generalization, from the following verse: “And if any be at all eaten of the flesh of the sacrifice of his peace offerings on the third day, it shall not be accepted” (Leviticus 7:18). The terms: “And if any” and “be at all eaten” are generalizations, while the words: “The flesh of the sacrifice of his peace offering” constitute a detail. According to the hermeneutical principle of a generalization and a detail and a generalization, in such a case one includes any item that is similar to the detail, and therefore one includes the firstborn offering.

The Gemara raises a difficulty: These two phrases are generalizations that are adjacent to one another, which means that this is not an instance of a generalization and a detail and a generalization, as they are not in that order. Rava said: The hermeneutical principle applies even in this case, as they say in the West, Eretz Yisrael: In every place that you find two generalizations that are adjacent to one another, cast the detail that is written afterward between them, and interpret them in the manner of a generalization and a detail and a generalization. Consequently, this verse is considered to state a generalization and a detail and a generalization.

§ The baraita teaches: Until I include even the log of oil of a leper. The Gemara asks: In accordance with whose opinion is this ruling? The Gemara answers that it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, as it is taught in a baraita: With regard to the log of oil of the leper, one is liable for consuming it due to violation of the prohibition of piggul, if the guilt offering that this oil accompanied became piggul; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. The Gemara raises a difficulty: Say the latter clause: And I exclude the meal offering brought with the libations that accompany animal offerings, and the blood, as they do not have a permitting factor. Here we arrive at the opinion of the Rabbis, who dispute the ruling of Rabbi Meir.

The Gemara elaborates: As it is taught in another baraita: With regard to the libations of an animal offering, one is liable for consuming them due to violation of the prohibition of piggul, as the blood of the offering renders them permitted to be offered on the altar; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. The Rabbis said to him: But a person may bring his offerings today and the accompanying libations from now until even ten days later. Evidently, then, the blood of the offering does not render the libations permitted. Rabbi Meir said to them: I too spoke only about libations that come to be sacrificed together with the offering. If so, the baraita under discussion represents two conflicting opinions.

Rav Yosef said: In accordance with whose opinion is this ruling, that even the log of oil of a leper is included in the prohibition of piggul? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, who agrees with the Rabbis that the libations of an animal offering are not permitted by the blood of the offering. And Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says with regard to the log of oil of a leper that it is not the blood of the guilt offering that renders it permitted; rather, the placements of its oil “before the Lord” (Leviticus 14:16) render the remainder of the oil permitted to be eaten by the priests. And from the fact that the placements of its oil render the oil permitted, by the same token the placements of its oil render it piggul, i.e., if the oil was placed with the intent that the priests should consume its remainder on the following day, one who consumes the oil is liable for consuming piggul.

The Gemara cites the source for Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi’s opinion. As it is taught in a baraita: With regard to the log of oil of a leper, one who derives benefit from it is liable for misusing consecrated property if he derives benefit from it at any point after it has been consecrated in a service vessel, until the blood of the leper’s guilt offering is sprinkled. At this stage the oil is permitted to the priests, and therefore the prohibition against misusing property consecrated to the Temple no longer applies to it. Once the blood has been sprinkled, one may not derive benefit from the oil ab initio, by rabbinic law, as it must still be placed on the leper’s right ear, thumb, and big toe. But if one derived benefit from it, he is not liable for misuse.

Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: One who derives benefit from the oil is liable for misusing consecrated property until the priest places its own placements, i.e., until the oil is sprinkled seven times toward the Sanctuary, as these sprinklings render the remainder of the oil permitted to the priests. And the Rabbis and Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi agree that consumption of the log of oil is prohibited until the priest places the seven placements, i.e., sprinklings, of oil toward the Sanctuary, and performs the placing of the oil on the leper’s thumb and big toe.

They said this statement before Rabbi Yirmeya in Eretz Yisrael, whereupon he said: Would a great man such as Rav Yosef say such a matter, that the sprinkling of the oil renders the rest of the oil piggul?

Traduction : The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren Noé Talmud, with commentary by Rabbi Adin Even-Israel Steinsaltz.

Zevachim 44a explores the a fortiori reasoning comparing corpse impurity and creeping animal impurity regarding penalties for eating tithes and teruma.