Talmud - Temurah 6a תמורה ו׳ א׳

“Either a bull or a lamb that has anything too long or too short, that may you offer for a gift; but for a vow it shall not be accepted” (Leviticus 22:23). This verse teaches that only blemished animals may be consecrated for Temple maintenance. And we learned in a baraita: With regard to one who consecrates unblemished animals for Temple maintenance, even though he has transgressed a prohibition, what he did is done. This is apparently a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Rava.

The Gemara explains that Rava could say to you: From the same place that it was derived earlier that blemished animals are included, i.e., that their consecration for sacrifice on the altar is effective after the fact, it is likewise derived that unblemished animals are included, that their consecration for Temple maintenance is effective. But in general, transgressions are not effective.

The Gemara objects: But there is the case of robbery, with regard to which the Merciful One states: “You shall not oppress you neighbor, and you shall not rob him” (Leviticus 19:13), and we learned in a mishna (Bava Kamma 93b): One who robs another of wood and fashions it into vessels, or one who robs another of wool and fashions it into garments, pays the victim according to the value of the goods at the time of the robbery, but he need not return the vessels or garments, since by changing the stolen items he acquired them. If he can acquire the stolen item, this is apparently a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Rava.

The Gemara explains that Rava could say to you: It is different there, as the verse states: “He shall restore the stolen item that he took by robbery” (Leviticus 5:23). This teaches that he must return the original item only if it is still like that which he took by robbery and has not been altered. But in general, transgressions are not effective.

And according to the opinion of Abaye, this phrase: “That he took by robbery,” is necessary to teach that one who takes a false oath denying he robbed another, who must then pay an additional fifth of the value of the stolen item when he returns it, need add a fifth only for denying his own act of robbery, but for denying his deceased father’s act of robbery when sued by the victim as the robber’s heir, he need not add an additional fifth.

The Gemara objects: But there is the case of collateral, with regard to which the Merciful One states: “When you lend your neighbor any manner of loan, you shall not go into his house to fetch his pledge” (Deuteronomy 24:10), teaching that a creditor may not seize collateral if the debtor delays payment. And we learned in a mishna (Bava Metzia 113a): If the creditor nevertheless seized two items as collateral, he returns a mattress by night, as the debtor requires it for sleeping, and a plow, which is needed for his daytime work, by day. The creditor may keep possession of seized collateral when it is not being used, which is apparently a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Rava.

The Gemara explains that Rava could say to you: It is different there, as the verse states: “And if he be a poor man, you shall not sleep with his pledge; you shall restore [hashev tashiv] to him the pledge” (Deuteronomy 24:12–13). The repetition of the verb teaches that the creditor must return the collateral many times, e.g., he must return a plow each morning and take it back each night, and return a mattress each night and take it back each morning, but he does not have to return the collateral permanently. But in general, transgressions are not effective.

The Gemara notes: And according to the opinion of Abaye, that transgressions are generally effective, the repetition of the verb may be explained as follows: If the Merciful One had not stated: “Hashev tashiv,” I would say that a creditor who seizes collateral from the home of the debtor has performed a prohibition, but having done so, if he desires, he may return the collateral, and if he desires, he may not return it. The verse therefore teaches us that he must return the items the debtor needs.

The Gemara objects: But there is the case of produce in the corner of the field, which is given to the poor [pe’a], with regard to which the Merciful One stated: And when you reap the harvest of your land, you shall not wholly reap the corner of your field” (Leviticus 23:22), but one must leave a corner of the field for the poor. And we learned in a baraita (Tosefta, Pe’a 1:5): The optimal way to fulfill the mitzva of pe’a is for the owner to separate it from the standing grain, i.e., grain that has not been harvested. If he did not separate it from the standing grain, he separates it from the sheaves of grain that have already been harvested. If he did not separate it from the sheaves, he separates it from the pile of grain, as long as he has not yet smoothed the pile.

The baraita continues: Once he smooths the pile of grain, it becomes obligated in tithes. Therefore, he must first tithe the grain and then give a portion of the produce to the poor as pe’a, so that the poor need not tithe what they receive. Additionally, the Sages said in the name of Rabbi Yishmael: If he did not separate pe’a during any of these stages, and he milled the grain and kneaded it into dough, he separates pe’a even from the dough and gives it to the poor. Even if the owner harvested the grain, the pe’a is still not considered his, which is apparently a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Abaye.

The Gemara explains that Abaye could say to you: It is different there, as the verse states: “You shall leave them for the poor and for the stranger” (Leviticus 19:10), and subsequently, it again states: “You shall leave them for the poor and for the stranger” (Leviticus 23:22). The superfluous phrase teaches that the owner must give pe’a in any event, even if he harvests the grain and kneads it into dough. But in general, transgressions are effective.

And Rava, who maintains that in general transgressions are not effective, could say to you that the extra verse teaches that there is another type of leaving over one’s grain that is like this. And what is that? It is the case of one who renounces ownership of his vineyard.

As it is taught in a baraita: If one renounced ownership of his vineyard, thereby exempting it from tithes and gifts to the poor, and he rose early in the morning, retook possession of it, and harvested it, he is still obligated in the mitzva of individual fallen grapes left for the poor [peret], and in the mitzva of incompletely formed clusters of grapes left for the poor [olelot], and in the mitzva of forgotten clusters of grapes left for the poor, and in the mitzva of pe’a, but he remains exempt from the mitzva to tithe his produce. His obligation to give the gifts to the poor even though the vineyard was at some point ownerless is derived from the repeated phrase: “You shall leave them for the poor.”

§ Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, said to Rav Ashi: And now that we have given all of these answers, explaining that Abaye and Rava concede to one another in all the above cases, with regard to what cases do Abaye and Rava disagree?

Rav Ashi answered: They disagree with regard to fixed [ketzutza] interest, and their dispute is like that of Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Yoḥanan. As Rabbi Elazar said: If a debtor paid fixed interest and petitions the court to have it returned to him, since the Torah prohibits the charging of interest, it is repossessed from the creditor by the judges of the court.

Traduction : The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren Noé Talmud, with commentary by Rabbi Adin Even-Israel Steinsaltz.

Temura 6a examines whether consecrating unblemished animals for Temple upkeep is valid despite the prohibition, comparing this to robbery cases involving altered stolen goods.