Talmud - Zevahim 14a זבחים י״ד א׳

that any offering whose blood is not sprinkled on the external altar like a peace offering is not subject to the halakhot of piggul? If so, piggul does not apply to inner sin offerings at all.

Rather, both this baraita and that baraita are in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis; and the apparent contradiction between them is not difficult. Here, the baraita that maintains that one cannot render the offering piggul while dipping his finger in the blood is referring to the external sin offerings, since dipping one’s finger in order to sprinkle the blood on the external altar is not considered an essential rite. There, the baraita that maintains that one can render the offering piggul while performing this rite is referring to the inner sin offerings.

The Gemara asks: Isn’t it obvious that one cannot render the offering piggul while dipping his finger in the blood of the external sin offerings? The statement: “And the priest shall dip his finger in the blood” (Leviticus 4:6), is not written with regard to these offerings. Since it is clearly not an essential rite, why was it necessary for the baraita to teach that improper intent while performing it cannot render the offering piggul?

The Gemara answers: It was necessary for the baraita to teach this, as otherwise it might enter your mind to say that since it is written with regard to an external sin offering: “And the priest shall take of the blood of the sin offering with his finger” (Leviticus 4:34), and therefore if a monkey comes and places blood on the hand of the priest the priest must take blood from the vessel again to perform the mitzva as stated in the verse, it is considered as though the statement: And the priest shall dip his finger in the blood, is written with regard to an external sin offering as well.

Therefore, the baraita teaches us that dipping one’s finger in the blood of an external sin offering is an inessential rite and one cannot render the offering piggul while performing it. As it is for this reason that the phrase: And the priest shall dip his finger in the blood, is not written with regard to this offering, but rather: And the priest shall take of the blood of the sin offering with his finger, which indicates this halakha, that the priest must actively take the blood in his hand, and also indicates that halakha, that dipping one’s finger in the blood is not an essential rite and cannot render the offering piggul.

§ The mishna teaches that Rabbi Shimon deems the offering fit if the prohibited intent was during the rite of conveying the blood to the altar. Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish says: Rabbi Shimon concedes that prohibited intent during the conveying of the blood of the inner sin offerings disqualifies them, since with regard to those offerings, it is an indispensable rite. Because the blood must be sprinkled inside the Sanctuary and the offering cannot be slaughtered inside the Sanctuary, conveying the blood into the Sanctuary is always necessary for such offerings.

The Gemara asks: But doesn’t Rabbi Shimon say that with regard to any offering whose blood is not sprinkled on the external altar like a peace offering, one is not liable to be punished with karet for eating it, due to the prohibition of piggul? In other words, the halakha of piggul does not apply to inner sin offerings at all.

Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, says: Rabbi Shimon concedes that although intent to consume an inner sin offering after its designated time does not render it piggul, it disqualifies the offering, due to an a fortiori inference: Just as sacrifice not for its sake, which is valid in the case of a peace offering, is nevertheless not valid in the case of a sin offering, as stated in the mishna (2a), so too, isn’t it logical that sacrifice with intent to consume it beyond its designated time, which disqualifies peace offerings, should disqualify sin offerings?

The Gemara asks: And we found a source for the halakha that intent to consume an inner sin offering beyond its designated time disqualifies it according to Rabbi Shimon. From where do we derive that intent to consume it outside its designated area also disqualifies it?

If we derive it from the case of intent to consume it beyond its designated time, one may respond: What is notable about intent to consume it beyond its designated time? It is notable in that it can render an offering piggul, for partaking of which one is liable to receive karet.

If we derive it from the case of intent not for its sake, one may respond: What is notable about sacrifice not for its sake? It is notable in that this disqualification applies even to sacrifice on a private altar during the era when such altars were permitted. By contrast, intent to consume the offering outside its designated area is irrelevant to sacrifice on a private altar, which has no designated area.

The Gemara answers: With regard to what offering does disqualification due to intent not for its sake apply? It applies to a Paschal offering and a sin offering. Since a Paschal offering and a sin offering may not be sacrificed on a private altar, this factor is irrelevant. One may therefore derive from the case of intent not for its sake that intent to consume the offering outside its designated area disqualifies it.

And if you wish, say that it is derived from the juxtaposition of the halakha of intent to consume the offering beyond its designated time with the halakha of intent to consume it outside its designated area. The verse states: “And if any of the flesh of the sacrifice of his peace offerings is at all eaten on the third day, it shall not be accepted, neither shall it be imputed to the one who offers it; it shall be an abhorred thing [piggul]” (Leviticus 7:18). This statement: “On the third day, it shall not be accepted,” is referring to intent to consume the offering beyond its designated time; and this seemingly superfluous statement: “Neither shall it be imputed to the one who offers it; it shall be piggul,” is referring to intent to consume it outside its designated area. Such juxtaposition indicates that there are parallel halakhot in the two cases even if they are dissimilar.

§ Rava says: If you say that Rabbi Shimon holds in accordance with the opinion of his son Rabbi Elazar, who says that the area between the Entrance Hall and the altar is considered part of the north of the Temple courtyard, the only place where a sin offering may be slaughtered, he must also hold that prohibited intent while conveying the blood of the inner sin offerings is effective to disqualify them only from the doorway of the Entrance Hall inward. Prohibited intent before the priest reaches the doorway of the Entrance Hall does not disqualify the offering, as conveying the blood to the doorway is not necessary; the offering could have been slaughtered at the doorway in the first place.

And if you say that Rabbi Shimon holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who says that the interior of the Temple courtyard sanctifies offerings, i.e., that offerings can be sacrificed on the courtyard floor as if it were part of the altar, prohibited intent while conveying the removed bowls of frankincense from the table in the Sanctuary to burn them on the external altar is effective to disqualify them only while conveying them from the doorway of the Sanctuary outward to the Entrance Hall. Since the table can be placed anywhere in the Sanctuary, conveying the bowls of frankincense in the Sanctuary itself is unnecessary, and once the priest exits the Entrance Hall to the Temple courtyard, the frankincense could theoretically be burned immediately.

Rava continues: And if you say that Rabbi Shimon also holds that the sanctity of the Sanctuary and the Entrance Hall are one and the same, and the table can be placed in the Entrance Hall as well, prohibited intent is effective only while conveying the frankincense from the doorway of the Entrance Hall outward, i.e., in the doorway of the Entrance Hall itself.

And if you say that he also holds that inside the doorway is considered like inside the Entrance Hall, then the table can be placed in the doorway too, and prohibited intent is not effective while conveying the frankincense even one step. Rather, it is effective only during the moment when the frankincense is taken out of the doorway to the courtyard, the time it takes the priest to stretch out his hand to place the bowls on the courtyard floor.

And if you say that he also holds that conveying an offering not by foot is not considered conveying, prohibited intent is not effective at all while conveying the bowls of frankincense.

§ Abaye said to Rav Ḥisda’s interpreter: Ask Rav Ḥisda for me: What is the halakha with regard to a non-priest conveying the blood? Is the offering disqualified, as in a case where a non-priest performs any other sacrificial rite that may performed only by priests?

Rav Ḥisda said to him: The offering remains fit, and a verse supports my ruling: “And they slaughtered the Paschal offering, and the priests sprinkled the blood, which they received of their hand, and the Levites flayed them” (II Chronicles 35:11). Apparently, priests are required only for the sprinkling of the blood on the altar and later rites. Just as slaughter may be performed by non-priests, so can the collection and conveying of the blood be performed by them.

Rav Sheshet raises an objection from a baraita: If a non-priest, or an acute mourner,

Traduction : The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren Noé Talmud, with commentary by Rabbi Adin Even-Israel Steinsaltz.

Zevachim 14a explores whether improper intent during finger-dipping in blood invalidates offerings as piggul, distinguishing inner from outer sin offerings.