Talmud - Temurah 7b תמורה ז׳ ב׳

A vow offering differs from a gift offering in that if it dies prematurely, one is liable to replace the former but not the latter. The verse states: “Either a bull or a lamb that has anything too long or too short, you may offer it for a gift, and for a vow it shall not be accepted” (Leviticus 22:23). The phrase “You may offer it for a gift” is referring to a blemished animal consecrated for Temple maintenance. And I have derived only that one may consecrate it in the manner of a gift; from where is it derived that one may consecrate it in the manner of a vow as well? The verse states: “You may offer it for a gift and for a vow.”

One might have thought that one can consecrate blemished animals even as offerings to be sacrificed on the altar. Therefore, the verse states: “And for a vow it shall not be accepted.” This is referring to offerings sacrificed on the altar, for which acceptance is a relevant term. And I have derived only that one may not consecrate such an animal as a vow offering. From where is it derived that one may not do so as a gift offering? The verse states: “A gift…and for a vow it shall not be accepted.” Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: In employing the phrase “It shall not be accepted,” the verse is speaking of consecration that depends upon the acceptance of the animal’s body, i.e., consecration as an offering. Nevertheless, they may be consecrated for Temple maintenance.

The Gemara asks: The opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi is identical to the opinion of the first tanna. What is their dispute? The Gemara suggests: What, is it not that they disagree with regard to this, that the first tanna holds that even if one consecrates it to be sold and its money is used for purchasing libations, he is flogged as well; and Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds that in a case where there is acceptance of the animal’s body, the one who consecrated it is indeed flogged, but if one consecrates it to be sold and its money is used for purchasing libations, he is not flogged. Learn from the baraita that the first tanna holds that consecration toward libations is equivalent to consecration as an offering, as Rava suggested above.

§ The Gemara analyzes the wording of Leviticus 22:23: But why do I need the word “it,” in the phrase: “You may offer it”? What does this serve to exclude? It is required for that which is taught in a baraita: When the verse states: “You may offer it for a gift,” this teaches that you may offer this blemished animal as a gift for Temple maintenance, but you may not offer an unblemished animal as a gift for Temple maintenance. From here the Sages said: One who consecrates unblemished animals for Temple maintenance transgresses a positive mitzva.

And from where is it derived that he has transgressed a prohibition as well? As it is stated at the beginning of that passage: “And the Lord spoke to Moses, saying [lemor]” (Leviticus 22:1). This teaches that every mitzva stated in the passage is considered a prohibition. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda.

The Gemara relates that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said to bar Kappara: From where may it be inferred that every mitzva stated in the passage is considered a prohibition? Bar Kappara said to him that this is as it is written: As the verse states: “Lemor,” the term can be read as though it states: No [lo], an expression of prohibition, is stated [ne’emar] with regard to the subsequent matters. In the school of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi they say: The term should be understood to mean that God said to Moses: No [lo] shall you say [emor] to them these matters.

§ A baraita above (6b) stated that one who sacrifices a blemished animal on the altar transgresses the prohibition “You may not burn all of it,” and if he sacrificed part of it, he transgresses the prohibition “You may not burn part of it.” With regard to this it was stated: In the case of one who brings up the limbs of blemished animals onto the altar, Rava says that he violates both the prohibition of “You may not burn all of it;” and the prohibition of “You may not burn part of it,” and he receives two sets of lashes. Abaye says: One is not flogged twice for violating a general prohibition. Since one verse serves as the source for both prohibitions, one is not flogged twice for its violation.

The Gemara raises an objection from the Tosefta (1:10): One who consecrates blemished animals for sacrifice on the altar violates five separate categories of prohibition. The aforementioned baraita enumerated these and included both the prohibition “You may not burn all of it” and the prohibition “You may not burn part of it,” indicating that one is flogged for transgressing each of these prohibitions. This is apparently a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Abaye.

Abaye said: The baraita is teaching the halakha with regard to different men, one of whom burned an entire animal on the altar, and one of whom burned only part of it. One person cannot be liable for both prohibitions. The Gemara challenges: If it is teaching the halakha of different men, why does it say: Violates, in the third person singular? It should have stated: Violate, in the plural. Rather, it is obvious that the baraita is referring to one man, and this is apparently a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Abaye.

Abaye said: From the list of five prohibitions, remove that of burning part of the offering, and insert the collection of the blood, which means that there is only one prohibition for burning the offering, and the number of prohibitions still remains at five. The Gemara raises a difficulty: With regard to the collection of the blood, Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, is of the opinion that one transgresses that prohibition, but the first tanna is not of that opinion. How, then, can Abaye contradict the first tanna? The Gemara concludes: It is difficult.

The Gemara presents an alternative version of the previous point: But from the fact that the latter clause of the baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, it may be inferred that the first clause is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis. The Gemara concludes: The refutation of the opinion of Abaye is indeed a conclusive refutation.

MISHNA: The priests substitute for their own offerings and Israelites substitute for their own offerings. The priests substitute neither for a sin offering, nor for a guilt offering, nor for a firstborn offering that they received from an Israelite, as those animals are not their property, and one does not substitute an animal that is not his. Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri said: For what reason can priests not substitute for a firstborn offering that they received from an Israelite? Does it not belong to them? Rabbi Akiva said to him: A sin offering and a guilt offering are a gift to the priest, and the firstborn offering is likewise a gift to the priest. Just as in the cases of a sin offering and a guilt offering, priests that receive one of them from an Israelite cannot substitute for it, so too with regard to a firstborn offering, priests that receive it from an Israelite cannot substitute for it.

Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri said: What is this comparison for him? If a priest does not substitute for a sin offering and a guilt offering, which priests do not acquire during the animals’ lifetimes, will you say the same with regard to a firstborn, which priests do acquire during the animal’s lifetime? Rabbi Akiva said to him: But isn’t it already stated: “Then both it and its substitute shall be sacred” (Leviticus 27:10), which juxtaposes the consecration of the consecrated animal with that of its non-sacred substitute? Where is the consecrated animal imbued with sanctity? It is in the house of the owner. So too, the substitute animal is consecrated in the house of the owner. Therefore, the priest cannot substitute for the firstborn that he received because he is not the owner that initially consecrated it.

GEMARA: We learned in a mishna elsewhere (Ma’aser Sheni 1:2): With regard to a firstborn offering, one may sell it if it is unblemished only while it is still alive, as after it is slaughtered outside the Temple one may not derive benefit from it, and if it was offered in the Temple, one may not sell sacrificial meat. And if it is blemished, one may sell it while it is alive or after it has been slaughtered. And a priest can betroth a woman with it, as it is his property. Rav Naḥman says that Rabba bar Avuh says: They taught this halakha only with regard to the present, when there is no Temple, since the priest has the ability to acquire the firstborn offering. But when the Temple is standing, since the unblemished firstborn animal stands for sacrifice, one may not sell it unblemished while it is alive.

Rava raised an objection to Rav Naḥman: The mishna teaches that one may sell an unblemished firstborn offering while it is alive. One can infer that while it is alive, yes, one may sell it, but once it has been slaughtered, one may not sell it. When is this the halakha? If we say that this mishna is speaking in the present, is there an unblemished, slaughtered, firstborn offering? Offerings are not slaughtered in the present day. Rather, it is obvious that the mishna is speaking of the time when the Temple is standing. And yet, the mishna still teaches that one may sell an unblemished firstborn offering while it is alive, which contradicts the statement of Rav Naḥman.

Rav Naḥman responds: No; actually the mishna is referring to the halakha in the present. I disagree with the above inference. Does the mishna explicitly teach: One may sell an unblemished firstborn offering while it is alive, yes, but once it has been slaughtered, no? The mishna does not mean to rule out selling a slaughtered animal; rather, it is coming to teach us the matter itself, that even in the present, one may sell it unblemished while it is alive.

Traduction : The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren Noé Talmud, with commentary by Rabbi Adin Even-Israel Steinsaltz.

Temura 7b explores how blemished animals may be consecrated for Temple upkeep versus sacrificial offerings, contrasting vow and gift dedications.