Talmud - Beitza 20b ביצה כ׳ ב׳

and brought all the high-quality sheep of Kedar that were in Jerusalem, and he stood them in the Temple courtyard and said: Anyone who wishes to place his hands on the head of an animal should come and place his hands there. And on that day Beit Hillel gained the upper hand over Beit Shammai, and they established the halakha in this case in accordance with their opinion, and there was no one there who disputed the matter in any way.

And some time later there was another incident involving a certain disciple from among the disciples of Beit Hillel who brought his burnt-offering to the Temple courtyard in order to place his hands on the animal’s head on a Festival. A certain disciple from among the disciples of Beit Shammai found him and said to him: What is this placing of hands? Why do you place your hands on the animal’s head and thereby violate the statement of Beit Shammai? He said to him: What is this silence? Why do you not stay silent, as the halakha was not established in accordance with their opinion? He silenced him with a rebuke, and he, Beit Shammai’s disciple, departed quietly.

Abaye said: Therefore, it is clear from here that a Torah scholar whose colleague says something reprimanding or insulting to him should not answer back with something more than his colleague had said to him, to avoid adding fuel to the fire, as in the above story the one said to the other: What is this placing of hands? and the latter responded to the former using the same language: What is this silence?

§ With regard to the dispute concerning the sacrifice of burnt-offerings of appearance on a Festival, it is taught in a baraita: Beit Hillel said to Beit Shammai: Just as in a place where it is prohibited to slaughter for the sake of a common person [hedyot], e.g., on Shabbat, it is permitted to slaughter offerings in the Temple for the Most High, such as the daily and additional offerings, then so too, with regard to a place where it is permitted to slaughter for the sake of a common person, e.g., on a Festival, is it not right that it should be permitted for the sake of the Most High? This argument should include burnt-offerings of appearance as well. Beit Shammai said to them: This is no proof. Vow-offerings and gift-offerings prove that this reasoning is not valid, as it is permitted to slaughter an animal on a Festival for a common person to eat, but it is prohibited to slaughter vow-offerings and gift-offerings on a Festival for the sake of the Most High.

Beit Hillel said to them: If vow-offerings and gift-offerings may not be slaughtered on a Festival, that is because they do not have a fixed time and there is no obligation to sacrifice them on a Festival in particular, but can you say the same with regard to a burnt-offering of appearance, which has a fixed time, the Festival itself? Beit Shammai said to them: It too has no fixed time, as we learned in a mishna: One who did not bring his Festival offering on the first Festival day of Sukkot may bring it throughout the entire Festival, including the last Festival day of Sukkot, on the Eighth Day of Assembly, as that day is regarded as part of Sukkot for this purpose. This shows that a burnt-offering of appearance need not be brought at a fixed time on the Festival either.

Beit Hillel said to them: Although a burnt-offering of appearance need not be sacrificed on a particular day of the Festival, nevertheless it too has a fixed time, albeit a lengthier one. As we learned in a mishna: If the entire Festival passed and he did not bring his Festival-offering, he is not accountable for it. That is to say, he is not required to bring another offering, as the mitzva has already passed. This indicates that the offering is limited specifically to the Festival days, unlike vow-offerings and gift-offerings, which may be brought at any time.

Beit Shammai said to Beit Hillel in support of their own position: But wasn’t it already stated in the verse: “Only that which every soul must eat, that alone may be done for you” (Exodus 12:16), which indicates that for you may food be prepared, but not for the Most High? Beit Hillel said to them: But wasn’t it already stated in the verse: “You shall observe it as a Festival to the Lord” (Leviticus 23:41), which teaches: Anything sacrificed to the Lord may be sacrificed? If so, what is the meaning when the verse states “for you”? It means for you, but not for gentiles; for you, but not for dogs.

Abba Shaul stated the same disagreement in a different formulation, that Beit Hillel said to Beit Shammai as follows: Just as in a place where your stove is closed, i.e., on Shabbat, when a person may not cook for himself, your Master’s stove is open, as it is permitted to light a fire on the altar and sacrifice offerings upon it, so too, in a place where your stove is open, i.e., on a Festival, when one may cook food that he will eat, is it not right that your Master’s stove should be open? And it likewise stands to reason that your table should not be full while your Master’s table, the altar, remains empty.

The Gemara asks: With regard to what do the tanna of the first baraita and Abba Shaul disagree in their different versions of Beit Hillel’s statement? The Gemara explains: One Sage, Abba Shaul, holds that according to Beit Hillel, even vow-offerings and gift-offerings may be sacrificed on a Festival, and therefore Beit Shammai could not cite as proof the fact that they may not be sacrificed, as they claim in the first baraita. And one Sage, the tanna of the first baraita, holds that according to Beit Hillel, vow-offerings and gift-offerings may not be sacrificed on a Festival, and therefore Beit Shammai could adduce this halakha in support of their opinion.

Rav Huna said: According to the statement of the one who says that vow-offerings and gift-offerings may not be sacrificed on a Festival, you should not say that by Torah law they are in fact fit to be sacrificed, and that it was the Sages who issued a decree about them that they should not be sacrificed on a Festival as a preventive measure, lest one delay sacrificing them until the Festival, when it is more convenient for him to bring them to the Temple, and thereby transgress the prohibition against delaying the fulfillment of one’s pledge.

This is not the reason; rather, according to this opinion, they are not fit to be sacrificed on a Festival even by Torah law. As the two loaves brought on the festival of Shavuot are an obligation of that day, and there is no reason to issue a decree about them lest one come to delay their offering, since they may be brought only on that Festival, and yet their baking and preparation override neither Shabbat nor the Festival. According to this view, anything that need not be performed on the Festival itself may not be done on the Festival.

§ A dilemma was raised before the Sages: According to the statement of the one who says that vow-offerings and gift-offerings may not be sacrificed on a Festival, if one transgressed and slaughtered those vow-offerings and gift-offerings on a Festival, what is the halakha? Rava said: He sprinkles the blood of these offerings on the altar in order to allow the meat to be eaten on the Festival. Rabba bar Rav Huna, however, said: He sprinkles the blood in order to burn the sacrificial parts of the animal, including the fats and other portions that are brought upon the altar, in the evening.

The Gemara asks: What is the practical difference between the opinion of Rava and that of Rabba bar Rav Huna, since both agree that the blood is sprinkled? The Gemara answers: There is a practical difference between them in a case where the meat became ritually impure or was lost. According to Rava, who holds that the blood is sprinkled in order to permit the meat to be eaten, by rabbinic decree one may not sprinkle the blood, as this sprinkling is not required for the Festival. On the other hand, according to Rabba bar Rav Huna, who holds that the blood is sprinkled in order to burn the sacrificial parts upon the altar in the evening, he does sprinkle the blood, even though it does not enable him to eat the meat.

The Gemara raises an objection to the opinion of Rabba bar Rav Huna from the following baraita: With regard to the lambs of Shavuot, i.e., the two lambs sacrificed as peace-offerings that accompany the two loaves of bread brought on that Festival, if one slaughtered them not for their own purpose, i.e., at the time of slaughter his intent was to slaughter them as a different offering, or if he slaughtered them not at their proper time, whether before their time or after their time, the offerings themselves are valid, although the community has not fulfilled its obligation. What is to be done with them? The blood should be sprinkled and the meat should be eaten. And if the day he slaughtered the lambs was Shabbat, on which cooking or roasting the meat is prohibited, then since the sprinkling of the blood serves no purpose, neither with regard to their mitzva nor for any other matter, he may not sprinkle the blood. And if nevertheless he sprinkled the blood,

Traduction : The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren Noé Talmud, with commentary by Rabbi Adin Even-Israel Steinsaltz.

Beitza 20b explores the Hillel-Shammai dispute over placing hands on festival offerings, illustrating restraint in scholarly disputes through a telling incident.