Talmud - Bekhorot 5b בכורות ה׳ ב׳

But each shekel consists of four dinars, and therefore sixty shekels is equivalent to two hundred and forty dinars, not a maneh, which is generally worth one hundred dinars. Rather, learn from this verse a number of matters: First, learn that the maneh of the Sanctuary to which Ezekiel was referring was a maneh that was double its standard value. Therefore, it was worth fifty shekels, which is equivalent to two hundred dinars.

And furthermore, as Ezekiel stated that the maneh will be sixty dinars, not fifty, learn from it that a community may increase measures, but they may not increase them by more than one-sixth. And learn from it that the one-sixth is calculated from the outside, i.e., it is one-sixth of the final sum, which is one-fifth of the previous sum. Therefore, adding one-fifth of the original fifty shekels, which is ten shekels, to the total equals sixty shekels. It is from this sum that the one-sixth from the outside, ten shekels, is calculated.

§ The Gemara returns to discussing the redemption of firstborn donkeys: Rabbi Ḥanina said: I asked Rabbi Eliezer in the great study hall: In what way are firstborn donkeys different from firstborn horses and camels, i.e., other non-kosher animals, which are not redeemed? Rabbi Eliezer said to me: It is a Torah edict. And furthermore, donkeys assisted the Jewish people at the time of their exodus from Egypt, as there was not one member of the Jewish people that did not have ninety Nubian donkeys with him, which were considered to be of superior quality, laden with the silver and gold of the Egyptians.

Rabbi Ḥanina continues: And furthermore, I also asked Rabbi Eliezer: What is the meaning of the term: “Rephidim,” in the verse: “Then came Amalek, and fought with Israel in Rephidim” (Exodus 17:8)? And he said to me that Rephidim was its name, i.e., of the location. The Gemara comments that this answer is like one side of a dispute between tanna’im: Rabbi Eliezer says that its actual name was Rephidim. Rabbi Yehoshua says: This moniker is an allusion to the fact that the Jewish people became lax [rippu] with regard to the statements of the Torah in Rephidim, and so it says: “The fathers look not back to their children because of feebleness [rifyon] of hands” (Jeremiah 47:3).

And furthermore, I also asked him the following question: What is the meaning of the term “Shittim” in the verse: “And Israel dwelled in Shittim” (Numbers 25:1)? And he said to me that Shittim was its name. The Gemara comments that this answer is like one side of a dispute between tanna’im: Rabbi Eliezer says: Shittim is the actual name of the place. Rabbi Yehoshua says: This moniker is an allusion to the fact that they were engaged in matters of nonsense [shetut], i.e., prostitution and idol worship (see Numbers, chapter 25).

The same tanna’im also dispute the meaning of another verse discussing that incident. With regard to the verse: “And they called [vatikrena] the people to the offerings of their gods” (Numbers 25:2), Rabbi Eliezer says: Naked women encountered them, which is how they were convinced to engage in idol worship. Rabbi Yehoshua says that they all became those who experienced seminal emissions [kerayyin] resulting from the lust they experienced.

MISHNA: A cow that gave birth to a donkey of sorts and a donkey that gave birth to a horse of sorts are exempt from their offspring being counted a firstborn, as it is stated: “And every firstborn of a donkey you shall redeem with a lamb” (Exodus 13:13); “and the firstborn of a donkey you shall redeem with a lamb” (Exodus 34:20). The Torah states this halakha twice, indicating that one is not obligated unless both the birth mother is a donkey and the animal born is a donkey.

And what is the halakhic status of offspring that are unlike the mother animal with regard to their consumption? In the case of a kosher animal that gave birth to a non-kosher animal of sorts, its consumption is permitted. And in the case of a non-kosher animal that gave birth to a kosher animal of sorts, its consumption is prohibited. This is because that which emerges from the non-kosher animal is non-kosher and that which emerges from the kosher animal is kosher.

GEMARA: With regard to the issue of a kosher animal that gave birth to a donkey of sorts and its firstborn status, the Gemara comments: We learned in a mishna there (16b): A ewe that gave birth to a goat of sorts and a goat that gave birth to a ewe of sorts are exempt from the mitzva of the firstborn. And if the offspring has some of the characteristics of its mother, it is obligated, i.e., subject to the obligations of firstborn status.

The Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived? Rav Yehuda says they are derived from a verse, as the verse states with regard to a firstborn kosher animal: “But the firstborn of an ox, or the firstborn of a lamb, or the firstborn of a goat, you shall not redeem, they are holy” (Numbers 18:17). The word firstborn seems superfluous in this verse, as it is clear from the context that it is referring to a firstborn. Therefore, the phrase “the firstborn of an ox” is interpreted as teaching that it must be an ox and its firstborn must be an ox in order for firstborn status to apply. Likewise, the phrase “the firstborn of a lamb” teaches that it must be a lamb and its firstborn a lamb, and not another animal. Similarly, the phrase “the firstborn of a goat” teaches that it must be a goat and its firstborn a goat.

One might have thought that even if the offspring has some of the characteristics of the mother it should still be exempt, as it does not entirely resemble the mother. Therefore, the verse states: “But,” indicating that the Torah makes a distinction with regard to this principle, in that it does not apply when the offspring has some of the characteristics of the mother; and the offspring therefore does have firstborn status.

The Gemara asks: But doesn’t the tanna of the mishna here cite the verses “firstborn,” “firstborn,” from Exodus (13:13, 34:20), with regard to the case of a cow that gave birth to a donkey of sorts, as teaching that the offspring has no firstborn status? Why, then, does Rav Yehuda resort to interpreting a different verse?

The Gemara answers that this interpretation was not suggested originally by Rav Yehuda; rather, he says it in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, as it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says the phrase “but the firstborn of an ox” indicates that the offspring does not have firstborn status unless it is an ox and its firstborn is an ox. The phrase “the firstborn of a lamb” indicates that the offspring does not have firstborn status unless it is a lamb and its firstborn is a lamb. Likewise, the phrase “or the firstborn of a goat” indicates that the offspring does not have firstborn status unless it is a goat and its firstborn is a goat.

One might have thought that even if the offspring has some of the characteristics of the mother this principle that it must be entirely like the mother applies, and it does not have firstborn status. Therefore, the verse states: “But,” indicating that the Torah makes a distinction with regard to this principle, in that it does not apply when the offspring has some of the characteristics of the mother; and the offspring therefore does have firstborn status.

The Gemara asks: With regard to what matter do the tanna of the mishna and Rabbi Yosei HaGelili disagree, and therefore derive this halakha from different verses? The Gemara answers: The tanna of our mishna holds that the Merciful One revealed in the Torah that a firstborn donkey, which is subject to sanctity that inheres in its value in that a lamb is given to the priest to redeem it, does not have firstborn status unless it resembles its mother, and the same is true with regard to a kosher firstborn animal, which has inherent sanctity and is sacrificed on the altar.

And Rabbi Yosei HaGelili holds that the Merciful One revealed that a kosher firstborn animal, which is subject to inherent sanctity, does not have firstborn status unless it resembles its mother, and the same is true with regard to a donkey, which has sanctity that inheres in its value, and he derives the halakha of sanctity that inheres in its value from the halakha of inherent sanctity.

The Gemara asks: And as for the tanna of our mishna, what does he do with this repetition of the word: “Firstborn,” “firstborn,” employed both with regard to an ox and with regard to a lamb and goat, from which Rabbi Yosei HaGelili derives this halakha? The Gemara answers: He requires it to teach the halakha of burning the sacrificial portions of the animal on the altar, which is mentioned in this verse: “And you shall make their fat burn” (Numbers 18:17), in accordance with the interpretation of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina.

As Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, says: Why were sacrificial portions stated with regard to a firstborn ox, and the sacrificial portions are mentioned again with regard to a firstborn lamb, and the sacrificial portions are mentioned again with regard to a firstborn goat?

It is necessary, as had the Merciful One written the halakha of burning the sacrificial portions on the altar only with regard to a firstborn ox, one might have said only an ox’s sacrificial portions are burned, as an ox offering has more wine libations than a lamb or a goat. Therefore, perhaps the additional obligation of burning the sacrificial portions applies only to an ox.

Likewise, if this halakha had been written only with regard to a lamb, one might have thought only a lamb’s portions are burned, as it has more sacrificial portions than other animals because its tail is also included.

Likewise, if it had been written only with regard to a goat, one might have thought the burning of the portions applies only in that case, as it has an increased applicability with regard to the case of an individual guilty of idol worship, who brings a goat as a sin offering; unlike one who commits other sins unwittingly, for which a lamb may be brought.

The Gemara challenges: The halakha with regard to one of these cases, i.e., an ox, lamb, or goat offering, evidently cannot be derived from one of the others. Why not derive one of them from the other two?

The Gemara responds: With regard to which case shall the Torah not write this halakha? If the Merciful One shall not write it with regard to an ox, and one should derive it from these other cases, that derivation is not valid. What is notable about these offerings, i.e., a lamb and a goat? They are notable in that they have an increased applicability with regard to the Paschal offering, for which a lamb or a goat is suitable but not an ox.

If the Merciful One should not write this halakha with regard to a lamb, and one should derive it from these cases of an ox and a goat, that derivation is not valid either. What is notable about these offerings, i.e., an ox and a goat? They are notable in that they have an increased applicability with regard to a case where the entire Jewish community is guilty of unwitting idol worship, as in such a case the community brings an ox as a burnt offering and a goat as a sin offering (see Numbers 15:24), but not a lamb.

If the Merciful One shall not write the obligation to burn the sacrificial portions with regard to a goat, and one should derive it from these cases of an ox and a lamb, that derivation is not valid either. What is notable about these offerings, namely, an ox and a lamb? They are notable in that they have an element of increase with regard to the altar, as the libations for an ox are larger than those for a goat; and also the tail of a lamb, but not that of a goat, is a sacrificial portion. The Gemara concludes: Therefore, all three cases are necessary.

The Gemara asks: And how does Rabbi Yosei HaGelili interpret this verse as teaching that a firstborn must resemble its mother in order to have firstborn status? Isn’t the verse necessary to teach the halakha of burning the sacrificial portions upon the altar? The Gemara answers: If it is so that the verse teaches only that halakha, let the verse write: But a firstborn ox, lamb, or goat. Why do I need the word “firstborn” to be repeated with regard to a lamb, and the word “firstborn” to be repeated again with regard to a goat? Rather, isn’t it correct to conclude from here that the mother is not subject to having its offspring counted as a firstborn unless it resembles its mother, e.g., the mother is an ox and its firstborn is an ox?

The Gemara asks: And as for Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, what does he do with this phrase: “Firstborn of a donkey,” “firstborn of a donkey,” mentioned twice in Exodus, from which the tanna of the mishna derives that the offspring must resemble its mother in order to have firstborn status?

The Gemara answers that he requires that phrase for that which is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says that since it is stated: “Yet you shall redeem the firstborn of man, and the firstborn of non-kosher animals you shall redeem” (Numbers 18:15), I would derive that even firstborn horses and camels must be redeemed, as they too are non-kosher animals. Therefore, the verse states: “Firstborn of a donkey,” which indicates I said to you that firstborn status applies to a firstborn donkey, but not to firstborn horses or camels.

And still I can say that the phrase “firstborn of a donkey” merely indicates that firstborn donkeys alone are redeemed by means of a lamb, while firstborn horses and camels are redeemed by means of any other item.

Traduction : The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren Noé Talmud, with commentary by Rabbi Adin Even-Israel Steinsaltz.

Bechorot 5b explores the sacred maneh's value versus the shekel, the one-sixth markup rule, and why firstborn donkeys alone require redemption.