Talmud - Zevahim 82b זבחים פ״ב ב׳

This verse teaches that the place where improper intent disqualifies the offering must be triply functional: For the presenting of the blood, for the eating of the meat, and for the burning of the sacrificial portions of the offering that are consumed on the altar. In other words, it must be outside its designated place with regard to all three of these issues. Consequently, intent to present the blood in the Sanctuary does not disqualify the blood.

The Gemara suggests the opposite: And if so, let intent to present the blood outside the Sanctuary not disqualify the offering based on an a fortiori inference: And just as in a place where the part of the blood that went inside the Sanctuary disqualifies the rest of the blood that is outside in the courtyard, and yet intent to present the blood inside the Sanctuary does not disqualify the offering, so too, in a place where the part of the blood that went outside the courtyard does not disqualify the rest of the blood that is inside the courtyard, is it not logical that intent to present the blood outside the courtyard does not disqualify the offering?

The Gemara answers that the verse states: “And if it be eaten at all on the third day, it is piggul; it shall not be accepted,” and the Sages interpreted this verse as follows: “On the third day” is referring to intent to perform its rites beyond its designated time; “it is piggul” is referring to intent to perform its rites outside its designated area.

A baraita teaches: The meat of offerings that left its designated area and was taken to a place that is outside its designated area for consumption, which is outside the wall of Jerusalem in the case of offerings of lesser sanctity and outside the wall of the Temple courtyard in the case of offerings of the most sacred order, is disqualified from being eaten. By contrast, meat of offerings that entered inside the Sanctuary is not disqualified and remains fit to be eaten.

One might have thought that it should be derived based on a logical inference that this meat is disqualified, as follows: And just as in a place where the part of the blood that went outside the courtyard does not disqualify the rest of the blood that remained inside the courtyard, yet meat that leaves and is taken outside the courtyard is disqualified, so too, in a place where the part of the blood that went inside the Sanctuary disqualifies the rest of the blood that is outside the Sanctuary, is it not right that meat that enters the Sanctuary should be disqualified?

The baraita explains that one does not derive this inference, as the verse states: “And any sin offering, whereof any of the blood is brought into the Tent of Meeting to atone in the Sanctuary, shall not be eaten” (Leviticus 6:23), which indicates that the blood of an offering that is brought inside is disqualified, but not meat that enters the Sanctuary.

The baraita continues: From now, as it has been established that the meat of offerings that is brought inside the Sanctuary is not disqualified, one can suggest an a fortiori inference: And just as in a place where blood that went inside the Sanctuary disqualifies the blood that remained outside in the courtyard, and yet meat that enters the Sanctuary is fit, therefore, in a place where the blood that went outside the courtyard does not disqualify the blood that is inside the courtyard, is it not logical that meat that left and was taken outside the courtyard should be fit?

The Gemara explains that one does not derive this a fortiori inference, as the verse states: “And you shall not eat any flesh that is torn of beasts in the field” (Exodus 22:30). The apparently superfluous term “in the field” teaches a general halakha: Once meat has left and been removed outside of its boundary, i.e., the area in which it is permitted to consume it, it has become prohibited.

§ The Gemara returns to its discussion of the blood of a sin offering that entered the Sanctuary. The Sages taught: It is stated that when Moses questioned Aaron as to why a sin offering was not consumed, he said: “Behold, its blood was not brought into the sacred place within” (Leviticus 10:18). This indicates that had the blood been brought within, Moses would have understood that the offering would have been disqualified and rendered prohibited for consumption. The baraita comments: I have derived only that the offering is disqualified if the blood is brought within, i.e., into the Holy of Holies; from where is it derived that the same applies if it was merely brought into the Sanctuary? The verse states: “Into the sacred place within,” and this sacred place is the Sanctuary.

The Gemara questions this derivation: And let the verse state only “sacred place,” and it need not state “within.” If blood that entered the Sanctuary is already disqualified, this halakha certainly applies if it was brought farther inside, to the Holy of Holies. Rava says: This verse comes and teaches about that verse. In other words, had the verse stated only “sacred place,” it would have been interpreted as referring to the Holy of Holies. The addition of “within” indicates that this sacred place is the Sanctuary, while the term “within” is referring to the Holy of Holies. The Gemara cites a similar example: This is just as it is with regard to a tenant and a hired worker.

As it is taught in a baraita concerning teruma: The verse states: “A tenant of a priest or a hired worker shall not eat of the consecrated” (Leviticus 22:10). “A tenant”; this is referring to a Hebrew slave who has been acquired as a permanent acquisition, i.e., one who said he wishes to stay with his master. This slave has his ear pierced and he remains with his master until the Jubilee Year. “A hired worker”; this is referring to a Hebrew slave who has been acquired for an acquisition of six years, the standard period of servitude for a Hebrew slave.

The baraita asks: Let the verse say “tenant” and let it not say “hired worker,” and I would say: If one who is acquired as a permanent acquisition does not partake of his master’s, i.e., the priest’s, teruma, as despite his status as a slave he is not considered his master’s property, is it not all the more so logical that one who is acquired for an acquisition of six years should not be permitted to partake of teruma?

The baraita answers: If so, that the verse were stated in this manner, I would say: “A tenant”; this is one who was acquired for an acquisition of six years, as the term itself is ambiguous, but one who was acquired as a permanent acquisition may partake of teruma. Therefore, the term “hired worker,” which is certainly referring to one who is less permanent than a tenant, comes and teaches about the meaning of the term “tenant,” that this one was acquired as a permanent acquisition and that one was acquired for an acquisition of six years, and both this one and that one may not partake of teruma. Similar reasoning applies in the above case concerning the terms “sacred place” and “within.”

Abaye said to Rava: Are these cases comparable? Granted, there, the tenant and the hired worker are two bodies. And this is significant, as even though the verse could have written explicitly that a pierced tenant may not partake of teruma, from which the halakha of a Hebrew slave for six years could have been inferred, and the other case, that of a slave for six years, is therefore a matter that can be derived through an a fortiori inference, it need not be stated explicitly. Nevertheless, there is a principle: At times, with regard to a matter that can be derived through an a fortiori inference, the verse nevertheless takes the trouble and writes it explicitly. But here, the same blood enters the Holy of Holies via the Sanctuary, and once it is disqualified in the Sanctuary, why is it necessary for the verse to teach that this blood is disqualified when it enters the innermost sanctum, the Holy of Holies?

Rather, Abaye says: This mention of “within” is necessary only for a case where the blood entered the Holy of Holies not via the Sanctuary but in a roundabout manner, e.g., from the roof or the loft of the Holy of Holies, without having entered the Sanctuary. Rava said to Abaye: But an expression of bringing is written in the verse: “Behold, its blood was not brought into the sacred place within,” which indicates a standard manner of bringing it into the Holy of Holies. Rather, Rava says: In any circumstance where the priest intended to bring the blood inside the innermost sanctum, it is not disqualified when it is only in the Sanctuary, and therefore it was necessary for the verse to teach both disqualifications.

§ Rava raises a dilemma: With regard to the bull for an unwitting communal sin and the goat for a sin of idol worship, whose blood should be presented in the Sanctuary, if it occurred that the priest brought their blood into the innermost sanctum, what is the halakha?

Rava explains the sides of the dilemma: Do we say that since the verse states: “Into the sacred place within” (Leviticus 10:18) as a single phrase, and therefore anywhere that we read a prohibition against bringing the blood “into the sacred place,” i.e., that the blood is disqualified by being brought into the Sanctuary, we also read a prohibition against bringing the blood “within,” i.e., that it is likewise disqualified when it is brought into the Holy of Holies; but anywhere that we do not read a prohibition against bringing the blood “into the sacred place,” such as with regard to these offerings, whose blood is supposed to be brought into the Sanctuary, we do not read a prohibition against bringing the blood “within” the Holy of Holies? Or perhaps, since in any event the Holy of Holies is not the proper place for the blood of these offerings, it is disqualified.

And if you say that the Holy of Holies is not the proper place for the blood of these offerings and they are therefore disqualified, one can raise another dilemma: In the case of the bull and goat of Yom Kippur, where the High Priest sprinkled from their blood on the staves of the Ark, as required (see Leviticus 16:14), and he brought their remaining blood out to the Sanctuary and subsequently brought it in again to the Holy of Holies, what is the halakha? Is the blood disqualified by this improper second entrance into the Holy of Holies?

Rava explains the sides of the question: Do we say that it is its place, as the High Priest is supposed to bring this blood into the Holy of Holies on Yom Kippur at some point? Or perhaps one should say that since the High Priest has performed the mitzva and the blood has been brought out, it has been brought out, and the Holy of Holies is no longer considered its place.

And if you say that since the blood has been brought out, it has been brought out, one can raise another dilemma: If the High Priest sprinkled from their blood on the Sanctuary Curtain

Traduction : The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren Noé Talmud, with commentary by Rabbi Adin Even-Israel Steinsaltz.

Zevachim 82b explores how improper intent regarding location affects sacrificial disqualification, distinguishing blood presentation, meat consumption, and offering boundaries.