Talmud - Shevu'ot 43a שבועות מ״ג א׳

The verse introduces the halakhot with regard to an unpaid bailee with the phrase: “If a man delivers to his neighbor silver or vessels to safeguard” (Exodus 22:6). The phrase “if a man delivers to his neighbor” is a generalization, “silver or vessels” is a detail, and when the verse states: “To safeguard,” it then generalized again. Consequently, this verse contains a generalization and a detail and a generalization, in which case you may deduce that the verse is referring only to items similar to the detail. Applying this principle here, one concludes that just as each of the items mentioned in the detail is clearly defined as an item that is movable property and has intrinsic monetary value, so too, an unpaid bailee takes an oath concerning anything that is movable property and has intrinsic monetary value.

Land is therefore excluded, as it is not movable property. Canaanite slaves are excluded, as they are compared to land in many areas of halakha. Financial documents are excluded, since although they are movable property, they do not have intrinsic monetary value. Consecrated property is excluded because it is written in the verse: “If a man delivers to his neighbor.” This term indicates that both the one depositing the item and the bailee must be people, and not the Temple treasury.

§ The mishna teaches that a paid bailee does not pay for the loss or theft of one of these items. The Gemara asks: From where do we derive this halakha? The Gemara answers: It is as the Sages taught in a baraita: The verse introduces the halakhot with regard to a paid bailee with the phrase: “If a man delivers to his neighbor a donkey, or an ox, or a sheep, or any animal to guard” (Exodus 22:9). The phrase “if a man delivers to his neighbor” is a generalization, the phrase “a donkey, or an ox, or a sheep” is a detail, and when the verse states: “Or any animal to safeguard,” it then generalized again. Consequently, this verse contains a generalization, and a detail, and a generalization, which excludes any item that is not similar to the detail, as delineated in the previous baraita with regard to an unpaid bailee, up to and including the last clause of that baraita: Consecrated property is excluded because it is written in the verse: “If a man delivers to his neighbor.”

§ The mishna teaches: Rabbi Meir says: There are certain items that are like land with regard to their form, but are not treated like land from a halakhic perspective; and the Rabbis do not concede that this is so, as they hold that the halakhic status of anything that is attached to the land is like the land itself. The Gemara challenges: By inference, does Rabbi Meir hold that the halakhic status of anything that is attached to the land is not like land? If so, rather than disagreeing with regard to grapevines laden with fruit, let them disagree with regard to fruitless vines, as Rabbi Meir holds that the halakhic status of the vines themselves is not like that of the land.

Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, said that they disagree here not with regard to any item that is attached to the land, as Rabbi Meir concedes that such items usually have the halakhic status of the land itself. The dispute is specifically with regard to grapes that are ready to be harvested, as Rabbi Meir holds that their halakhic status is similar to that of grapes that are already harvested, and the Rabbis hold that their halakhic status is not similar to that of grapes that are already harvested, and that they still have the status of land.

§ The mishna teaches that one takes an oath only concerning an item that is defined by size, by weight, or by number. How so? If the claimant says: I delivered to you a house full of produce, and the other person says: I do not know how much you gave me, but what you left in my possession you may take, and the amount in the house is less that that claimed by the claimant, the defendant is exempt from taking an oath. Abaye said: They taught this halakha only in a case where the claimant said to him: I gave you a house full of produce, without specification. But if he said to him: I gave you this specific house full of produce, his claim is known and defined, and the defendant is therefore required to take an oath concerning it.

Rava said to him: If so, rather than teaching in the last clause of the mishna: If this party says that the house was full up to the ledge, and that party says that it was full up to the window, the defendant is liable to take an oath, let the tanna distinguish and teach the distinction within the case itself, where the claim was for a house full of produce, and say: In what case is this statement, that the defendant is exempt, said? It is said in a case where the claim was for an unspecified house full of produce; but if the claim was for this particular house full of produce, the defendant is liable to take an oath. Since the mishna did not make this distinction, evidently the defendant is exempt even if the claim is referring to a specific house.

Rather, Rava said: The defendant is never liable to take an oath unless the claimant claims from him an item that is defined by size, by weight, or by number, and the defendant admits to him with regard to a part of the claim that is an item that is defined by size, by weight, or by number.

The Gemara comments: It is taught in a baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rava: If the claimant says: I have a kor of produce in your possession, and the other one says: Nothing of yours is in my possession, the defendant is exempt from taking an oath, as he denies the entire debt. If he says: I have a large candelabrum in your possession, and the defendant responds: You have only a small candelabrum in my possession, he is exempt from taking an oath, as he admits not to part of the claim, but to possessing a different item. Similarly, if the claimant says: I have a large belt in your possession, and the defendant responds: You have only a small belt in my possession, he is exempt from taking an oath.

The baraita continues: But if the claimant said to him: I have a kor of produce in your possession, and the other one says: You have only a half-kor in my possession, he is liable to take an oath. Similarly, if the claimant says: I have a candelabrum weighing ten litra in your possession, and the defendant responds: You have only a five-litra candelabrum in my possession, he is liable to take an oath.

The baraita concludes: The principle of the matter is that the defendant is never liable to take an oath unless the claimant claims from him an item that is defined by size, or by weight, or by number, and the defendant admits to him with regard to a part of the claim that is an item that is defined by size, by weight, or by number.

The Gemara asks: What does the baraita add that was not already taught, by mentioning the principle of the matter? Doesn’t the baraita mention this principle to add that even if the claim is for this specific house full of produce, the defendant is exempt, as this is not considered an item defined by size? Accordingly, the baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rava.

Having cited the baraita, the Gemara now analyzes it: What is different about a case where the claimant claimed a large candelabrum and the defendant admitted to owing a small candelabrum that renders the defendant exempt from taking an oath? It is because that which he claimed from him, he did not admit to at all, and that which he admitted to, he had not claimed from him. If so, in a case where the claimant claimed a ten-litra candelabrum and the defendant admitted to owing a five-litra candelabrum, the defendant should also be exempt, as that which he claimed from him, a heavier candelabrum, he did not admit to at all, and that which he admitted to, a lighter candelabrum, he had not claimed from him.

Rabbi Shmuel bar Rav Yitzḥak said: Here in the latter case we are dealing with a candelabrum composed of segments that detach; the defendant is liable to take an oath because he admits to owing him part of the candelabrum claimed by the claimant.

The Gemara asks: If so, let the baraita teach the case in which the defendant is liable to take an oath involving a belt as well, and interpret the case as referring to a belt made of pieces that are connected to each other; the claimant claims a belt with a larger number of pieces, and the defendant claims that he owes him a belt with fewer pieces. Rather, clearly the baraita is not teaching cases involving items made of pieces connected to each other. Here too, in the case of the candelabrum, the baraita is not teaching a case of a candelabrum composed of segments that detach.

Rather, Rabbi Abba bar Memel said that the case of a candelabrum is different because one can scrape a ten-litra candelabrum and reduce it to a five-litra one. Therefore, he admitted to a part of the claim.

MISHNA: There is a case of one who lends money to another on the basis of collateral, and the collateral was lost while in the possession of the creditor, and the creditor says to the debtor: I lent you a sela on the basis of that collateral and that collateral was worth a shekel, i.e., a half-sela. Therefore, you owe me a shekel. And the other individual, the debtor, says in response to that claim: That is not the case. Rather, you lent me a sela on the basis of that collateral, and the collateral was worth a sela; I owe you nothing. In this case, the debtor is exempt from payment.

There is a case of a creditor who claims: I lent you a sela on the basis of that collateral and it was worth a shekel. And the other individual, the debtor, says: That is not the case; rather, you lent me a sela on the basis of that collateral, and the collateral was worth three dinars, i.e., three-quarters of a sela. In this case, the debtor is liable to take an oath, due to the fact that he responded to the claim of the creditor with a partial admission.

If in that case the debtor said: You lent me a sela on the basis of that collateral and the collateral was worth two sela, so now you owe me a sela. And the other party, i.e., the creditor, said: That is not the case; rather, I lent you a sela on the basis of that collateral and the collateral was worth a sela. Here, the creditor is exempt. If in that case the debtor said: You lent me a sela on the basis of that collateral and the collateral was worth two sela. And the other party, i.e., the creditor, said: That is not the case; rather, I lent you a sela on the basis of that collateral and the collateral was worth five dinars. Here, the creditor is liable to take an oath due to the fact that he responded to the claim of the debtor with a partial admission.

And who takes the oath? The one in whose possession the deposit had been located, i.e., the creditor, who took collateral from the debtor. The Sages instituted this provision lest this party, i.e., the debtor, take an oath and the other party, i.e., the creditor, produce the deposit and prove the oath false.

Traduction : The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren Noé Talmud, with commentary by Rabbi Adin Even-Israel Steinsaltz.

Shevuot 43a examines hermeneutic rules deriving which items qualify for bailee oaths, excluding land, slaves, documents, and consecrated property.