Talmud - Zevahim 47a זבחים מ״ז א׳

From where is it derived with regard to one who acts unawares in the case of consecrated items, i.e., if one slaughtered an offering without intending to perform the act of slaughter at all, but rather like one occupied with other matters, that the offering is disqualified? Rav Huna said to Shmuel: It is derived from a verse, as it is stated: “And he shall slaughter the young bull before the Lord” (Leviticus 1:5), teaching that the mitzva is not performed properly unless the slaughter is for the sake of a young bull, i.e., knowing that he is performing an act of slaughter.

Shmuel said to Rav Huna: We have this as an established halakha already, that it is a mitzva to slaughter the offering for the sake of a bull, but from where is it derived that this requirement is indispensable? Rav Huna said to him that the verse states: “With your will you shall slaughter it” (Leviticus 19:5), i.e., with your full awareness you shall slaughter it, in the form of a purposeful action.

§ The mishna teaches: Because the intent follows only the one performing the sacrificial rite. The Gemara comments: The mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of this tanna, as it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Yosei, says: I heard that even the owner of an offering can render it piggul through improper intention. Rava says: What is the reason of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Yosei? As the verse states: “Then he who sacrifices shall sacrifice his offering to the Lord” (Numbers 15:4). The term “he who sacrifices” is a reference to the owner; since the owner is considered one who sacrifices, he too can render his offering piggul with an improper intention.

Abaye says: Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Yosei, and Rabbi Eliezer, and Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar all hold that even in a case involving two people, where this one has intention and that one performs the service, it is the intention that is relevant, i.e., it is as though the one performing the service had the intention. The Gemara explains: The statement of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Yosei, is that which we just said, that the owner can render his offering piggul through improper intention despite the fact that it is the priest who performs the service.

The statement of Rabbi Eliezer is as we learned in a mishna (Ḥullin 38b): With regard to one who slaughters an animal on behalf of a gentile, his slaughter is valid and a Jew may eat the meat of this animal. But Rabbi Eliezer deems it unfit, as the intention of the gentile, which is presumably to use the animal for idol worship, invalidates the act of slaughter performed by the Jew.

The statement of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar is as we learned in a baraita: Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar stated a principle: In the case of any item that is not fit to be stored, and therefore people do not typically store items like it, but it was deemed fit for storage by this person and he stored it, and another person came and carried out on Shabbat the item that was stored, that one who carried it out is rendered liable by the thought of this one who stored it.

The Gemara notes: These two Sages, Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar, although their rulings are stated in the context of entirely different matters, accept as halakha the ruling of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Yosei. The Gemara explains: Now that concerning matters outside the Temple, i.e., non-sacred slaughter and carrying on Shabbat, with regard to which the Torah makes no reference to intention, we say that the intention of one person is effective for the action of another, is it necessary to state that the same halakha applies to matters inside the Temple, i.e., offerings, with regard to which it is explicitly stated that intention is effective, as indicated by the verse: “With your will you shall slaughter it” (Leviticus 19:5)?

But Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Yosei, does not necessarily accept as halakha the rulings of these two Sages, Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar. The Gemara explains: Perhaps it is only concerning inside the Temple that we say that one person’s intention is effective for the action of another, whereas concerning outside the Temple, we do not say this.

The Gemara further differentiates between the opinions of those two Sages themselves. Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar accepts as halakha the ruling of Rabbi Eliezer: Now that with regard to Shabbat we say that the intention of one person is effective for the action of another, is it necessary to say that the same applies concerning idol worship, where the actions are somewhat similar to those performed in the Temple?

But Rabbi Eliezer does not necessarily accept as halakha the ruling of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar: Perhaps it is only with regard to idol worship that you say that one person’s intention is effective for the action of another, as idol worship is somewhat similar to service performed inside the Temple. Consequently, it is reasonable that one person’s intention is effective for the action of another in the case of idolatry, as it does for offerings. But with regard to Shabbat, the Torah prohibited only planned, constructive labor, i.e., one is liable only for an action that includes the creative intent of the doer, and here the one who took the item out did not intend to perform a labor.

MISHNA: What is the location of the slaughtering and consumption of offerings? The principle is that with regard to offerings of the most sacred order, their slaughter is in the north of the Temple courtyard.

Specifically, with regard to the bull and the goat of Yom Kippur, their slaughter is in the north and the collection of their blood in a service vessel is in the north, and their blood requires sprinkling between the staves of the Ark in the Holy of Holies, and upon the Curtain separating the Sanctuary and Holy of Holies, and on the golden altar. Concerning all those sprinklings, failure to perform even one placement of their blood disqualifies the offering. As to the remainder of the blood, which is left after those sprinklings, a priest would pour it onto the western base of the external altar. But if he did not place the remainder of the blood on the western base, it does not disqualify the offering.

With regard to bulls that are burned and goats that are burned, their slaughter is in the north of the Temple courtyard, and the collection of their blood in a service vessel is in the north, and their blood requires sprinkling upon the Curtain separating the Sanctuary and Holy of Holies, and upon the golden altar,

Traduction : The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren Noé Talmud, with commentary by Rabbi Adin Even-Israel Steinsaltz.

Zevachim 47a examines whether an inattentive slaughter invalidates an offering and debates if an owner's improper intent can render a sacrifice piggul.