Talmud - Beitza 36a ביצה ל״ו א׳

The Gemara poses another question with regard to the same issue. We learned elsewhere, at the end of the mishna cited above concerning clearing out sacks for guests and study: But one may not clear out a storeroom. And Shmuel said: What is the meaning of: But not a storeroom? It means: But one may not finish clearing out the entire storeroom while clearing out the sacks, exposing the floor of the storeroom. The reason this is prohibited is lest he come to level out depressions in the dirt floor of the storeroom, which would constitute a biblically prohibited labor. What would be the halakha here, with regard to lowering the produce from the roof on a Festival to prevent its ruin in the rain? Is it prohibited also in this case to remove all of it and thereby expose the floor of the roof?

The Gemara specifies the possible arguments: Perhaps it is there, on Shabbat, that it is prohibited, because punishment for Shabbat desecration is severe, but on a Festival, which has a lighter punishment for desecration, it is acceptable. Or perhaps it can be argued to the contrary: There, in the case of the sacks on Shabbat, even though there is suspension of study in the study hall, i.e., the clearing out facilitates a mitzva, you say that they did not permit exposing the floor. Here, in the case of lowering produce on a Festival to prevent its ruin, where there is no suspension of study in the study hall, i.e., clearing out the produce does not facilitate any mitzva, is it not all the more so prohibited?

The Gemara poses a further question. And here we learned in the mishna: One may lower produce through a skylight on a Festival, and Rav Naḥman said: They taught this halakha only with regard to the same roof, i.e., only if the skylight is in the same roof where the produce is located, but to carry the produce from one roof to another roof in order to lower it through a skylight in the second roof is not permitted. This would involve too much exertion to be permitted on the Festival. And this ruling is also taught in a baraita: One may not carry from one roof to another roof, even when the two roofs are on the same level and there is no extra effort of lifting or lowering the produce while transporting it between the roofs.

The question arises: There, in the case of moving sacks on Shabbat for guests or for study, what is the halakha? May the sacks be moved from one roof or house to another for this purpose? Perhaps all the more so they may not be moved on Shabbat, because Shabbat is more severe than a Festival? Or perhaps it can be argued to the contrary: It is here, with regard to a Festival, that it is prohibited to transfer from one roof to another, because a Festival is regarded lightly by people and they might consequently come to belittle it; but on Shabbat, which is severe in people’s eyes and so they will not come to belittle it, it is acceptable to transfer even from one house to another.

Or perhaps it may be argued: If here, in the case of clearing produce from the roof, when there is the issue of the loss of the produce, you say he may not transfer from one roof to another, then there, in the case of moving sacks on Shabbat for guests or study, when there is no issue of loss of produce, is it not all the more so prohibited?

The Gemara presents yet another dilemma: Here, with regard to bringing produce into one’s house from the roof, we learned in a baraita: If there is no skylight from the roof to the house, necessitating another method of moving the produce out of the rain, he may not lower them by means of a rope through the windows, nor may he take them down by way of ladders. There, with regard to moving sacks on Shabbat, what is the halakha? May they be moved by ropes or using a ladder? Perhaps it is only here, in the case of moving produce out of the rain on a Festival, that it is prohibited, because produce left on a roof does not entail suspension of a mitzva such as study in the study hall; but on Shabbat, when there is the possibility that leaving the sacks in their current location will lead to suspension of study in the study hall, it is acceptable to remove them even via windows and ladders.

Or perhaps it can be argued to the contrary: Here, in the case of the produce on the roof, when there is the issue of the loss of the produce, you say it is not permitted. There, in the case of clearing out sacks on Shabbat, where there is no issue of the loss of produce, should it not all the more so be prohibited to lower them via windows and ladders? No resolution was found, so the dilemma shall stand unresolved.

§ It was taught in the mishna: And one may cover produce with cloths to prevent damage due to a leak. Ulla said: And even a row of bricks that might be ruined by the rain may be covered to prevent damage. Although the halakha in the mishna mentions produce, it is not limited to that case, but extends to any item liable to be spoiled. Rabbi Yitzḥak said: It applies only to an item like produce, which is fit for use on the Festival, but not to items such as bricks, which are designated for building and are not fit for use on the Festival. The Gemara comments: And Rabbi Yitzḥak follows his line of reasoning in this regard, as Rabbi Yitzḥak said: A vessel, even if it is of the type that may be handled on Shabbat, may be handled on Shabbat only if it is going to be used for something that may itself be handled on Shabbat, but not for the sake of set-aside [muktze] objects. Since the bricks are muktze, one may not handle cloths to cover the bricks.

The Gemara attempts to find a proof for this view: We learned in the mishna: One may cover produce with cloths, which seems to imply: Produce, yes, because it may be handled on the Festival, but muktze items such as a row of bricks, no. The Gemara rejects this argument: This is no proof, as it is possible that the same is true even for a row of bricks, i.e., that they may be covered. But since the tanna taught in the first clause of the mishna: One may lower produce, and there it is referring specifically to produce, as bricks may not be handled at all and surely not lowered from the roof, he taught also in the latter clause: One may cover produce. The example of produce was chosen to parallel the first clause in the mishna, not in order to imply exclusion of bricks.

The Gemara offers a different proof. We learned in the mishna: And similarly one may cover jugs of wine and jugs of oil due to a leak in the ceiling. This choice of examples seems to indicate that one may cover only things that are fit for use on the Festival, as opposed to objects such as bricks, which are muktze. The Gemara rejects this proof: With what are we dealing here? With jugs that contain wine and oil that are untithed, which are not fit for Festival use and are therefore muktze. And the same would be true for bricks.

The Gemara goes further: So, too, it is in fact more reasonable that this is the case, as if it enters your mind that the mishna is referring to jugs of wine and jugs of oil containing permitted liquids, didn’t the tanna already teach in the first clause of this part of the mishna that it is permitted to cover produce? What new information would be added by specifying jugs as well?

The Gemara rejects this assertion. It is possible that the mishna is referring specifically to jugs containing permitted liquids. Nevertheless, it was necessary for the tanna to add the example of jugs of wine and jugs of oil, as it could enter your mind to say that the Sages were concerned over a substantial loss, such as of produce, which can be ruined by drops of rain that leak on it. But with regard to a minor loss, such as drops of rain falling into a wine jug or an oil jug, they were not concerned, and they did not permit covering them. The mishna therefore teaches us that those may be covered as well.

The Gemara raises objections against Rabbi Yitzḥak’s view: We learned in the mishna: One may place a vessel beneath a leak on Shabbat. It is permitted, then, to bring a bucket for the purpose of containing the water leaking into the house, although that water is ostensibly not fit for drinking and is therefore muktze. The Gemara rejects this objection: The case in the mishna is of leakage of water that is in fact fit to be drunk, at least by animals, and is consequently fit for Festival use.

Come and hear another objection from a baraita: One may spread a mat over bricks on Shabbat to protect against rain. The baraita explicitly permits covering bricks, which Rabbi Yitzḥak prohibited. The Gemara rejects this argument: This baraita is referring to bricks that were left over from building and are no longer designated for use in building, and which are consequently fit for use on the Festival by sitting on them.

Come and hear another objection. It was taught in a baraita: One may spread a mat over stones on Shabbat, although stones are muktze. The Gemara responds: That baraita is speaking not of ordinary stones but of rounded [mekurzalot] stones, which are fit for use in personal hygiene in the lavatory on Shabbat, and are therefore not muktze.

Come and hear an objection from a different source. One may spread a mat over a beehive on Shabbat to protect it from the elements, in the sun due to the sun, and in the rain due to the rain, provided he does not have the intent to trap the bees inside by covering the hive, as trapping is prohibited on Shabbat. A beehive and its bees are not fit for Shabbat use, yet it is permitted to handle a mat in order to cover the hive. The Gemara rejects this: There, too, the reference is to an item that is fit for Shabbat use, as it is discussing a hive when there is honey in it, which can be eaten on Shabbat. It is therefore permitted to handle the mat for the sake of the honey.

Rav Ukva from Meishan said to Rav Ashi: This explanation works out well with regard to the summer, when there is honey, but in the rainy season, when there is no honey in beehives, what can be said? The baraita explicitly mentioned the two phrases in the sun and in the rain. The Gemara answers: This halakha is necessary only for those two honeycombs left in the beehive in the winter to sustain the bees. The Gemara questions this: Are those two honeycombs not muktze, as they have clearly been left for the sake of the bees, and not to be used by humans? The Gemara replies: With what case are we dealing here? This is a case when the beekeeper had in mind before the Festival that he was going to take them from the bees and eat them himself.

The Gemara raises an objection to this interpretation. But if he did not have in mind to take them for himself, what would be the halakha? Wouldn’t it be prohibited to spread a mat over the hive? If so, when the baraita goes on to specify that sometimes it is prohibited to cover the hive, rather than teaching: As long as he does not have the intent to trap the bees, introducing a totally new factor into the discussion, let it make a distinction within the case itself by saying: In what case is this statement said, that the beehive may be covered? When he had in mind beforehand to take the honeycombs; but if he did not have in mind to take them, it is prohibited.

The Gemara responds: This is what the tanna is saying: Even if he had in mind to take the honeycombs, so that there is no problem of the hive’s being muktze, it is still permitted to cover it provided he does not have intent to trap the bees.

The Gemara raises a further objection against this interpretation of the baraita. In what manner did you establish and explain this baraita? In accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who, in disagreement with Rabbi Shimon, holds that the halakhot of muktze apply. But now say the latter clause of the baraita: Provided he does not have the intent to trap. This indicates that even though the bees may be trapped in the process of covering, it is permitted if this was not his intention. If so, we have come to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who, in disagreement with Rabbi Yehuda, said: An unintentional act is permitted even though it leads inadvertently to a prohibited result. This interpretation of the baraita is internally conflicted, half in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda and half in accordance with Rabbi Shimon.

The Gemara rejects this argument. And how can you understand that the baraita follows the view of Rabbi Shimon at all? But didn’t Abaye and Rava both say: Rabbi Shimon concedes that even an unintentional act is prohibited in a case of: Cut off its head and will it not die? In this case the person covering the hive with a mat inevitably traps the bees, even if he does not have intent to do so, and this act should be prohibited even by Rabbi Shimon.

Rather, actually all of the baraita is in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda, and with what case are we dealing here? With a beehive that has windows, i.e., small openings, besides the main opening on top, so that some of the windows remain uncovered and covering the hive does not inevitably trap the bees. And in the baraita you should not say, according to Rabbi Yehuda: Provided he does not have intent to trap the bees, which would imply that the deciding factor is the intention of the one who covers them,

Traduction : The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren Noé Talmud, with commentary by Rabbi Adin Even-Israel Steinsaltz.

Beitza 36a examines whether clearing a storeroom floor while removing produce or sacks is permitted on Shabbat versus Festivals, and limits on moving items between rooftops.