Talmud - Bekhorot 31b בכורות ל״א ב׳

GEMARA: The mishna teaches that with regard to all disqualified consecrated animals that were disqualified for sacrifice due to blemishes and were redeemed, all benefit accrued from their sale belongs to the Temple treasury, and the animals may consequently be sold in the manner of non-sacred meat. The Gemara asks: When does this apply? If we say that it applies to an animal after its redemption, i.e., after the owner redeemed it from the Temple treasury, does the benefit accrued belong to the Temple? Certainly not. Once a consecrated animal is redeemed from the Temple treasury, it is in the possession of its owner, which means that the benefit accrued belongs to the owner.

Rather, it applies to an animal before its redemption, in which case the money accrued from its sale, which renders it non-sacred, belongs to the Temple treasury. But if so, the mishna’s statement that the animals may be slaughtered in the butchers’ market is problematic. The Gemara explains the difficulty: How can the animal be evaluated after having been slaughtered? Redeeming a sanctified animal requires standing and valuation, i.e., it has to be set standing before a priest for him to appraise its monetary value and only then is it redeemed (see Leviticus 27:11–12).

The Gemara adds: This works out well according to the one who says that items consecrated to be sacrificed on the altar that were then disqualified due to a blemish were not included in the requirement of standing and valuation. If so, the animal may be slaughtered and subsequently sold. But according to the one who says that items consecrated to be sacrificed on the altar were included in the requirement of standing and valuation, what is there to say in explanation of the mishna?

The Gemara answers: Rather, the ruling of the mishna actually applies to a case where the animals are sold and slaughtered after their redemption by the owner. And what is the meaning of the mishna’s statement that all benefit accrued from their sale belongs to the Temple treasury? This is not referring to the profit from the sale in the butchers’ market, as was previously assumed. Instead, it is referring to their initial redemption from the Temple treasury.

The Gemara explains: Since the Sage in the mishna deems it permitted for the redeemed animals to be subsequently sold in the butchers’ market and slaughtered in the butchers’ market, and weighed and sold by the litra, there is a higher probability that the owner will redeem the animal for more money initially. The owner’s later ability to sell the redeemed animal for the highest market value is in effect a benefit that eventually accrues to the Temple treasury, as he will be willing to spend more money to redeem the animal.

§ The mishna teaches that the meat of blemished, consecrated animals may be sold in the same manner as non-sacred meat, except for the firstborn animal and animal tithe offering, as all benefit accrued from their sale belongs to the owner. Accordingly, even if it is blemished, the meat may be sold only in the owner’s house. The Gemara asks: Granted, in the case of a firstborn offering, it is in the butchers’ market that it may not be sold, whereas it may be sold in its owner’s house. But with regard to the animal tithe offering, may it be sold in its owner’s house?

But isn’t it taught in a baraita: With regard to a firstborn animal it is stated: “You shall not redeem” (Numbers 18:17), indicating that its sanctity can never be removed from it and transferred to non-sacred objects. But it can be sold after it comes into the possession of the priest, while it is alive. By contrast, with regard to the animal tithe offering, it is stated: “It shall not be redeemed” (Leviticus 27:33), which teaches that its sanctity can never be removed from it, and it cannot be sold either, as the Gemara will explain (32a–b), not when alive and not when slaughtered, not when unblemished and not when blemished. This baraita clearly states that the animal tithe offering may not be sold no matter what its status, which seems to contradict the mishna.

The Gemara notes: At night, Rav Sheshet found this matter difficult, and he resolved it in the morning from a baraita. He explains that in the mishna we are dealing with a case of an animal tithe offering belonging to young orphans that was blemished and slaughtered. Since the orphans are unable to consume the entire animal and would therefore suffer a monetary loss if the meat were to spoil, the Sages permitted its sale, and it is due to the principle of returning a lost item that they touched upon it, i.e., allowed for this.

The Gemara relates: Rav Idi, the attendant [saraseih] of Rav Sheshet, heard this explanation from Rav Sheshet. Rav Idi went and stated the matter in the study hall, but did not say it in his master’s name. Rav Sheshet heard what he had done and was annoyed. Rav Sheshet said: The one who stung me, let him be stung by a scorpion. The Gemara asks: And as for Rav Sheshet, what difference does it make to him whether or not his interpretation was cited in his name? The Gemara answers that this is as Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: What is the meaning of that which is written: “I will dwell in Your tent forever [olamim]” (Psalms 61:5)? Rav asked: But is it possible for a person to live in two worlds [olamim], this world and the next, simultaneously?

Rather, David, who recited this psalm, said to God: Master of the Universe, let people say a matter of halakha in my name in this world after I have passed on to another world. As Rabbi Yoḥanan said in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai: With regard to any Torah scholar in whose name a matter of halakha is stated in this world, his lips mouth the words in the grave, as though he were speaking.

And Rabbi Yitzḥak ben Ze’eiri says: What is the verse from which this is derived? The verse states: “And the roof of your mouth is like the best wine that glides down smoothly for my beloved, moving gently the lips of those who are asleep” (Song of Songs 7:10). Here, words of Torah in the mouths of the Jewish people are likened to a pile [kekhomer] of grapes left to warm before they are pressed, which causes the wine to exude from them easily: Just as with regard to a pile of grapes, when a person places his finger on it and touches it, it moves and issues a sound as the wine bursts forth, so too with regard to Torah scholars, when a matter of halakha is stated in their name, their lips mouth the words in the grave.

The Gemara returns to Rav Sheshet’s explanation: What is the baraita mentioned by Rav Sheshet, upon which he based his resolution? The Gemara explains: As it is taught in a baraita: With regard to an animal tithe offering of young orphans, one may sell it. And with regard to an animal tithe offering that one has slaughtered, whose meat may not be sold, one may include the cost of the meat in the cost of its negligent parts, thereby inflating the cost of those parts, i.e., the animal’s hide, its fat, its sinews, and its horns, which are permitted to be sold.

The Gemara asks: What is the tanna of the baraita saying? Initially, the baraita stated that one may sell the meat of an animal tithe offering belonging to young orphans, which indicates that this may be done in the normal fashion. The baraita then proceeds to state that the sale of the meat must be performed in the indirect manner of inclusion. Abaye said: The baraita is actually referring to only one case, and this is what it is saying: With regard to the meat of an animal tithe offering of young orphans, it may be sold, but only by means of inclusion.

The Gemara states: One can conclude by inference from this baraita that in the case of an animal tithe offering of an adult, i.e., a non-orphan, its meat may not be sold even by means of inclusion. What is different in this case from that which is taught in a mishna (Sukka 3:11): In the case of one who purchases a lulav from another, who is an am ha’aretz, during the Sabbatical Year, the seller gives him an etrog together with the lulav as a gift, as it is not permitted for one to purchase the etrog during the Sabbatical Year, and one may not give the value of Sabbatical-Year produce to an am ha’aretz, lest he engage in commerce with it, which is prohibited.

The Gemara continues: And we discussed this mishna and asked: If the seller did not want to give him the etrog as a gift, what is the halakha? How can the buyer receive the etrog? And Rav Huna said: The seller includes the value of the etrog in the cost of the lulav. The buyer should purchase the lulav at an elevated price to cover the cost of the etrog as well. If inclusion is allowed in the case of the etrog, why would it not be permitted in the case of the meat of an animal tithe offering belonging to an adult?

The Gemara answers: There, in the case of the etrog, the matter is not evident, whereas here, with regard to the meat of an animal tithe offering, the matter is evident. The inclusion of the cost of the etrog in the elevated cost of the lulav is not evident, as it is reasonable that the price of a lulav might fluctuate. By contrast, inflating the cost of the negligible parts of the animal tithe offering to include the cost of its expensive meat is obviously an artifice and is therefore not permitted.

Rava said to Abaye in response: If so, that the baraita is referring to only one case, why do I need it to use the expression: Animal tithe offering, twice? Rather, Rava said that the baraita is discussing two distinct cases, and this is what the tanna is saying: With regard to the meat of an animal tithe offering of young orphans, one may sell it in its usual manner, but in the case of an animal tithe offering belonging to an adult that was slaughtered, one may sell its meat only by means of including its cost in the elevated price of the animal’s hide, its fat, its sinews, and its horns.

Rava said: From where do I say that the meat of an animal tithe offering belonging to an adult may be sold by inclusion? As it is written with regard to the animal tithe offering: “Then both it and that for which it is substituted shall be holy; it shall not be redeemed” (Leviticus 27:33). This indicates that a non-sacred animal designated as a substitute for an animal tithe offering assumes sacred status, while the animal tithe offering retains its sacred status as well. As stated earlier, the phrase “it shall not be redeemed” is interpreted as referring to the prohibition against selling the animal tithe offering. The verse’s juxtaposition of substitution and the prohibition against selling an animal tithe offering indicates a similarity between the two.

Rava explains: When does an animal tithe offering render consecrated as a substitute a non-sacred animal for which it is exchanged? Only when the animal tithe offering is alive, as substitution is invalid after its death. Similarly, when may the animal tithe offering not be redeemed, i.e., sold? When it is alive. It may be inferred from here that it may be redeemed, i.e., sold, after its slaughter. This teaches that by Torah law, the meat of an animal tithe offering may be sold once the animal has been slaughtered. The Sages decreed that an animal tithe offering may not be sold after its slaughter, due to the concern that one might sell it before its slaughter.

Rava continues: It was only with regard to an item that is appraised when the animal is alive, i.e., its meat, which gives the animal its primary value, that the Sages decreed that it may not be sold even after its slaughter, due to the concern that one might sell the animal before its slaughter.

Traduction : The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren Noé Talmud, with commentary by Rabbi Adin Even-Israel Steinsaltz.

Bechorot 31b examines the redemption process for blemished consecrated animals, focusing on valuation requirements before slaughter and sale.