Talmud - Zevahim 29a זבחים כ״ט א׳

indicates that to render an offering piggul, the priest does not mix other improper intentions [maḥashavot] with intent of piggul. If he has more than one type of improper intent, the offering is disqualified, but it is not rendered piggul.

When the verse states: “Piggul,” this is referring to an offering that one had intent to consume outside its designated area.

And since the verse states: “It shall be,” and not: They shall be, this teaches that intent to consume half an olive-bulk beyond its designated time and intent to consume half an olive-bulk outside its designated area join together with one another to constitute the minimum measure required to disqualify the offering.

Finally, when the verse states: “And the soul that eats of it shall bear his iniquity,” the term “of it” indicates that only one of the above disqualifications carries the penalty of karet, but not two of them. And which is this? It is intent to consume the offering beyond its designated time, as one derives by way of verbal analogy between “iniquity” and “iniquity” from notar (Leviticus 19:8), that “bear his iniquity” means that one is liable to receive karet. The comparison is apt since notar is similar to intent to consume the offering beyond its designated time in that both prohibitions share the features mentioned above that form the acronym: Zayin, beit.

Rav Pappa said to Rava: According to your opinion, in what way do you interpret the reference to the third day (Leviticus 19:7) in the Torah portion that begins: “You shall be holy”? Rava responded: That verse is necessary to teach that a given location is considered to be outside the offering’s designated area only if it is so in three ways, i.e., outside the permitted limits of the blood, of the meat, and of the sacrificial portions.

The Gemara asks: Why not let me derive that halakha from the first verse: “And if any of the flesh of his peace offerings be at all eaten on the third day” (Leviticus 7:18), since the Merciful One expresses that verse as well with the term “third”? Since Rava derives the disqualification of intent to consume an offering outside its designated area from this verse, why not let him derive this halakha from the verse as well?

Rav Ashi said: I stated this halakha before Rav Mattana, and he said to me: If one were to derive this halakha only from there (Leviticus 7:18), I would say: The term “third” is a detail, and the term “piggul” is a generalization, and whenever a detail is followed by a generalization, the generalization becomes an addition to the detail, and consequently, all other areas are included as well. The additional verse teaches us that the halakha includes only those areas that are outside in three ways.

§ The Sages taught with regard to the verse: “And if any of the flesh of his peace offerings be at all eaten on the third day, it shall not be accepted” (Leviticus 7:18): Rabbi Eliezer said: Bend your ear to hear the true meaning of the verse: The verse is speaking of one who intends to partake of his offering on the third day. Or perhaps it is referring only to one who actually partakes of his offering on the third day, per the straightforward meaning of the verse? But that cannot be; would you say that after the offering is fit for the first two days, it should then be disqualified retroactively by being eaten on the third day?

Rabbi Akiva said to him: Yes, it could be disqualified retroactively. After all, we find with regard to a man who experiences a gonorrhea-like discharge [zav], or a woman who experiences a discharge of uterine blood after her menstrual period [zava], or a woman who observes a clean day for a day when she experiences a discharge, that they all have the presumptive status of purity after immersing. But once they have seen another discharge the same day, they have negated this status retroactively, and everything they had touched after immersing becomes impure. Therefore, you as well should not be surprised about this offering consumed beyond its designated time, that even though it was rendered fit, it may then be disqualified retroactively.

Rabbi Eliezer said to him: But the same verse says: “He who offers it,” indicating that the offering is disqualified at the time of its offering, and it is not disqualified on the third day. Or perhaps when the verse says: “He who offers it,” this is referring only to the priest who sacrifices the offering, indicating that he is disqualified. But if so, it would have been enough for the verse to state: He who offers shall not be credited. Therefore, when it states instead: “Neither shall it be credited to he who offers it,” this indicates that the verse is speaking of the offering, and it is not speaking of the priest.

Ben Azzai says: Why must the verse state: “It”? It is necessary because elsewhere it is stated: “When you shall vow a vow to the Lord your God, you shall not delay paying it; for the Lord your God will require it from you, and it will be sin in you” (Deuteronomy 23:22). One might have thought that even one who is late in fulfilling his vow is included in: “It shall not be accepted” (Leviticus 7:18). Therefore, the verse states: “It,” to indicate that it, an offering rendered piggul, is included in the halakha of: “It shall not be accepted,” but the animal of one who is late in fulfilling his vow is not included in the halakha of: “It shall not be accepted.”

Aḥerim say: One can conclude that the verse (Leviticus 7:18) is referring to improper intention rather than improper consumption from the phrase “neither shall it be credited [yeḥashev],” which indicates that the offering is disqualified by improper intention [maḥashava], and it is not disqualified by consumption on the third day.

The Gemara asks: And ben Azzai, who interprets the term “it” as excluding vows that were fulfilled late, from where does he derive that the verse is speaking of the offering and not of the priest? The Gemara responds: If you wish, say that he derives it from the statement of Aḥerim that the verse rules out disqualification on the third day itself. This would be necessary only if the verse is referring to the offering and not the priest. Or, if you wish, say instead: From the fact that it is written: “They shall not be accepted” (Leviticus 22:25), and: “It shall not be accepted” (Leviticus 7:18), it is evident that the verse is referring to an offering, which may be accepted or may not be accepted.

The Gemara asks: And with regard to the statement of ben Azzai that one derives from the word “it” that it, i.e., piggul, is included in the halakha of: “It shall not be accepted,” but the animal of one who is late in fulfilling his vow is not included in the halakha of: “It shall not be accepted,” is this halakha derived from here? It is derived from the statement of Aḥerim, as it is taught in a baraita: Aḥerim say: One might have thought that a firstborn animal whose first year passed, during which time it ought to have been sacrificed, should be

Traduction : The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren Noé Talmud, with commentary by Rabbi Adin Even-Israel Steinsaltz.

Zevachim 29a examines how piggul disqualification arises from intent to eat sacrifices beyond their time or place, and when karet penalty applies.