Talmud - Beitza 21a ביצה כ״א א׳

the offering is accepted on condition that he burn the sacrificial parts that are brought upon the altar in the evening and not during the day. The wording of the baraita indicates that if the meat may not be eaten on that day, then only if he already sprinkled the blood, i.e., after the fact, yes, it is permitted; however, he may not sprinkle it ab initio. Granted, according to the opinion of Rava it works out well, but according to the opinion of Rabba bar Rav Huna, it is difficult. The Gemara comments: Indeed, it is difficult. And if you wish, say instead: A rabbinic decree concerning Shabbat is different from a rabbinic decree concerning a Festival, as the Sages were more stringent with regard to Shabbat than with regard to Festivals.

§ Rav Avya the Elder raised the following dilemma before Rav Huna: If an animal is owned in partnership, half of it belonging to a gentile and half of it to a Jew, what is the halakha with regard to slaughtering it on a Festival? Rav Huna said to him: It is permitted. Rav Avya said to him: And what is the difference between this case and that of vow-offerings and gift-offerings? Vow-offerings and gift-offerings are similar to jointly owned animals, as part of the animal is sacrificed upon the altar while the other part is eaten by the owner and the priest. Why, then, is it not similarly permitted to slaughter them on a Festival? Seeking to distract Rav Avya so that he need not answer his question, Rav Huna said to him: Look, a raven flies in the sky.

When Rav Avya left, Rabba, son of Rav Huna, said to his father: Was this not Rav Avya the Elder, whom Master would recommend to us, saying that he is a great man? If so, why did you treat him in that manner and evade his question? Rav Huna said to him: What should I have done for him? Today I am in a state best described by the verse: “Let me lean against the stout trunks; let me couch among the apple trees” (Song of Songs 2:5), meaning I am worn out and exhausted from all the communal responsibility that has fallen upon me, and he asked me about something that requires reasoning and careful examination, and therefore I could not provide an immediate answer.

The Gemara asks: And what, then, is the reason? The Gemara explains the difference between a jointly owned animal and a vow-offering or gift-offering: A jointly owned animal, half of which belongs to a gentile and half to a Jew, may be slaughtered on a Festival, as it is impossible to obtain an olive-bulk of meat without slaughtering. If a Jew wishes to eat even a small portion of meat, he has no alternative but to slaughter an entire animal, even though he will not use all of it. Therefore, it does not matter if part of the animal belongs to a gentile. However, it is prohibited to slaughter vow-offerings and gift-offerings on a Festival, because in this case there is no real joint ownership of the animal, as the priests, when they receive their portions of the meat of the offering, and similarly, when Israelites partake of the offering, they receive their portions from the table of the Most High. In other words, the entire offering belongs to God, and those who partake of it are considered guests at His table; and as stated above, one may not slaughter an animal on a Festival for the sake of God.

In continuation of the previous discussion, Rav Ḥisda said: A jointly owned animal, half of which belongs to a gentile and half to a Jew, may be slaughtered on a Festival because it is impossible to obtain an olive-bulk of meat without slaughtering. However, with regard to dough, half of which belongs to a gentile and half to a Jew, it is prohibited to bake it on a Festival, as it is possible for him to divide it in half during the kneading and bake only the part that belongs to the Jew.

Rav Ḥana bar Ḥanilai raised an objection from the following mishna: Dough for bread that is meant for dogs, when it is of such quality that even shepherds eat of it, is considered like regular bread. Accordingly, one is obligated to separate ḥalla from such dough, and one may use it to establish an eiruv, i.e., a joining of courtyards and a joining of Shabbat boundaries, and to establish a merging of alleyways, and one recites a blessing before and after eating it, and one invites those with whom he ate to recite Grace after Meals after eating it, and it may be baked on a Festival, like all foods fit for human consumption, and a person fulfills his obligation to eat matza on the first night of Passover with it if it has not leavened.

With regard to the allowance to bake this dough, the Gemara asks: And why may it be baked on a Festival? Isn’t it possible to divide it during the kneading, so that he bakes only the portion to be eaten by people and leaves aside the part given to dogs? The Gemara answers: Dough for bread meant for dogs is different, since it is possible to appease them with a carcass. It is possible that one of his animals will die, and he will feed the carcass to the dogs, in which case all of the dough will be eaten by people.

The Gemara challenges this explanation: Does Rav Ḥisda accept the principle of since, i.e., that since it is possible that the situation may change, the halakha is not determined based on the current circumstances? But wasn’t it stated that the amora’im disagreed about the halakha governing one who intentionally bakes on a Festival day for a weekday? Rav Ḥisda said: He is flogged for desecrating the Festival. Rabba said: He is not flogged.

The Gemara explains the two opinions: Rav Ḥisda said that he is flogged because he holds that we do not say that since, if guests happen to visit him, whatever he bakes will be fit for him on the Festival itself, now too, although guests have not yet arrived, it is considered fit for him. According to that logic, baking would not be considered a full-fledged transgression, and one cannot be forewarned about it and does not receive lashes. Rabba, however, said: He is not flogged, as he holds that we do say the principle of: Since. As Rav Ḥisda himself does not accept the principle of since, how can it be used to resolve a difficulty raised against him?

Rather, the Gemara retracts its previous answer: Do not say that dough for dogs is different, since it is possible that one of his animals will die and he will appease the dogs with the carcass. Rather, the reference here is to a case where he has a carcass ready, so that it is certainly possible to appease them with the carcass. Consequently, when the shepherds bake the dough, it is highly likely that they will consume it all themselves.

§ They raised a dilemma before Rav Huna: With regard to the Jewish residents of a village [baga] upon whom the authorities imposed the obligation to supply flour and bread to the gentile military troops serving in the area, what is the halakha with regard to baking it on a Festival? Rav Huna said to them: We examine the matter: If those villagers can give bread from the soldiers’ quota to a child and the soldiers are not particular about it, then each and every one of the loaves is fit for a Jewish child, and therefore it is permitted to bake them. But if the soldiers do not allow anyone else to partake of their bread, it is prohibited to bake the loaves for them on a Festival.

The Gemara challenges Rav Huna’s lenient ruling: But isn’t it taught in a baraita: There was an incident involving Shimon the Timnite, who did not come on the night of the Festival to the study hall. In the morning, Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava found him and said to him: Why did you not come last night to the study hall? He said to him: A military unit on a search mission [balleshet] came to our city and wanted to pillage the entire city. We slaughtered a calf in order to placate them, and we fed them with it and had them depart in peace.

Rav Yehuda ben Bava said to him: I wonder if your gain, that which you saved by preventing the soldiers from taking your possessions, was not outweighed by your loss, the punishment for your desecration of the Festival. As the Torah states: “Only that which every soul must eat, that alone may be done for you” (Exodus 12:16), which indicates that food may be prepared for you, but not for gentiles. The Gemara asks: But why did Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava say this? Wasn’t some portion of the calf fit to be eaten by them? The conclusion seems to be that even if a Jew may eat from an animal, it may not be slaughtered on a Festival for the sake of a gentile.

Rav Yosef said: In that case it was a calf with a condition that would cause it to die within twelve months [tereifa], which may not be eaten by Jews. The Gemara challenges: But wasn’t it still fit to be eaten by dogs, and it could be argued that it was slaughtered for the sake of dogs belonging to Jews?

The Gemara answers: The question of whether or not one may perform prohibited labor on a Festival for the sake of dogs is a dispute between tanna’im. As it is taught in a baraita: It is written: “Only that which every soul must eat, that alone may be done for you.” By inference, from that which is stated: “Every soul,” I might derive that even the soul of an animal is included, similar to that which is stated: “And he that kills the soul of an animal shall pay it” (Leviticus 24:18), indicating that the life force of an animal is also called a soul. Therefore, the verse states and emphasizes: “For you,”

Traduction : The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren Noé Talmud, with commentary by Rabbi Adin Even-Israel Steinsaltz.

Beitza 21a explores sacrificial timing rules on Festivals and debates whether a jointly owned animal, part Jewish and part gentile, may be slaughtered.