Talmud - Rosh Hashanah 5b ראש השנה ה׳ ב׳

they are considered like the Paschal lamb itself, and so one transgresses the prohibition against delaying as soon as one Festival has passed. The baraita therefore teaches us that this is not so, as even this type of peace-offering is treated like the other offerings, and there is no liability until three Festivals have passed.

§ The Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived that all the offerings and vows listed above in the baraita are subject to the prohibition against delaying? As the Sages taught in a baraita: The verse states: “When you shall vow a vow to the Lord your God, you shall not delay paying it; for the Lord your God will surely require it from you, and it would be sin in you” (Deuteronomy 23:22). From the words “when you shall vow a vow,” I have derived only the halakha in the case of a vow-offering, where one says: I undertake to bring an offering, thereby assuming personal responsibility to bring an offering, no matter what happens to any particular animal. But as for the case of a gift-offering, one says: I undertake to bring this animal as an offering. He assumes responsibility only to bring that particular animal, without assuming a general responsibility to bring an offering. From where do I derive that this, too, is included in the prohibition against delaying?

The Gemara now analyzes the words of Deuteronomy 23:22 cited above and looks at each component. It is stated here: “Vow,” and it is stated elsewhere: “But if the sacrifice of his offering be a vow or a gift-offering” (Leviticus 7:16). Just as there a gift-offering is together with the vow and is governed by the same halakha, so too, here, a gift-offering is together with the vow and is governed by the same halakha.

The verse continues: “To the Lord your God.” This is referring to various types of consecrations that are allocated to Temple maintenance: Assessments, valuations, dedications, and consecrations. “You shall not delay paying it” teaches that one violates the prohibition against delaying if he is late in paying it, but not if he is late in paying its substitute, as will be explained below. “For the Lord your God will surely require it from you” comes to include all other things that one is required to bring; these are sin-offerings, guilt-offerings, burnt-offerings, and peace-offerings.

The words in the verse: “For the Lord your God” are an apparently superfluous phrase that in fact comes to include additional things in the prohibition; these are vows of charity, and tithes, and firstborn offerings. “From you”; this comes to include other items that one gives of one’s own for the sake of a mitzva, i.e., gleanings, forgotten sheaves, and produce of the corner of the field. “And it would be sin in you”; this teaches that the sin of delaying would be in you, but there would be no sin in your offering, i.e., the offering is not disqualified due to the delay.

The Gemara clarifies certain points in the baraita. The Master said, citing the baraita: “You shall not delay paying it” teaches that one violates the prohibition if he is late in paying it, i.e., the original offering, but not if he is late in paying its substitute, i.e., an animal that substituted for his offering. The Gemara asks: A substitute for what offering? If you say that the baraita is speaking of a substitute for a burnt-offering or a peace-offering, i.e., if an animal was set aside to serve as a burnt-offering or a peace-offering and it was lost, and a substitute was set aside in its place, and then the original animal was found and sacrificed, in that case the substitute is sacrificed just like the first, and so it is certainly subject to the prohibition against delaying.

If the baraita is referring to a substitute for a sin-offering, i.e., if an animal was set aside as a sin-offering and it was lost, and a substitute was set aside in its place, and then the original animal was found and sacrificed, in that case the substitute is left to die, as it has become disqualified and can no longer be sacrificed on the altar. This being the case, there is no reason to say that it is subject to the prohibition against delaying. Rather, what is the substitute referred to in the baraita? It is the substitute for a thanks-offering.

As Rabbi Ḥiyya taught in a baraita: In the case of a thanks-offering that became mixed up with its substitute, i.e., one substituted an animal for one designated as a thanks-offering, in which case both animals are considered consecrated, and then the original animal and its substitute became mixed up with each other, and one of them died, there is no remedy for the other one, and so it must be left to graze until it becomes blemished.

The Gemara explains: What could he have done with the remaining animal? If you say that he may sacrifice it and sacrifice the bread with it, i.e., the forty loaves of bread that are brought as a meal-offering together with the animal component of the thanks-offering, perhaps this animal is not the one that had originally been set aside but rather the substitute, and the rule is that the substitute is sacrificed like the thanks-offering itself, but without bread. If you say that he should sacrifice it without bread, perhaps it is the original thanks-offering, which must be brought with bread. This, then, is the substitute that the baraita says is not subject to the prohibition against delaying.

The Gemara raises a difficulty: But since the animal is not fit to be sacrificed, why do I need a special verse to exclude it from the prohibition against delaying? In any case it cannot be sacrificed on the altar, and so there is no need to state that it is not included in the prohibition.

Rav Sheshet said: Actually, you can say that the verse comes to exclude the substitute for a burnt-offering or a peace-offering. And here we are dealing with a case where two Festivals already passed from the time that one had consecrated the original animal but did not bring it to the altar, and it became blemished, and he redeemed it by replacing it with another animal, as required. And then another Festival passed and he did not yet bring the substitute to the altar. In that case, it might enter your mind to say that since this second animal comes in place of the first one, as it was consecrated as a substitute for it, it should be considered as one for which three Festivals have already passed; therefore, the verse teaches us that this is not so. Rather, the three Festivals are counted from the time of the replacement animal’s consecration.

The Gemara asks: This answers the question of which substitute the baraita is referring to according to the opinion of the Rabbis, but according to the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who said: Once even the first Festival has passed one transgresses the mitzva: You shall not delay, what is there to say here? Rava said: Here, we are dealing with a case where the original animal became blemished during the Festival, and one redeemed it by replacing it with another animal, and the Festival passed without that animal being sacrificed. In that case, it might enter your mind to say that since this second animal comes in place of the first one, and the first one had already been consecrated before the Festival, it should be considered as one for which an entire Festival has already passed, so that he transgresses the prohibition against delaying; therefore, the verse teaches us that this is not the case. Rather, an entire Festival must pass for the replacement animal.

§ It was taught in the baraita: The verse states: “And it would be sin in you,” which teaches that the sin of delaying would be sin in you, but there would be no sin in your offering, i.e., the offering would not become disqualified due to the delay. The Gemara asks: Is it from here that this is learned? But isn’t it derived from the statement of Aḥerim? As it is taught in a baraita: Aḥerim say that one might have thought that a firstborn animal after its first year passed, during which time it was not sacrificed, should be like consecrated things that have become disqualified due to a blemish, and so it is disqualified from being brought to the altar.

Therefore, the verse states: “And you shall eat before the Lord your God, in the place which He shall choose to place His name there, the tithe of your grain, of your wine, and of your oil, and the firstborns of your herds, and of your flocks” (Deuteronomy 14:23), thereby juxtaposing a firstborn animal to the tithe of grain. Just as tithe is not disqualified by being kept over from one year to the next, as it is explicitly stated that tithes may be eaten until the end of three years, so too, a firstborn animal is not disqualified by being kept over from one year to the next, despite the delay in being brought to the altar. Therefore, there is another source for the halakha that the offering itself does not become disqualified even if it is brought late.

The Gemara answers: The first derivation cited was necessary. Had this halakha been learned only from the case of a firstborn animal, it might enter your mind to say that this halakha that the offering is not disqualified applies only to a firstborn, which is not for appeasement, i.e., it does not come to atone for any sin, not even for the neglect of a positive mitzva, but is merely a gift for the priest. But as for other consecrated animals, which appease, their role being to atone for the sins of their owners, one might say that they do not appease when brought late. Therefore, the verse teaches us that this is not so. Rather, the other offerings are also not disqualified when brought late.

The Gemara asks further: But still, it may be argued that this derivation is unnecessary,

Traduction : The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren Noé Talmud, with commentary by Rabbi Adin Even-Israel Steinsaltz.

RoshHashana 5b explores the biblical basis for the prohibition against delaying vows and gift-offerings, tying peace-offerings to the three Festivals rule.