Talmud - Avodah Zarah 64a עבודה זרה ס״ד א׳

but one may uproot diverse kinds with him, in order to reduce impropriety.

The Sages initially assumed that in accordance with whose opinion is this baraita? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who says that not only one who sows or grows diverse kinds, but even one who maintains diverse kinds, is flogged. As it is taught in a baraita: One who removes the weeds interfering with the growth of the plants or who covers up the seeds of diverse kinds with earth is flogged. Rabbi Akiva says: Even one who maintains them instead of actively uprooting them is flogged.

The Gemara asks: What is the reasoning of Rabbi Akiva? The Gemara answers: The verse states: “You shall not sow your field with diverse kinds of seed” (Leviticus 19:19). I have derived only the case of one who sows. From where is it derived that one who maintains diverse kinds also receives lashes? The verse states: “Not…diverse kinds of seed,” indicating that there should not be diverse kinds in one’s field.

The Gemara concludes its support for the opinion of Rav Naḥman: It is prohibited to maintain diverse kinds, but nevertheless, if one wishes to maintain diverse kinds temporarily in order to be paid for uprooting them, thereby reducing impropriety, it is permitted. Similarly, it is permitted for one to receive payment for breaking barrels of wine used for a libation.

The Gemara rejects this explanation: No, in accordance with whose opinion is this baraita, which deems it permitted for one to uproot diverse kinds with a gentile? It is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who permit one to maintain diverse kinds, but prohibit one from maintaining wine used for a libation, so there is no proof from this baraita in support of Rav Naḥman’s opinion.

The Gemara asks: If the baraita is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, why does the tanna specifically permit uprooting with a gentile? Even maintaining the diverse kinds is permitted. The Gemara answers: Here we are dealing with a case where he performed the uprooting unpaid, and it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who says that giving an unpaid gift to a gentile is prohibited.

The Gemara reasons that Rav Naḥman’s ruling can in any event be proven from this baraita: From the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda we may understand the halakha according to the opinion of Rabbi Akiva. Doesn’t Rabbi Yehuda say that it is prohibited to give a gentile an unpaid gift, but to reduce impropriety he holds that it is permitted to work with a gentile? The same can be said according to Rabbi Akiva as well: Although Rabbi Akiva says that one who maintains diverse kinds is flogged, he presumably holds that if the purpose is to reduce impropriety, it is permitted. The Gemara concludes: And nothing more is to be said on this matter.

§ Rav Naḥman, Ulla, Avimi bar Pappi, and Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Ami were sitting again and a dilemma was raised before them: With regard to the proceeds from the sale of an object of idol worship that are in the possession of a gentile, who sold the object to another, what is the halakha? Does the object of idol worship transfer its forbidden status to the money that is in the possession of a gentile, as it would to money in the possession of a Jew, or not?

Rav Naḥman said to them: It stands to reason that the proceeds from the sale of an object of idol worship in the possession of a gentile are permitted. This may be proven from certain gentiles who came before Rabba bar Avuh to convert. Rabba bar Avuh said to them: Go sell everything that you have, including your objects of idol worship, and then come back to me to convert.

What is the reason he gave this advice? Isn’t it because he maintains that the proceeds from the sale of an object of idol worship in the possession of a gentile are permitted, and therefore he suggested they sell the objects of idol worship so they could derive benefit from the money after they converted? The Gemara rejects this proof: But perhaps it is different there, as since their intention is to convert, they certainly revoked the idolatrous status of these objects, and when they sold them they were selling permitted items.

Rather, proof may be brought from here, as it is taught in a baraita: In the case of a Jew who was a creditor to a gentile for the amount of one hundred dinars, and the gentile sold an object of idol worship and from the proceeds brought him the payment of the debt, or sold wine used for a libation and from the proceeds brought him the payment of the debt, the money is permitted. But if the gentile said to him: Wait for me until I sell an object of idol worship and from the proceeds I will bring you the payment of the debt, or: Wait until I sell wine used for a libation and from the proceeds I will bring you the payment of the debt, this money is forbidden. This proves that the proceeds of an object of idol worship in the possession of a gentile are permitted.

The Gemara asks: What is different in the first clause that it is permitted, and what is different in the latter clause that it is forbidden? Rav Sheshet said: In the latter clause the proceeds are forbidden because the Jew desires the preservation of the object of idol worship or wine used for a libation, since he knows that the gentile must sell it in order to repay the debt.

The Gemara asks: And if he desires its preservation in a case like this, is the money forbidden? But didn’t we learn in a mishna (Demai 6:10): In the case of a convert and a gentile who inherited from their gentile father, the convert can say to his gentile brother: You take the objects of idol worship and I will take the money, or: You take the wine used for a libation and I will take the produce; but if they make this exchange after the property came into the possession of the convert, it is forbidden.

Rava bar Ulla said: The ruling of the mishna is stated with regard to an object of idol worship whose value can be distributed among its shards, i.e., even if it were broken to pieces its value would remain, so the convert does not desire its preservation.

The Gemara asks: This resolution works out well in the case of objects of idol worship, but with regard to wine used for a libation, what is there to say? There is no situation in which the convert does not desire the preservation of the wine until the exchange. The Gemara answers: The ruling of the mishna is stated with regard to Hadrianic earthenware permeated with wine used for a libation. Since the wine can be extracted by soaking the earthenware in water, the convert does not desire that the vessel remain intact.

The Gemara asks: But doesn’t he desire its preservation in the sense that it should not be stolen or lost? Rather, Rav Pappa said that there is a different resolution: You say there is a difficulty from the case of the inheritance of a convert? The inheritance of a convert is different, as the Sages were lenient with regard to it, as a rabbinic decree, lest he return to his corrupted ways if it were prohibited for him to inherit property from his father. In the case of one who is not a convert and desires the preservation of an object of idol worship, it is prohibited for him to profit from it.

Traduction : The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren Noé Talmud, with commentary by Rabbi Adin Even-Israel Steinsaltz.

AvodaZara 64a examines Rabbi Akiva's ruling on maintaining diverse kinds in a field and debates permissible payment for uprooting forbidden mixtures or libation wine barrels.