Talmud - Gittin 83b גיטין פ״ג ב׳

isn’t the woman a divorcée with regard to engaging in licentious behavior with him? The husband stipulated that she not marry that man, but he did not prohibit her from engaging in licentious behavior with him. Therefore, she is considered a divorcée with regard to him as well. This removes the a fortiori inference, as with regard to all other men she is not considered married at all. Rather, the objection was clearly raised with regard to a case of exception.

The Gemara asks: If Rabbi Akiva holds that Rabbi Eliezer is referring to a case of an exception, he should raise an objection with regard to an exception, and if he holds that Rabbi Eliezer is referring to a case of a stipulation, he should raise an objection with regard to a case of a stipulation. Why does he raise one objection with regard to an exception and then another with regard to a stipulation?

The Gemara answers: Rabbi Akiva heard that there is someone who states Rabbi Eliezer’s ruling with regard to an exception, and there is someone else who states it with regard to a stipulation. He therefore raised objections with regard to both exceptions and stipulations; according to the one who says that it is with regard to an exception, this is the refutation, and according to the one who says that it is with regard to a stipulation, that is the refutation.

The Gemara asks: What is the refutation that Rava found for Rabbi Akiva’s second objection? If we say that it is that the prohibition against marrying into the priesthood is different, and therefore the halakhot of adultery and divorce cannot be inferred from it, doesn’t Rabbi Eliezer also derive his opinion from the prohibition against marrying into the priesthood? Rabbi Yoḥanan stated (82b) that Rabbi Eliezer’s ruling is derived from the verse that states with regard to priests: “Neither may they take a woman divorced from her husband” (Leviticus 21:7), indicating that even if a woman was divorced only from her husband and was not permitted to marry others, she is disqualified from marrying into the priesthood as a divorcée.

The Gemara answers: Rava taught his statement in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yannai, who said in the name of one elder that Rabbi Eliezer’s opinion is derived not from the prohibition against marrying into the priesthood, but from the verse: “And she departs out of his house, and goes and becomes another man’s wife” (Deuteronomy 24:2), which indicates that even if he divorced her in a manner that permitted her to marry only one other man, the divorce takes effect. Therefore, Rava refutes Rabbi Akiva’s latter objection by claiming that the prohibition against marrying into the priesthood is different from other prohibitions and cannot be compared to them.

It is stated in the baraita that Rabbi Yehoshua said to them: One does not refute the opinion of a lion after his death. The Gemara asks: Is this to say that Rabbi Yehoshua holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer? But doesn’t he also raise a refutation against Rabbi Eliezer’s opinion?

The Gemara answers that this is what he was saying to them: I also have a refutation against Rabbi Eliezer’s opinion, but both my objection and yours should not be raised, as one does not refute the opinion of a lion after his death.

The Gemara asks: And what is Rabbi Yehoshua’s refutation? It is as it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yehoshua said that the passage: “When a man takes a wife, and marries her, and it comes to pass, if she finds no favor in his eyes, because he has found some unseemly matter in her, and he writes her a scroll of severance, and gives it in her hand, and sends her out of his house; and she departs out of his house, and goes and becomes another man’s wife” (Deuteronomy 24:1–2), juxtaposes the woman’s status before the second marriage to her status before the first marriage. It should be derived from here that just as before the first marriage she is not bound to another man, so too, before the second marriage she is not bound to another man. Therefore, a woman cannot remarry if she is still bound to her ex-husband due to a qualification that prohibits her from marrying a certain man.

§ The Gemara discusses the matter itself that was mentioned above in passing: With regard to a case where a man divorces his wife and said to her: You are hereby permitted to marry any man except for so-and-so, and she went and married someone from the general public and was subsequently widowed or divorced from him, Rabbi Eliezer concedes that she is now permitted to marry the man whom she was initially prohibited from marrying.

The baraita continues: Rabbi Shimon bar Elazar raised a refutation to Rabbi Eliezer’s statement: Where do we find a situation where this person prohibits something and that other person permits it? How can the first husband render the woman prohibited from marrying a certain man and her second husband render her permitted to do so after his death or their divorce?

The Gemara questions this refutation: Is there not such a situation? But isn’t there the case of a yevama, a woman whose husband dies childless, and he deems her forbidden to other men while she waits for his brother, her yavam, to perform levirate marriage with her, and the yavam, after performing levirate marriage with her, deems her permitted in the event of divorce or his death?

The Gemara answers: There, it is the yavam who renders her forbidden, since if not for the yavam, i.e., if her deceased husband did not have any brothers, she would have already been released from her bond to her husband and permitted to marry any man. It is only the existence of the yavam that prevents her from marrying other men. Therefore, it is he who renders her permitted.

The Gemara asks: Isn’t there the matter of vows, where the one who takes the vow prohibits something and a halakhic authority renders it permitted by dissolving the vow? The Gemara answers: Rabbi Yoḥanan says that a halakhic authority dissolves a vow only through regret of the person who took the vow. Since it is necessary for this person to express regret for taking the vow, it is not actually the halakhic authority who causes the dissolution of the vow.

The Gemara asks: Isn’t there the nullification of a wife’s vows by the husband, where the wife vows, creating a prohibition, and her husband nullifies the vow? The Gemara answers: There it can be explained in accordance with that which Rav Pineḥas reasoned in the name of Rava, as Rav Pineḥas says in the name of Rava that with regard to any woman who takes a vow, it is from the outset contingent on her husband’s consent that she takes the vow. Therefore, the husband can nullify it.

§ The Gemara resumes discussion of the previous baraita. Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya responded, saying: What is the meaning of the expression: “Scroll of severance [keritut],” that is used in the Torah for a bill of divorce? It means something that severs the bond between him and her entirely. You have therefore derived that this divorce, after which the wife is still bound to her husband due to his qualification, is not an act of severance.

The Gemara asks: And what do the other Rabbis, who did not refute Rabbi Eliezer’s opinion in this manner, do with this term “severance”? How do they interpret it? The Gemara answers: They need it for that which is taught in a baraita: If a man says to his wife: This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you will not ever drink wine, or: On the condition that you will never go to your father’s house, that is not an act of severance, as she remains restricted by him indefinitely. If he stipulates that she may not do so for thirty days, that is an act of severance. The Rabbis derive from the term severance that any indefinite condition prevents the divorce from taking effect.

The Gemara asks: And from where does the other Sage, Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya, derive this principle? The Gemara answers: It is derived from the fact that the verse does not utilize the basic form of the word severance, i.e., karet, but rather its conjugate, keritut. This indicates an additional principle that is derived from the term. The Gemara asks: And what do the other Sages derive from the seemingly superfluous use of this word? The Gemara answers: They do not interpret the distinction between karet and keritut.

§ Rava says that if a man says to his wife: This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you will not drink wine for all the days of my life, that is not an act of severance, as she remains bound to his condition for the rest of his life. If he stipulates that she may not drink wine for all the days of the life of so-and-so, that is an act of severance.

The Gemara asks: What is different about the case where he mentioned the life of so-and-so? Is it because perhaps that person will die and she will thereby fulfill the condition, allowing her to remarry? With regard to his own life it is also true that perhaps he will die and she will thereby fulfill the condition. Why is the divorce invalid in that case?

Rather, say that if the husband tells her: This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you will not drink wine for all the days of your life, that is not an act of severance, as the wife will never be released from this restriction. If he says: For all the days of my life, or: For all the days of so-and-so’s life, that is an act of severance, as the condition can potentially be fulfilled during her lifetime.

§ Rava raised a dilemma before Rav Naḥman: If a man hands his wife a bill of divorce and says to her: Today you are not my wife, and tomorrow you are my wife, what is the halakha? The Gemara elaborates: Let the dilemma be raised according to the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer and let the dilemma be raised according to the opinion of the Rabbis.

Let the dilemma be raised according to Rabbi Eliezer: Is Rabbi Eliezer saying that only there, in the case of the mishna, the divorce is valid because concerning the one whom the husband permits the wife to marry, he permits her to marry him forever, but here, the divorce is not valid as it is limited in time? Or perhaps it is no different from the case in the mishna, and in both cases Rabbi Eliezer holds that the divorce takes effect?

Let the dilemma be raised according to the Rabbis: Perhaps the Rabbis are saying only there that the divorce is invalid because the husband did not separate her from himself entirely, as she is prohibited from marrying a certain man due to his qualification. But here, the divorce takes effect, as once he separates her, even for a limited period of time, he has consequently separated her entirely.

After Rava raised the dilemma he then resolved it on his own:

Traduction : The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren Noé Talmud, with commentary by Rabbi Adin Even-Israel Steinsaltz.

Gittin 83b explores Rabbi Akiva's challenges to Rabbi Eliezer's conditional divorce ruling, weighing exceptions versus stipulations and priestly marriage law.