Talmud - Shevu'ot 46b שבועות מ״ו ב׳

and then that person says: They were purchased and that is why they are in my possession, he is not deemed credible. And we said this only with regard to items taken from a homeowner who is not apt to sell his items; but with regard to a homeowner who is apt to sell his items, the one taking the items is deemed credible. And even with regard to a homeowner who is not apt to sell his items, we said that the one carrying the items is not deemed credible only with regard to items that are not typically concealed; but with regard to items that are typically concealed, he is deemed credible.

And even with regard to items that are not typically concealed, we said that he is not deemed credible only with regard to a person who is not generally secretive, but with regard to a person who is generally secretive, that is his manner, i.e., he would be likely to conceal items beneath his clothing, and he is deemed credible. And we said this only when this one, the homeowner, says: The items are borrowed, and that one who took the items, says: They are purchased, but in a case where the homeowner claims that the items are stolen, it is not in his power to have his accusation accepted, as we do not presume a person to be a thief.

Furthermore, we said that the one who claims he purchased the items is not deemed credible only with regard to items that are typically lent or rented, where the homeowner’s claim that they must now be returned is more reasonable; but for items that are not typically lent or rented, the person who took them is deemed credible. As Rav Huna bar Avin sent a ruling to the Sages: With regard to items that are typically lent or rented that someone took and said: They were purchased and that is why they are in my possession, he is not deemed credible. This is like that incident where Rava ruled to expropriate fabric scissors and a book of aggada from orphans whose father had taken them, as they were items that are typically lent or rented.

The oath of one who was robbed can be taken by others as well. Rava says: Even a watchman at the house can take the oath, and even the wife of the watchman can take the oath. Rav Pappa asks: With regard to the employer’s regular hired worker or his regular harvester, who are not appointed to safeguard the employer’s property, what is the halakha? The Gemara responds: The question shall stand unresolved.

Rav Yeimar said to Rav Ashi: If one states a claim against another that he left his house with a silver cup and is liable to return it, what is the halakha? Rav Ashi replied: We see if the owner of the house is an affluent person, or if he is a trustworthy person with whom people deposit their valuables, as those are people who would typically have a silver cup. If the homeowner is in these categories he takes an oath and receives payment of his claim; but if he is not, he does not receive the benefit of taking an oath in order to prove his claim.

§ The mishna teaches: How does this halakha apply to one who was injured? If witnesses testified about the injured person that he entered into the domain of the defendant whole, but left injured, the injured party may take an oath and receive compensation. Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: The Sages taught that he needs to take an oath in order to receive compensation only if he was injured in a place where he is able to injure himself, but if he was injured in a place where he is unable to injure himself, he receives compensation without taking an oath.

The Gemara challenges: And let us be concerned that perhaps he scraped against a wall and caused the injury himself. The Gemara explains: Rabbi Ḥiyya teaches that the mishna is referring to a case where, for example, he has a bite on his back or on his elbows, which must have been caused by someone else. The Gemara challenges: And perhaps a different person did it to him, and not the defendant. The Gemara explains: This is a case where there is no other person with him besides the defendant.

§ The mishna teaches: How does this halakha apply to one whose opposing litigant is suspect with regard to the taking of an oath and therefore is not permitted to take the oath? One is suspected if he had been found to have taken a false oath, whether it was an oath of testimony or an oath on a deposit, which are prescribed by Torah law, or even an oath taken in vain. The Gemara asks: For what reason does the mishna emphasize: Even an oath taken in vain?

The Gemara explains: The mishna is speaking utilizing the style of: It is not necessary. It is not necessary to state that one who is suspected of falsifying these oaths is disqualified from taking oaths, as they entail the denial of a monetary claim, i.e., due to the false oath someone incurs financial loss, but it is necessary to state that even that oath, an oath taken in vain, which involves merely the repudiation of one’s verbal commitment, nevertheless grants one the status of a person who is not credible and who is disqualified from taking oaths.

The Gemara suggests: And let the tanna also teach that falsifying an oath on an utterance, which is also an oath without monetary consequences, disqualifies one from taking oaths. The Gemara responds: When the tanna teaches which types of false oaths disqualify a person, it includes only oaths with regard to which when one takes the oath, he is at that time falsely taking the oath. But with regard to an oath on an utterance, such as an oath that he will eat a specific fruit that day, where it can be said that he took the oath with true intention and intended to eat that fruit, but ultimately failed to do so, the tanna does not teach, as one who does not fulfill such an oath retains his credibility to take oaths, since he did not consciously lie.

The Gemara raises a difficulty: It works out well to make this distinction for one who is liable for an oath on an utterance like: I will eat, or: I will not eat, where it is possible that he was not lying when he took the oath. But with regard to oaths about the past like: I ate, or: I did not eat, what can be said, since he certainly took a false oath? The Gemara answers: Teach the mishna, i.e., understand it to mean: An oath taken in vain

Traduction : The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren Noé Talmud, with commentary by Rabbi Adin Even-Israel Steinsaltz.

Shevuot 46b examines credibility rules for someone claiming purchased goods, weighing factors like concealment habits, item type, and whether things are typically borrowed or rented.