Talmud - Gittin 70b גיטין ע׳ ב׳

When the Gemara mentioned letting blood from below it meant below the testicles, and when it mentioned letting blood from above it meant above the testicles.

It was taught: And dodder eaten not in its time, before it is ripe, causes harm. The Gemara explains: A Sage taught: Just as eating dodder not in its time is harmful to the body, so too, eating it in its time, when it is ripe, is good for the body. Rav Pappa said: Its time is Tammuz, in the summer, and not in its time is Tevet, in the winter. And during the days of Nisan, spring, and the days of Tishrei, autumn, they neither help nor harm.

§ The Gemara returns to its discussion of the halakhot mentioned in the mishna. The mishna teaches: If he said: Write a bill of divorce for my wife, when he was lucid, and was then afflicted with temporary insanity and he retracted his previous statement and said: Do not write it, his latter statement is considered to be nothing, i.e., it is not halakhically valid. The Gemara comments on this that Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish says: In that case the court writes and gives the bill of divorce immediately, because even though he is insane, the court does not wait for him to return to his senses. And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: They write this bill of divorce based on his instructions only once he is healed and returns to a sound state of mind.

The Gemara elaborates: What is the reason for the opinion of Reish Lakish? As it teaches in the mishna: His final statement is considered to be nothing, which indicates that his initial statement stands and the court should act in accordance with his instructions. By contrast, Rabbi Yoḥanan could have said to you as follows: When the mishna said that his final statement is considered to be nothing it means that when his mind becomes lucid it is not necessary for the court to return and confirm his instructions; rather, they rely on his statement. But the court actually writes the bill of divorce only once he is healed.

The Gemara asks: With regard to what principle do Reish Lakish and Rabbi Yoḥanan disagree? Reish Lakish compares one afflicted with temporary insanity to one who is sleeping. If one said to write a bill of divorce and went to sleep then the court may write it without waiting for him to awaken. And Rabbi Yoḥanan compares him to an imbecile: When he is afflicted with temporary insanity he is not of sound mind and is therefore unfit to give a bill of divorce.

The Gemara asks: And Rabbi Yoḥanan also could compare him to one who is sleeping, so why does he not do so? The Gemara answers: One who is sleeping is not lacking an action, meaning that no action is needed in order to awaken him, and he can awaken on his own. This one, who is afflicted with temporary insanity, is lacking an action by not taking the remedy mentioned earlier.

The Gemara asks: And Reish Lakish could also compare him to an imbecile, so why does he not do so? The Gemara answers: There is a difference, as there is no remedy in our possession that can cure an imbecile. And since there is no remedy, a bill of divorce may not be written on his behalf. By contrast, for this one, who is afflicted with temporary insanity, there is a remedy in our possession. As the Gemara explained (67b): The remedy for this disease is for the afflicted person to eat lean red meat roasted over coals and drink wine that has been diluted with a large amount of water.

The Gemara asks: But did Rabbi Yoḥanan actually say this, that the court must wait for him to regain his mental capabilities? But didn’t Rav Yehuda say that Shmuel says: If one was attacked by another who slit his throat and severed the two pipes, his trachea and esophagus, or the majority of the two pipes, and the dying man signaled and thereby stated through his gestures: Write a bill of divorce for my wife, then those present should write and give a bill of divorce to his wife?

And it was similarly taught in a baraita: If they saw a man whose limbs had been severed or crucified on a cross, and he signaled and thereby stated: Write a bill of divorce for my wife, then those present should write and give the document to his wife. This teaches that it is permitted to write a bill of divorce even on behalf of one who cannot be cured and will certainly die. If so, why does Rabbi Yoḥanan claim that a bill of divorce may be written for someone afflicted with temporary insanity only once he has been cured?

The Gemara rejects this: How can these cases be compared? There, after his throat was slit or he was crucified, his mind is lucid, but he has begun to feel weakness and will die very soon. Consequently, he cannot speak, but his intellectual capabilities are assumed to be intact. But here, in the case of one afflicted with temporary insanity, his mind is confused, and he is not lucid enough to act with intent.

The Gemara asks: But did Shmuel actually say this, that someone whose throat has been slit is treated as though he is alive, and he can give a bill of divorce? But didn’t Rav Yehuda say that Shmuel says: If someone slit the two pipes in his throat or the majority of the two pipes and the victim fled without the witnesses seeing what ultimately happened to him, then they may testify with regard to him that he is dead? And if it enters your mind to say that one whose throat has been slit is alive and able to instruct others to write a bill of divorce for his wife, then why can witnesses testify with regard to him that he is dead?

The Gemara says in response to this that he is currently alive and on account of this he can give a bill of divorce to his wife, but ultimately he will certainly die within a short period of time. Consequently, it is possible to testify with certainty that he died later on.

The Gemara asks: If that is so, that he is assumed to have ultimately died, then the one who slit his throat should be exiled on his account if he did so unintentionally. Exile is the punishment for unintentionally killing another. If so, why is it taught in a baraita: If he unintentionally slit the two pipes in his throat or the majority of the two, for example if one dropped a knife and accidentally cut another’s trachea and esophagus, then this one is not exiled?

The Gemara answers: Wasn’t it stated with regard to that baraita that Rabbi Hoshaya says: We are concerned that perhaps the wind made him senseless, and it was not only the one who dropped the knife who caused this man’s death, but also the wind or some other factor. One who only partially causes the death of another is not exiled. Or also perhaps he, the one who had his throat slit, brought his death closer through his convulsions and his death throes.

What is the difference between the first and second explanations with regard to why the killer is not exiled? The difference between them is if he slit his throat in a marble house and the victim convulsed. In such a case the death cannot be attributed to the wind, so according to the first explanation the killer would be exiled. Rather, his death can be attributed to his convulsions, so according to the latter explanation the killer would not be exiled. Alternatively, he slit his throat outside and the victim did not convulse. In such a case the death can be attributed to the wind, so according to the first explanation the killer would not be exiled. Since it cannot be attributed to his convulsions, according to the latter explanation the killer would be exiled.

§ The mishna teaches: In a case where the husband became mute, and the members of the court said to him: Shall we will write a bill of divorce for your wife? And he nodded his head as a signal, and then the court checked his intent three times with different questions; if he said no, shaking his head to questions to which he should have answered no, and yes to questions to which he should have answered yes, this demonstrates that he understands the questions and his intent is clear. The Gemara asks: But let there be a concern that perhaps the involuntary movement of: No, no, took hold of him, and he continuously nods his head as if he were signaling no, even though he does not intend it? Alternatively, perhaps the involuntary movement of: Yes, yes, took hold of him?

Rav Yosef bar Minyumi says that Rav Naḥman says: The meaning of the mishna is that we, the court, say alternating questions to him, switching between asking him questions to which he must answer yes and questions to which he must answer no.

The Gemara asks: But let there be a concern that perhaps alternating involuntary movements took hold of him, such that he switches between nodding his head yes and nodding his head no. The Gemara answers: The meaning of the mishna is that we, the court, say to him questions to which he must answer no once and yes twice, and twice no and one time yes. If he nevertheless answers each question correctly there is no concern that his movements were involuntary.

The school of Rabbi Yishmael taught: The court says to him questions concerning matters of the summer in the rainy season, and concerning matters of the rainy season in the summer, in order to check if he is answering coherently.

The Gemara asks: What are these matters that the court asks him? If we say that the court asks him if he wants a warm coat in the summer or a thin sheet in the rainy season, and he answers that he does, this cannot serve as proof of his intellectual capabilities, as the following is possible: Let there be a concern that perhaps he has the chills even though it is the summer and needs a warm coat. Alternatively, that the heat afflicted him during the rainy season and he requires a thin sheet, in which case his response does not demonstrate a lack of comprehension.

Traduction : The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren Noé Talmud, with commentary by Rabbi Adin Even-Israel Steinsaltz.

Gittin 70b explores bloodletting locations and dodder's seasonal effects on health, then examines whether a court must wait for sanity to return before finalizing a divorce writ.