Talmud - Yoma 23a יומא כ״ג א׳

who does not avenge himself and bear a grudge like a snake when insulted is not considered a Torah scholar at all, as it is important to uphold the honor of Torah and its students by reacting harshly to insults. The Gemara asks: But isn’t it written explicitly in the Torah: “You shall not take vengeance nor bear any grudge against the children of your people” (Leviticus 19:18)? The Gemara responds: That prohibition is written with regard to monetary matters and not personal insults, as it was taught in a baraita: What is revenge and what is bearing a grudge? Revenge is illustrated by the following example: One said to his fellow: Lend me your sickle, and he said: No. The next day he, the one who had refused to lend the sickle, said to the other person: Lend me your ax. If he said to him: I will not lend to you, just as you did not lend to me, that is revenge.

And what is bearing a grudge? If one said to his fellow: Lend me your ax, and he said: No, and the next day he, the one who had refused to lend the ax, said to the other man: Lend me your robe; if the first one said to him: Here it is, as I am not like you, who would not lend to me, that is bearing a grudge. Although he does not respond to his friend’s inconsiderate behavior in kind, he still makes it known to his friend that he resents his inconsiderate behavior. This baraita shows that the prohibition relates only to monetary matters, such as borrowing and lending.

The Gemara asks: But does the prohibition against vengeance really not relate also to matters of personal anguish suffered by someone? Wasn’t it taught in a baraita: Those who are insulted but do not insult others, who hear themselves being shamed but do not respond, who act out of love for God, and who remain happy in their suffering, about them the verse states: “They that love Him be as the sun when it goes forth in its might” (Judges 5:31). This baraita shows that one should forgive personal insults as well as wrongs in monetary matters.

The Gemara responds that the prohibition against taking vengeance and bearing a grudge indeed applies to cases of personal anguish; however, actually, the scholar may keep resentment in his heart, though he should not act on it or remind the other person of his insulting behavior. The Gemara asks: But didn’t Rava say: With regard to whoever forgoes his reckonings with others for injustices done to him, the heavenly court in turn forgoes punishment for all his sins? The Gemara answers: Indeed, even a scholar who is insulted must forgive insults, but that is only in cases where his antagonist has sought to appease him, in which case he should allow himself to be appeased toward him. However, if no apology has been offered, the scholar should not forgive him, in order to uphold the honor of the Torah.

§ The mishna describes that the lottery between competing priests is conducted by the priests extending their fingers for a count. And the mishna elaborated: And what fingers do they extend for the lottery? They may extend one or two fingers, and the priests do not extend a thumb in the Temple. The Gemara asks: Now that the mishna states that the priest may extend two fingers, is it necessary to state that they may also extend one finger?

Rav Ḥisda said: This is not difficult. Here, when the mishna speaks of extending one finger, it is referring to a healthy person, who has no difficulty extending just one finger without extending a second one. There, when the mishna mentions two fingers, it is referring to a sick person, for whom it is difficult to extend a single finger at a time. And so it was taught in a baraita: They may extend one finger, but they may not extend two. In what case is this statement said? It is said in reference to a healthy person; however, a sick person may extend even two fingers. And the sick priests who sit or lie alone, separately from the other priests, extend two fingers, but their two fingers are counted only as one.

The Gemara asks: And are the sick priest’s two fingers really counted as only one? Wasn’t it taught in a baraita: The priests may not extend the third finger, i.e., the middle finger, or the thumb, together with the index finger, due to concern for cheaters. One who sees that the count is approaching him might intentionally extend or withdraw an extra finger so that the lottery will fall on him. But if he does extend the third finger it is counted for him. This is because the third finger cannot be stretched very far from the index finger, so that it is easily recognizable that both fingers are from the same person, and this is not taken as an attempt to cheat. If he extends his thumb, however, it is not counted for him, and moreover he is punished with lashes administered by the person in charge of the pakia. The implication of the baraita is that when the third finger is extended along with the index finger, both fingers are counted.

The Gemara answers: What does the baraita mean when it says that if the priest extended his middle finger along with his index finger, it is counted for him? It also means, as stated earlier, that the two fingers are counted as one.

The baraita mentions lashes administered by the person in charge of the pakia. What is a pakia? Rav said: It is a madra. However, the meaning of that term also became unclear over time, so the Gemara asks: What is a madra? Rav Pappa said: It is a whip [matraka] used by the Arabs, the end of which is split into several strands. That is the pakia mentioned above, which was used for punishing the priests.

Apropos this discussion, Abaye said: At first I would say as follows: When we learned in a mishna that ben Beivai was in charge of the pakia, I would say that it means that he was in charge of producing wicks, as we learned in another mishna: They would tear [mafkia] strips from the priests’ worn-out trousers and belts and make wicks out of them, with which they lit the lamps for the Celebration of Drawing Water. But once I heard that which is taught in the previously cited baraita: And moreover, he is punished with lashes administered by the person in charge of the pakia, I now say: What is a pakia? It is lashes. Ben Beivai was in charge of corporal punishment in the Temple.

§ It was taught in the mishna: An incident occurred where both of the priests were equal as they were running and ascending on the ramp, and one of them shoved the other and he fell and his leg was broken. The Sages taught in the Tosefta: An incident occurred where there were two priests who were equal as they were running and ascending the ramp. One of them reached the four cubits before his colleague, who then, out of anger, took a knife and stabbed him in the heart.

The Tosefta continues: Rabbi Tzadok then stood up on the steps of the Entrance Hall of the Sanctuary and said: Hear this, my brothers of the house of Israel. The verse states: “If one be found slain in the land... and it be not known who had smitten him; then your Elders and your judges shall come forth and they shall measure…and it shall be that the city which is nearest to the slain man…shall take a heifer” (Deuteronomy 21:1–3). And the Elders of that city took that heifer and broke its neck in a ritual of atonement. But what of us, in our situation? Upon whom is the obligation to bring the heifer whose neck is broken? Does the obligation fall on the city, Jerusalem, so that its Sages must bring the calf, or does the obligation fall upon the Temple courtyards, so that the priests must bring it? At that point the entire assembly of people burst into tears.

The father of the boy, i.e., the young priest who was stabbed, came and found that he was still convulsing. He said: May my son’s death be an atonement for you. But my son is still convulsing and has not yet died, and as such, the knife, which is in his body, has not become ritually impure through contact with a corpse. If you remove it promptly, it will still be pure for future use. The Tosefta comments: This incident comes to teach you that the ritual purity of utensils was of more concern to them than the shedding of blood. Even the boy’s father voiced more concern over the purity of the knife than over the death of his child. And similarly, it says: “Furthermore, Manasseh spilled innocent blood very much, till he had filled Jerusalem from one end to another” (II Kings 21:16), which shows that in his day as well people paid little attention to bloodshed.

The Gemara asks: Which incident came first, the one about the broken leg reported in the mishna or the one about the slain priest in the Tosefta? If we say that the incident of bloodshed came first, this raises a problem: Now, if in response to a case of bloodshed they did not establish a lottery but continued with the running competition, can it be that in response to an incident of a priest’s leg being broken they did establish a lottery? Rather, we must say that the case in which the priest’s leg was broken in the course of the race came first, and as the mishna states, the establishment of the lottery was in response to that incident.

The Gemara asks: If the running competition was abolished immediately after the incident of the broken leg and a lottery was instituted to replace it, once they established the lottery, what were they doing still running to within the four cubits in the incident that led to the priest’s murder? Rather, actually, it is necessary to return to the approach suggested earlier, that the case involving bloodshed came first. Initially, the Sages thought that it was merely a random, i.e., isolated, event, and because it was extremely unlikely for a murder to happen again they did not abolish the competition due to that incident. Then, once they saw that in any event the priests were coming to danger, as one of them was pushed and broke his leg, the Sages established a lottery.

The Gemara returns to the incident of the slain priest and discusses several details of it. It was related that Rabbi Tzadok stood up on the steps of the Entrance Hall of the Sanctuary and said: Hear this, my brothers of the house of Israel. The verse states: “If one be found slain in the land, etc.” But what of us, in our situation? Upon whom is the obligation to bring the heifer whose neck is broken? Does the obligation fall upon the city, Jerusalem, or does the obligation fall upon the Temple courtyards? The Gemara asks: Is Jerusalem subject to bringing a heifer whose neck is broken? Wasn’t it taught in a baraita: Ten things were said about Jerusalem to distinguish it from all other cities in Eretz Yisrael, and this is one of them:

Traduction : The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren Noé Talmud, with commentary by Rabbi Adin Even-Israel Steinsaltz.

Yoma 23a examines whether Torah scholars should forgive personal insults, exploring the biblical ban on revenge and grudges through examples of lending disputes.