Talmud - Bekhorot 14b בכורות י״ד ב׳

The halakha is that the offspring of an animal that possesses inherent sanctity is born sanctified, and therefore it cannot be redeemed until it develops a blemish. The Gemara asks: With regard to the offspring of an animal that possesses sanctity that inheres in its value, are they redeemed unblemished, or are they not redeemed unblemished? In other words, can they be redeemed immediately, or must one wait until they develop a blemish?

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from a baraita: With regard to one who dedicates permanently blemished animals for the altar, and those animals gave birth, their offspring may be sold in order to be redeemed and they do not require a blemish to render their sale permitted. The reason is that they are not imbued with sanctity, and that the subsidiary sanctity of the offspring should not be more stringent than the primary sanctity of the mother. Since the blemished mother can be redeemed without delay, the same applies to its offspring. This proves that the offspring of animals that possess sanctity that inheres in their value may be redeemed.

The Gemara notes: The reason that the baraita rules that the sanctity for the altar does not take effect is that the subsidiary sanctity should not be more stringent than the primary sanctity, i.e., the only reason it is not sanctified for the altar is because its sanctity is derived from its mother, which cannot be sanctified for the altar as it is blemished. But if one consecrated an unblemished male animal for its value, where there is no secondary consecration, it is sanctified with inherent sanctity. The Gemara adds that this supports the opinion of Rava, as Rava says: If one consecrated a male animal for its value, it is sanctified with inherent sanctity.

§ The mishna teaches with regard to animals whose blemish preceded their consecration: And one who slaughters them outside the Temple courtyard is exempt. The Gemara notes that Rabbi Elazar teaches the mishna as follows: And one who slaughters them outside the Temple courtyard is liable, and he interprets the mishna as referring to a case of a private altar of an individual. In other words, the mishna is not teaching that one is liable to receive karet for slaughtering an animal outside the Temple courtyard, but that he is liable to receive lashes for sacrificing a blemished animal upon a private altar.

As Rabbi Elazar says: From where is it derived that one who slaughters a blemished animal upon a private altar of an individual at a time when private altars are permitted is in violation of a prohibition? It is derived from a verse, as it is stated: “You shall not sacrifice to the Lord an ox, or a sheep, in which is a blemish” (Deuteronomy 17:1). If this verse is not referring to the matter of a great public altar, since that halakha is derived from a different verse, as it is written: “Blind or broken…you shall not sacrifice these unto the Lord” (Leviticus 22:22), apply the verse in Deuteronomy to the matter of a private altar of an individual.

The Gemara raises an objection: But one can say with regard to the verse in Deuteronomy: If this verse is not referring to the matter of regular sacrificial animals, which is derived from the verse in Leviticus, apply it to the matter of a firstborn, as it might enter your mind to say: Since a firstborn animal is sanctified even when it is a permanently blemished animal, let it also be sacrificed upon the altar when it is a blemished animal. The verse in Deuteronomy would therefore teach us that this is not the halakha, i.e., a blemished firstborn animal may not be sacrificed upon the altar. What, then, is the reason that the halakha of a private altar of an individual, rather than the halakha of firstborn animals, is derived from the verse in Deuteronomy?

The Sages said in explanation: Concerning a firstborn, the halakha is written explicitly with regard to it: “Every firstborn…if there be any blemish therein, lameness, or blindness…you shall not sacrifice it” (Deuteronomy 15:19–21). Consequently, the verse in Deuteronomy, chapter 17, cannot be referring to the halakha that a firstborn animal may not be sacrificed upon the altar, as that is already taught in chapter 15.

The Gemara inquires: But still, one can say: If the verse in chapter 17 is not referring to the matter of sacrificial animals, which is derived from the verse in Leviticus, apply it to the matter of the animal tithe, as it might enter your mind to say: Since a tithed animal is sacred even with its blemish, as it is written: “He shall not inquire whether it be good or bad” (Leviticus 27:33), let it also be sacrificed with its blemish. The verse in Deuteronomy (17:1) would therefore teach us that this is not the halakha, i.e., a blemished tithed animal may not be sacrificed upon the altar.

The Sages said in response: With regard to the animal tithe as well, it is unnecessary for the verse to teach this halakha, as it is derived from a verbal analogy between the word: Passing, mentioned with regard to tithed animals (see Leviticus 27:32), and passing mentioned with regard to the firstborn (see Exodus 13:12). Just as a blemished firstborn animal is not sacrificed upon the altar, so too, a blemished tithed animal is not sacrificed upon the altar.

The Gemara persists: But say that one should apply Deuteronomy 17:1 to the matter of animals substituted for sacrificial animals, as it might enter your mind to say: Since a substitute becomes sacred even when it is blemished, as it is written: “He shall not exchange it, nor substitute it, a good for a bad, or a bad for a good; and if he shall at all substitute animal for animal, then both it and that for which it is substituted shall be holy” (Leviticus 27:10), it may likewise be sacrificed when it is blemished. The verse in Deuteronomy would therefore teach us that this is not the halakha, as a blemished substitute cannot be sacrificed upon the altar.

The Gemara answers: The halakha with regard to a substitute is already established, as the verse states: “It and that for which it is substituted shall be holy.” The verse compares a substitute to the consecrated animal for which it was substituted: Just as the consecrated animal is not sacrificed if it is blemished, so too, its substitute is not sacrificed if it is blemished.

The Gemara presents a final objection: Rabbi Zeira objects to the claim that Deuteronomy 17:1 should be understood as referring to a private altar of an individual. Say instead that one should apply it to the matter of the offspring of sacrificial animals, as it could enter your mind to say: Since they are sacred even when they are blemished, on account of their mother, they may also be sacrificed when they are blemished. Deuteronomy 17:1 would therefore teach us that this is not the halakha.

Rava says in response: The tanna of the school of Rabbi Yishmael has already ruled that the blemished offspring of sacrificial animals cannot be sacrificed upon the altar, from a different verse. As the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught: The verse states: “Only your sacred items which you have, and your vows, you shall take, and go to the place which the Lord shall choose” (Deuteronomy 12:26). “Only your sacred items”; these are the substitutes. “Which you have”; these are the offspring. When it states: “And your vows,” the verse thereby juxtaposes animal substitutes and offspring with an animal consecrated by a vow, teaching that just as an animal consecrated by a vow is not sacrificed if it is blemished, so too, these are also not sacrificed if they are blemished. Accordingly, Deuteronomy 17:1 must be understood as referring to a private altar of an individual, as maintained by Rabbi Elazar.

§ The mishna teaches: And sacrificial animals whose blemish preceded their consecration do not render an animal that was a substitute for them sacred. The Gemara asks: What is the reason for this ruling? It is derived from a verse, as the verse states: “He shall not exchange it, nor substitute it, a good for a bad, or a bad for a good” (Leviticus 27:10). The Gemara infers: Now that you have said that substituting a bad animal for a good animal is not permitted, is it necessary to state that substituting a good animal for a bad animal is not permitted? Rather, the verse is teaching that an animal which is good at the outset renders an animal that was a subsitute for it sacred, but an animal that is bad at the outset, i.e., whose blemish preceded its consecration, does not render an animal that was a subsitute for it sacred.

§ The mishna further teaches: And if these animals died before they were redeemed, they may be redeemed and fed to dogs. Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: This is the statement of Rabbi Shimon, who says: Items consecrated to be sacrificed on the altar were included in the requirement of standing and valuation, but items with the sanctity of those consecrated for Temple maintenance, such as the red heifer, were not included in the requirement of standing and valuation. Since animals that were consecrated for the altar require standing and valuation in order to be redeemed, they cannot be redeemed after death, as it is no longer possible to stand them before the priest. Animals consecrated for the Temple maintenance, and likewise animals whose blemish preceded their consecration, do not require standing and valuation, and therefore they can be redeemed after death.

This is as we learned in a mishna (Temura 32a): Rabbi Shimon says: With regard to animals consecrated for the Temple maintenance, if they died they may be redeemed, because animals consecrated for the Temple maintenance are not included in the obligation of standing and valuation. And Rabbi Shimon concedes with regard to an animal that was blemished from the outset, i.e., before it was consecrated, that it may be redeemed even if it was consecrated for the altar. What is the reason? It is derived from a verse, as the verse states: “Then he shall stand the animal before the priest. And the priest shall appraise it” (Leviticus 27:11–12). The emphasis on “it” serves to exclude an animal that was blemished from the outset.

But the Rabbis say: With regard to both animals consecrated for the altar and animals consecrated for Temple maintenance, if they died they must be buried. The Gemara asks: Whose opinion is that of the Rabbis in the mishna? It is the opinion of the tanna of the school of Levi, as the school of Levi taught: All animals were included in the obligation of standing and valuation, even an animal that was blemished from the outset.

And similarly, the school of Levi taught in Levi’s own collection of baraitot: Even an undomesticated animal and even a bird are included in the obligation of standing and valuation, despite the fact that they can never be sacrificed upon the altar. The Gemara asks: But isn’t it written: “And the priest shall appraise it,” which is an expression of exclusion? If so, the verse must be excluding some case, at least that of an undomesticated animal or a bird. The Gemara concedes that the phrase “and the priest shall appraise it” is difficult according to the opinion of the tanna of the school of Levi.

The Gemara asks: But in light of this difficulty, according to the Rabbis who disagree with Rabbi Shimon in the mishna in Temura, what is the halakha? Is it indeed so that if animals whose blemish preceded their consecration died they may be redeemed, as derived from the word “it”? If that is so, then why did Rav say: This is the statement of Rabbi Shimon?

Traduction : The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren Noé Talmud, with commentary by Rabbi Adin Even-Israel Steinsaltz.

Bechorot 14b explores whether offspring of animals sanctified only by value can be redeemed unblemished, linking this to Rava's ruling on inherent sanctity.