Talmud - Temurah 10b תמורה י׳ ב׳

the fetus itself. But here, where he consecrated its pregnant mother, not the fetus itself, one might think that this fetus is not consecrated along with its mother.

And if Rabbi Yoḥanan had taught us only this last case, of one who consecrates a pregnant animal, I might have said that it is only there that its fetus is sacred, as he consecrated the animal and all that is inside it, including the fetus. But here, where he consecrated the fetus itself, since the object of the consecration is not outside its mother, as it has yet to be born, one might say that it is not consecrated. Therefore, it was necessary for Rabbi Yoḥanan to state both halakhot.

§ The Gemara cites another version of the discussion: What is Rabbi Yoḥanan teaching us when he says above that one may atone with either the mother or the offspring? He is evidently saying that if he explicitly excluded the fetus from his consecration, it is excluded, and only the mother is consecrated. And the reason is that a fetus is not considered the thigh of its mother but a separate entity that can possess a different status. But if so, why do I need two halakhot to teach me this, both with regard to one who consecrates a pregnant animal and with regard to one who consecrates the fetus alone?

The Gemara answers: Both halakhot are necessary, as, if it was stated only with regard to that case of one who consecrates a pregnant animal, I would say that the fetus is consecrated because its mother is fit to be consecrated itself, and since sanctity applies to her, it likewise applies to the offspring. But in the other case of one who consecrates a fetus alone, perhaps it is not consecrated. Therefore, Rabbi Yoḥanan teaches us this case as well.

And if it was stated only with regard to this case of one who consecrates a fetus, one might say that the fetus is sanctified because he expressly states that sanctity should apply to the offspring. But with regard to that case of one who consecrates a pregnant animal, where he does not explicitly mention the fetus, perhaps is it not consecrated. Therefore, both statements are necessary.

§ Rabbi Zeira sat and stated this halakha of the dispute between bar Padda and Rabbi Yoḥanan with regard to the consecration of fetuses. Rabbi Yirmeya raised an objection to Rabbi Zeira from a mishna (24b): How may one employ artifice to circumvent the obligation to give the firstborn to the priest and use the animal instead to fulfill a different obligation? He may approach an animal that is going to give birth to its firstborn but which is still pregnant, and say: That which is in the womb of this animal, if it is male, is designated as a burnt offering. If he did so, and the animal gave birth to a male, it will be sacrificed as a burnt offering, and it is not consecrated as a firstborn. Evidently, a fetus can be consecrated, contrary to the opinion of bar Padda.

Rabbi Zeira said to Rabbi Yirmeya: Bar Padda can answer that when that mishna is taught, it is referring to one who consecrates the fetus for sanctity that inheres in its value, i.e., that the offspring should be sold and a burnt offering brought with the proceeds. This form of sanctity does apply to a fetus, but inherent sanctity rendering it obligated to be sacrificed itself does not. Rabbi Yirmeya again asked Rabbi Zeira: Is sanctity that inheres in the animal’s value so strong that it removes the firstborn status from an animal?

Rabbi Zeira said to him: Yes, and so we learned in a mishna in tractate Bekhorot (14a): All sacrificial animals in which a permanent blemish preceded their consecration assume not inherent sanctity but sanctity of value, and once they are redeemed they are obligated, i.e., subject to, accounting their offspring a firstborn, and one is obligated to give the gifts of the foreleg, the jaw, and the maw to a priest as for any non-sacred slaughtered animal. One can infer from the mishna that the reason that these animals are obligated is that they have already been redeemed. But before they are redeemed, they are exempt from the obligation of the firstborn and the gifts, despite the fact that only their value is sacred. Evidently, sanctity that inheres in the animal’s value is strong enough to remove firstborn status from an animal.

Rabbi Yirmeya raised another objection to bar Padda’s opinion from a baraita: If one says: That which is in the womb of this animal is a burnt offering, it is permitted for the mother to be shorn but it is prohibited to use it for labor, due to the inevitable weakening and consequent reduction in value of the fetus that is inside it. This indicates that fetuses are imbued with sanctity, contrary to the opinion of bar Padda. Rabbi Zeira said to Rabbi Yirmeya: This baraita is also referring to one who consecrates the fetus for sanctity that inheres in its value, and bar Padda concedes that this sanctity applies to the fetus.

Rabbi Yirmeya objected: But is sanctity that inheres in the animal’s value so strong that it renders the mother prohibited for labor? Rabbi Zeira said to Rabbi Yirmeya: Yes, and so we learned in the mishna cited previously, that blemished animals that were consecrated for their value and redeemed emerge from their sacred status and assume complete non-sacred status and may be shorn and used for labor. Apparently, the reason they may be used for labor is that they were redeemed. One may infer that before they are redeemed, they are prohibited for labor. Evidently, sanctity that inheres in the animal’s value renders the mother of the fetus prohibited for labor.

Rabbi Yirmeya raised another objection to bar Padda’s opinion from the mishna: One does not substitute non-sacred limbs for consecrated fetuses, and likewise one does not substitute non-sacred fetuses for consecrated limbs, or non-sacred limbs or fetuses for whole consecrated animals, or non-sacred whole animals for consecrated limbs or fetuses. One may infer from the mishna that it is a substitution of fetuses that one cannot effect, as the Torah states with regard to substitution: “And if he substitutes an animal for an animal” (Leviticus 27:10), and a fetus is not classified as an animal. But if one consecrates fetuses directly, not in the manner of substitution, they are consecrated, contrary to the opinion of bar Padda.

Rabbi Zeira said to him: The mishna is referring to the offspring of sacrificial animals that became pregnant after they were consecrated. That case is different, as they are already consecrated through their mothers. It does not indicate that one can consecrate a fetus directly.

Rabbi Yirmeya objected: If the mishna is referring to the offspring of sacrificial animals, and it is teaching that one does not substitute them because fetuses are not considered animals, one can infer that it is only when they are in their mother’s womb that one cannot effect substitution with them. But once they are outside their mother’s womb, i.e., once they are born, one can effect substitution with them. But this is not the case, as isn’t it taught in the next mishna (12a) that the offspring born of a consecrated animal that was not itself consecrated does not render a non-sacred animal exchanged for it a substitute?

Rabbi Zeira answered: In accordance with whose opinion is this first mishna? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who disagreed with that ruling in the next mishna and said that the offspring renders a non-sacred animal exchanged for it a substitute.

Rabbi Yirmeya objected: If this mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, one encounters another difficulty. The mishna indicates that it is substitution that one cannot perform with consecrated limbs, as the sanctity of substitution does not extend to the entire animal. Consequently, if one consecrates limbs directly, they are consecrated and the sanctity extends to the whole animal. But doesn’t Rabbi Yehuda say that limbs are not consecrated in this manner, that the sanctity extends to the whole animal? Rabbi Zeira said him: What are we dealing with here? With a limb upon which the animal’s life depends. Rabbi Yehuda’s ruling that limbs cannot be consecrated applies only to non-vital organs, e.g., legs. He concedes that vital organs are consecrated and the consecration extends to the entire animal.

Rabbi Yirmeya raised another objection to bar Padda’s opinion: A later mishna (16b) lists stringencies that apply to sacrificial animals but not to substitutes: One consecrates an animal’s limbs and fetuses in utero, but one does not substitute non-sacred animals for them. This contradicts bar Padda’s opinion that one cannot consecrate fetuses. Rabbi Zeira answered: Here too, the mishna is referring to the offspring of sacrificial animals that became pregnant after they were consecrated.

Rabbi Yirmeya objected: If the mishna is referring to the offspring of sacrificial animals, what is the meaning of the term: One consecrates? After all, these offspring are already consecrated through their mothers.

Traduction : The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren Noé Talmud, with commentary by Rabbi Adin Even-Israel Steinsaltz.

Temura 10b explores whether consecrating a pregnant animal or its fetus alone extends sanctity to the unborn offspring in both scenarios.