Talmud - Zevahim 110a זבחים ק״י א׳

by placing them in a vessel. One Sage, Rabbi Eliezer, holds that the designation of a measure of incense larger than an olive-bulk by placing it in a vessel is a significant matter that renders one obligated to burn all the incense that was placed there. Therefore, one who then burned only an olive-bulk of that incense outside the courtyard is exempt. And one Sage, the Rabbis, holds that it is nothing and does not render one obligated to burn all the incense that was placed in the vessel. Therefore, one who then burned an olive-bulk of that incense outside the courtyard is liable.

Rava said: Now, according to the one who says that designation by placing in a vessel is nothing, if one designated in a vessel six log of wine as a libation to accompany the sacrificing of a bull, which is the required amount, and then removed four log from it and brought those four log as a libation outside the courtyard, he would be liable, as a libation of four log of wine is fit for the sacrificing of a ram (see Numbers 28:14).

Similarly, if one designated by placing in a vessel four log of wine for a libation to accompany the sacrificing of a ram and then removed three log of wine from it and brought those three log as a libation outside the courtyard, he would be liable, as three log of wine is a fit libation for the sacrificing of a lamb (see Numbers 28:14).

But if those three log were lacking any amount, and one brought them as a libation outside the courtyard, he would be exempt because less than three log of wine is never a fit libation.

Rava inferred from the baraita that the Rabbis do not derive the measure for liability for a rite performed in the outer sanctum, i.e., the pouring of a libation, from one performed in the outer sanctum, i.e., the burning of incense. From that he concluded that the Rabbis would certainly not derive the measure for liability for a rite performed in the inner sanctum from a rite performed in the outer sanctum. This refuted Abaye’s claim that the Rabbis derive the measure for liability for burning outside the incense of the inner sanctum from the measure for liability for burning outside the incense of the outer sanctum. Rav Ashi said in defense of Abaye’s opinion: Indeed, as is indicated by the baraita, the Rabbis do not derive the measure for liability for pouring a libation outside the courtyard from the measure for liability for burning incense, which are two different rites performed in the outer sanctum.

Rav Ashi continues: Even though the Rabbis do not derive the halakhot of a rite performed in the outer sanctum from a different rite performed in the outer sanctum, they do derive the measure for liability for burning the incense of the outer sanctum from the identical rite of burning of the incense of the inner sanctum, even though it involves deriving the halakhot of a rite performed in the outer sanctum from one performed in the inner sanctum.

§ After enumerating various items that are burned entirely on the altar, the mishna states: And with regard to any of these offerings that were lacking any amount, if one sacrifices it outside the courtyard, he is exempt. Concerning this ruling, a dilemma was raised before the Sages: Is a lack that occurs to an offering outside the courtyard considered a lack in order to exempt one who sacrifices the remainder outside the courtyard? Or is it not considered a lack?

Do we say that once an offering emerges from the courtyard it is in any event disqualified, and yet the Torah deems one liable for offering it there, so what difference is there to me if there is an additional disqualification of being lacking and what difference is there to me if it is still complete? Or perhaps it is only with regard to emerging from the courtyard, where it is still in its original state, that yes, one is liable despite the fact that it was disqualified by emerging from the courtyard, but where it is not in its original state, one would not be liable.

Abaye said: Come and hear a resolution from the mishna: Rabbi Eliezer deems him exempt unless he sacrifices the whole of any one of these items outside the Temple. It is apparent then that the offering must remain complete.

Rabba bar Rav Ḥanan said to Abaye: Can the Master resolve the dilemma from the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer? The Rabbis disagree with Rabbi Eliezer, and hold that one is liable for sacrificing even an olive-bulk, and the dilemma was raised according to their opinion.

Abaye said to him: I heard explicitly from Rav that the Rabbis disagree with Rabbi Eliezer only where the offering is still in its original form, i.e., complete. But where it is lacking, they concede to him that one is not liable. The Gemara attempts to bring a proof from here: Was Rav not referring to a case where it became lacking outside the courtyard? If so, it is evident that even according to the Rabbis a lack that occurs outside is considered a lack. The Gemara rejects this: No, he was referring to a case where it became lacking inside the courtyard. Accordingly, this mishna cannot serve as a proof.

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a resolution from the continuation of the mishna: And with regard to any of these offerings that were lacking any amount, if one sacrifices them outside the courtyard, he is exempt. The Gemara attempts to bring a proof from here: Is the mishna not referring to a case where it became lacking outside the courtyard? If so, it is evident that even a lack that occurs outside is considered a lack. The Gemara rejects this: No, it is referring to a case where it became lacking inside the courtyard. Accordingly, this cannot serve as a proof.

§ The mishna teaches: One who sacrifices sacrificial meat, which is eaten, and sacrificial portions, i.e., those that are to be burned on the altar, outside the courtyard, is liable for the sacrifice of the sacrificial portions, but not for the meat. The Gemara asks: Why is he liable? If the meat is placed directly on the altar’s fire and then the sacrificial portions are placed upon the meat, isn’t there an interposition between the altar and the sacrificial portions? Since if they were offered in the Temple in that manner, one would not have fulfilled the obligation, one should not be liable if he offers them up in this manner outside the Temple.

Shmuel said: The mishna is referring to a case where he turned them over and the sacrificial portions lay directly on the altar’s fire.

Rabbi Yoḥanan said there is another explanation: You may even say that the mishna is referring to a case where they did not turn them over. And in accordance with whose opinion is this mishna? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who says (108a) that even if one offered it up on a rock he is liable. According to him, it is clear that in order for one to be liable, the mode of offering up performed outside the Temple does not need to entirely parallel the mode of offering up in the Temple.

Rav said there is another explanation: Even in the Temple, burning the sacrificial meat and sacrificial portions in this manner would be valid as both items are from the same animal, and a substance in contact with the same type of substance does not interpose.

MISHNA: If there is a meal offering from which a handful was not removed, and one sacrificed it outside the Temple courtyard, he is exempt from liability, because until the handful is actually removed it is not fit to be burned on the altar inside the Temple. But if a priest took a handful from it and then returned its handful into the remainder of the meal offering, and one sacrificed the entire mixture outside the courtyard, he is liable, as once the handful has been removed it is fit to be burned on the altar inside the Temple, and one is liable for offering it up outside even though it is mixed into the remainder.

GEMARA: The Gemara asks about the final clause: But why is he liable? Let the remainder of the meal offering, which is certainly the majority of the mixture, nullify the handful.

Rabbi Zeira said: A term of burning is stated with regard to the handful removed from the meal offering, and a term of burning is stated with regard to the remainder of the meal offering. With regard to the handful, referred to by the Torah as “the memorial part,” it is written: “And the priest shall burn the memorial part upon the altar” (Leviticus 2:2), and with regard to the remainder of the meal offering it is written: “Do not burn it as a fire to the Lord” (Leviticus 2:11). This provides a verbal analogy that teaches that just as with regard to the burning of the handful, if two handfuls are mixed together one handful does not nullify another, so too, with regard to the burning of the remainder, if the remainder and the handful are mixed together, the remainder does not nullify the handful.

MISHNA: The burning of both the handful and the frankincense permits the consumption of the remainder of the meal offering by the priests. With regard to the handful and the frankincense, in a case where one sacrificed only one of them outside the Temple courtyard, he is liable. Rabbi Eliezer exempts from liability one who burns only one of them until he also sacrifices the second. Since the remainder of the meal offering becomes permitted only once both have been burned, he considers each one alone to be an incomplete offering, and he holds one is not liable for sacrificing only one of them. Rabbi Eliezer concedes that if one sacrificed one inside the courtyard and one outside the courtyard, he is liable.

The burning of two bowls of frankincense permits the consumption of the shewbread. With regard to the two bowls of frankincense, in a case where one sacrificed only one of them outside the courtyard, he is liable. Rabbi Eliezer exempts from liability one who burns only one of them until he also sacrifices the second, since the shewbread becomes permitted only once both bowls of frankincense are burned. Rabbi Eliezer concedes that if one sacrificed one inside the courtyard and one outside the courtyard, he is liable.

GEMARA: The mishna is based on the fact that it is permitted for the priests to consume the remainder of the meal offering only once both the handful and the frankincense have been burned. With regard to this, Rabbi Yitzḥak Nappaḥa raises a dilemma: If one burned the handful but not the frankincense, what is the halakha with regard to whether this will permit the consumption of the corresponding half of the remainder? Since the burning of both the handful and the frankincense permits the entire remainder, it seems that each one of them affects half of the remainder. Accordingly, it is unclear whether burning one of them will entirely permit half of the remainder, or whether it will merely weaken the prohibition concerning the remainder, and it will still be prohibited to eat any of it.

The Gemara asks: In accordance with whose opinion did Rabbi Yitzḥak Nappaḥa raise this dilemma? If it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who says: One can render an offering piggul by having piggul intention during half of two acts that together permit the offering for consumption, i.e., during either one of them, then it should be obvious that the offering of the handful alone should entirely permit half of the remainder. The fact that Rabbi Meir holds that intention during just one of the acts can render the offering piggul demonstrates that he holds that each act alone has the power to permit part of the offering. It is apparent, then, the dilemma was not raised according to Rabbi Meir’s opinion.

If it is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who say: One cannot render an offering piggul by having piggul intention during half of two acts that together permit the offering for consumption; rather, one must have piggul intention during both acts, then it is evident that neither act alone has the power to affect the offering, and so the burning of the handful alone should neither permit any of the remainder nor weaken the prohibition that applies to it. It is apparent, then, the dilemma was not raised according to the Rabbis’ opinion.

Rather, the dilemma was raised in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer as taught in the mishna. Rabbi Eliezer rules that one who sacrifices outside only the handful or the frankincense is not liable. Evidently, he holds that neither of these alone can permit the consumption of the meal offering. The Gemara rejects this suggestion as well: Rabbi Eliezer holds in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who say: One cannot render an offering piggul by having piggul intention during half of two acts that together permit the offering for consumption. Accordingly, he would hold that the offering of only the handful neither permits any of the remainder, nor weakens the prohibition concerning it, and it would not make sense to raise the dilemma according to him.

Rather, it must be that the dilemma was raised in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis that is taught here in the mishna. They hold that one is liable even for sacrificing outside only the handful or only the frankincense. Evidently, they hold that each one alone has the power to affect the status of the remainder. Accordingly, Rabbi Yitzḥak Nappaḥa asked concerning a case where one of them is burned on the altar in the Temple, what is the halakha? Does it entirely permit half of the remainder, or does it weaken the prohibition concerning the entire remainder?

The Gemara concludes: The dilemma shall stand unresolved.

MISHNA: One who sprinkles part of the blood of an offering, e.g., one sprinkling instead of four, outside the Temple courtyard

Traduction : The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren Noé Talmud, with commentary by Rabbi Adin Even-Israel Steinsaltz.

Zevachim 110a explores whether designating incense or wine libations in a vessel creates binding obligations, debating measures for liability in sacrificial rites.