Talmud - Gittin 46b גיטין מ״ו ב׳

The Gemara discusses the formulation of the vow taken by the husband: What is meant by the expression: Konam, as stated by the husband? Generally this term is used when stating a vow of consecration; how does such a vow render her forbidden to him? Rav Huna said that the case is when he says: All the produce that is in the world will become forbidden to me if I do not divorce you.

The mishna taught: And they permitted him to remarry her. The Gemara asks: It is obvious that this is the case, as why shouldn’t he be able to remarry her? The Gemara answers that lest you say: Let us institute a decree due to the statement of Rabbi Natan. As it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Natan said: One who vows, it is as if he built a personal altar during the time the Temple stood, when it became prohibited to build a personal altar to God outside the Temple. And one who fulfills a vow, it is as if he sacrificed an offering on this personal altar, thereby doubling his sin. Therefore, it would be possible to suggest that the husband is penalized and prohibited from remarrying her because he sinned by taking a vow and fulfilling it. Therefore, it teaches us that this is not the case.

The end of the mishna stated that the reason for this halakha was for the betterment of the world. The Gemara asks: What betterment of the world is there in allowing him to remarry her? Rav Sheshet said: This statement refers back to the first clause of the mishna. The expression: For the betterment of the world, is not an explanation of Rabbi Yosei bar Yehuda’s statement, but rather, it is meant to explain why there is a penalty that one may not remarry a woman whom he divorced due to her bad reputation or due to a vow she had taken.

Ravina said: Actually, this expression applies to the latter clause of the mishna, and this is what it taught: This is not for the betterment of the world. In other words, when they instituted that he may not remarry her for the betterment of the world, it is only with regard to a case where the woman has taken a vow. However, when the husband takes a vow, there is no element of the betterment of the world and he is permitted to remarry her in that case.

MISHNA: With regard to one who divorces his wife because she is a sexually underdeveloped woman who is incapable of bearing children [ailonit], meaning that after their marriage it became clear that she was sexually underdeveloped, Rabbi Yehuda says: He may not remarry her, and the Rabbis say: He may remarry her.

If, after he divorced her, this ailonit married another man and had children from him, meaning that she was not actually an ailonit, and she is demanding payment of her marriage contract from her first husband, claiming that he unlawfully divorced her without paying her marriage contract as he claimed that she was an ailonit and their marriage was a mistaken transaction, Rabbi Yehuda said that he may say to her: Your silence is preferable to your speech, meaning that it is preferable for her to withdraw her claim. If she persists, he may say that he divorced her only because he believed her to be an ailonit, casting aspersions on the validity of the divorce and the status of her children. Therefore, it would be wise of her to withdraw her claim.

GEMARA: The Gemara clarifies the dispute in the mishna: Is this to say that Rabbi Yehuda is concerned about potential harm, i.e., the harm that she may later incur if he casts aspersions on the validity of the divorce, and therefore rules that he may not remarry her, ensuring that he will divorce her only if he is absolutely certain that he wishes to do so, and the Rabbis are not concerned about potential harm? But didn’t we learn that they each said the opposite?

As we learned in the previous mishna (45b): A man who divorces his wife due to her bad reputation may not remarry her. And if one divorces his wife due to a vow that she stated, and he could not live with her under the conditions of the vow, he may not remarry her. Rabbi Yehuda says: If he divorced her due to any vow that the public was aware of, he may not remarry her, but if he divorced her due to a vow that the public was not aware of, he may remarry her. Apparently, the Rabbis are concerned about potential harm, and consequently, they do not make a distinction between one vow and another; and Rabbi Yehuda is not concerned about potential harm, and he makes a distinction between a vow that may lead to permissiveness and one that does not.

Shmuel said: Reverse the opinions in this mishna. Rather, say that it is Rabbi Yehuda who says that he may remarry her, and he is not concerned about potential harm, while the Rabbis say he may not remarry her, and they are concerned about potential harm.

The Gemara challenges: But from the fact that it teaches in the last clause of the mishna: If, after he divorced her, this ailonit married another man and had children from him, and she is demanding payment of her marriage contract from her first husband, Rabbi Yehuda said that he may say to her: Your silence is preferable to your speech, and one can learn by inference that Rabbi Yehuda is concerned about potential harm. The Gemara answers: Here too, reverse the opinions, and it is the Rabbis who stated the last case of the mishna.

Abaye said: Actually, do not reverse the opinions, and say that Rabbi Yehuda is concerned about potential harm. The distinction is that in that mishna, which discussed a woman who took a vow, he holds in one matter in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, and he holds in another matter in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar. In the case of a vow that requires dissolution by a halakhic authority he holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar that there is no concern about potential harm in such a case, as a husband would not desire that his wife be disgraced before the court. In the case of a vow that does not require dissolution by a halakhic authority he holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who maintains that the husband would not be deemed credible if he were to state that he was unaware that he could nullify her vow.

Rava said: Is it difficult to reconcile the statement of Rabbi Yehuda in this mishna with the statement of Rabbi Yehuda in the previous mishna, but it is not difficult to reconcile the statement of the Rabbis in this mishna with the statement of the Rabbis in the previous mishna? Abaye only addressed how to explain the contradiction between the statements of Rabbi Yehuda.

Rather, Rava said: It is not difficult to reconcile the statement of Rabbi Yehuda in this mishna with the statement of Rabbi Yehuda in the previous mishna, as we answered. Additionally, it is not difficult to reconcile the statement of the Rabbis in this mishna with the statement of the Rabbis in the previous mishna, as who are the Rabbis in this mishna? It is Rabbi Meir, who said: We require a compound condition stipulating both positive and negative outcomes. And with what are we dealing here? We are dealing with a situation where he did not compound his condition, as he stated only that he is divorcing her because she is an ailonit, but did not state that he would not divorce her if she were not an ailonit. Therefore, his condition is disregarded, and he may remarry her.

MISHNA: With regard to one who sells himself and his children as slaves to gentiles, he is not redeemed, but the children are redeemed after their father’s death, as there is no reason to penalize them.

GEMARA: Rav Asi says: And this halakha, that he is not redeemed, applies only when he sold himself for a first time and was redeemed, and repeated his action by selling himself a second time and was redeemed, and repeated his action by selling himself a third time. Since he sold himself repeatedly, the Sages penalized him by instituting that he may not be redeemed.

The Gemara relates: There were those residents of Bei Mikhsi who borrowed money from gentiles, and they did not have sufficient funds to repay them. As a result, the gentiles came and seized them as slaves. They came before Rav Huna and requested that he instruct the Jews to redeem them. Rav Huna said to them: What can I do for you, as we learned in a mishna: With regard to one who sells himself and his children as slaves to gentiles, he is not redeemed.

Rabbi Abba said to Rav Huna: Our master taught me: And this halakha applies only when he sold himself, and repeated a second time, and repeated a third time, which was not the case in this incident. Rav Huna said to him: These people do this habitually, and it is as though they sold themselves for a second and third time.

The Gemara relates: A certain man sold himself to gladiators [luda’ei]. He came before Rabbi Ami and said to him:

Traduction : The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren Noé Talmud, with commentary by Rabbi Adin Even-Israel Steinsaltz.

Gittin 46b explores the wording of a husband’s vow tied to divorce and debates why Sages permitted remarriage despite concerns over fulfilling vows.